United States v. Johns-Manville, 1817.

Decision Date03 January 1941
Docket NumberNo. 1817.,1817.
Citation67 F. Supp. 291
PartiesUNITED STATES v. JOHNS-MANVILLE et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

J. Albert Woll, U. S. Atty., of Chicago, Ill., Leo F. Tierney and Samuel S. Isseks, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and Kurt Borchardt and Marcus A. Hollabaugh, Sp. Attys., both of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Lee J. Gary, Scott, MacLeish & Falk, Joseph B. Fleming (of Kirkland, Felming, Green, Martin & Ellis), Marshall & Marshall, and Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Raymond, all of Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

HOLLY, District Judge.

This is an action brought by the Government charging that the various defendants, Johns-Manville Corporation, Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, Eagle Picher Lead Company, General Insulating and Manufacturing Company, United States Gypsum Company, the Barrett Company and Slayter and Company, have engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, and Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730. In its complaint the Government prays that the agreements, understandings and practices set out in the complaint be adjudged and decreed to be in violation of the Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton Act and that the observance of such agreements and the execution of similar agreements be perpetually enjoined.

The various defendants have filed motions in which they ask that the complaint be dismissed, or in the alternative (a) that the plaintiff be required to furnish the defendants a bill of particulars or (b) that certain paragraphs of the complaint be stricken as redundant, immaterial and impertinent (c) that plaintiff file an amended complaint stating separately its claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts respectively.

As to the motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars, all of the defendants complain that the plaintiff has not set out facts showing a combination of the restraint of trade on the part of defendants but the allegations consist merely of the conclusions of the pleader. Paragraph 6 on page 14 of the original brief of defendant, Johns-Manville Corporation and others is typical. The paragraph is as follows:

"In Paragraph 63 there is found an allegation that after the execution of said licenses agreements, this defendant and others met repeatedly with Slayter, `for the purpose of formulating policies with respect to' establishing prices and considering different licenses to manufacturers * * *. Where and when were these meetings, who was present, and, above all, what happened? To say that the purpose was to formulate policy is undeniably a conclusion of the pleader unless the facts are shown what the purpose was and the defendant is totally unable to formulate a responsive pleading unless some supporting facts are alleged."

In another part of the same brief it is objected that in paragraph 43 of the complaint the allegations that an "understanding" was had concerning the price stabilization states only the conclusion of the pleader. These items are given as illustrative of the whole argument of all the defendants on this subject.

It is true that it has been said many times by courts that pleadings should contain statements of fact and not the conclusions of the pleader. It has also been said that the pleader should set forth ultimate facts and not evidence, but where the line may be drawn between an "ultimate" fact and a "conclusion of the pleader" is something the courts have never been able to say. The object of the pleading is to give the opposite party notice of the claim that will be made against him or the defense that will be interposed. Rule 8(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, provides that the complaint shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Forms are annexed to the Rules, among them forms of complaint that are undoubtedly intended to illustrate...

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6 cases
  • People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1982
    ...in the complaint. In denying a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars the district court in United States v. Johns-Manville (N.D.Ill.1941), 67 F.Supp. 291, 293, "(I)t must be remembered that the existence of a combination to restrain trade such as charged here can seldom b......
  • Baker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • January 12, 2005
    ...ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp., 91 Ill.2d 138, 147, 61 Ill.Dec. 766, 435 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1982), quoting United States v. Johns-Manville, 67 F.Supp. 291, 293 (N.D.Ill.1941). Therefore, antitrust conspiracies often have to be proven from inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. P......
  • United States v. Cattaraugus County
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • June 4, 1946
    ...Corp., D.C., 28 F. Supp. 103; Tahir Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 4 Cir., 116 F.2d 865; French v. French Paper Co.,1; United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 67 F.Supp. 291; Vide also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8, Edmunds Vol. 1, p. 261 et seq. and pp. 60-62, 1941 Sup. It was not n......
  • Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, NJ v. Show
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Montana
    • January 29, 1953
    ...be made, or defense interposed, and to prevent surprise. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., D.C., 1941, 38 F.Supp. 643; U. S. v. Johns-Manville, 1941, 67 F.Supp. 291; U. S. v. Demmon, D.C., 73 F.Supp. However, the court has considered the objections of plaintiffs' counsel to the proof wit......
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