United States v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 31 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 23759.,23759. |
| Citation | 415 F.2d 1130 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Peter Heintz (argued), Sacramento, Cal., for appellant.
William B. Shubb (argued), Special Asst. U. S. Atty., Cecil F. Poole, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before MERRILL and ELY, Circuit Judges, and KILKENNY District Judge.*
This appeal is from an order revoking probation. In 1966 Johnson pleaded guilty to the offense of dispensing narcotic drugs in an unstamped package (26 U.S.C. § 4704(a)) and was awarded probation by the same district judge who made the order in question. In 1967 Johnson entered a plea of guilty to second degree burglary in a California state court. This came to the attention of the district judge, who then advised Johnson that he was placed on "final warning" status. In 1968 Johnson pleaded guilty to traffic violations arising out of an automobile collision. After a series of evidentiary hearings, the District Court, on Nov. 26, 1968, made the order which is now challenged.
Johnson's counsel argues, quite forcefully, that the District Court, having "forgiven" Johnson for the state burglary offense, revoked the probation upon the basis of minor traffic violations alone and thus so grossly abused its discretion that we should intervene. We cannot accept the argument. In the first place, we do not interpret the "warning" letter as such total forgiveness of the California crime that the district judge, after having written the letter, was thereafter required to eliminate the offense from his consideration for all future time. Secondly, although the subsequent state law traffic violations, if viewed in isolation, were relatively minor, it is obvious that the District Court considered them to be the "straw that broke the camel's back." Probation was originally granted as a matter of grace, and we cannot hold that the court which extended the favor was, in the circumstances, disempowered to revoke it.
Affirmed.
* Hon. John F. Kilkenny, United States District Judge, District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
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U.S. v. Hamilton, 81-1430X
...a revocation proceeding. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2599, 33 L.Ed.2d 484; United States v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir.1969). We also do not suggest that revocation proceedings should be an automatic reaction to technical or minor violations sim......
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U.S. v. Shampang, 92-30047
...102 S.Ct. 1029, 71 L.Ed.2d 313 (1982); 3 LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.4, at 158 (1984); see also United States v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir.1969) (holding that warning letter was not "such total forgiveness" of the probation violation as to bar the district court f......
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United States v. Carrion, 71-2607.
...conviction was final and there was ample evidence that Carrion had violated the terms of his probation. See, e. g. United States v. Johnson, 9 Cir., 1969, 415 F.2d 1130. Second, though Carrion's federal conviction was pending on appeal, the judge was warranted in viewing that conviction as ......
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United States v. Taylor, 26799.
...or revoking of a period of probation are actions that especially rest within the discretion of the District Court. United States v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1969); Whitfield v. United States, 401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026, 89 S.Ct. 630, 21 L. Ed.2d 570 (1......