United States v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 04 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14–1048.,14–1048.
• Citation: 773 F.3d 905
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Brion Dodd JOHNSON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

773 F.3d 905

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
Brion Dodd JOHNSON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 14–1048.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 10, 2014.
Filed: Dec. 4, 2014.

[773 F.3d 907]

Mark C. Meyer, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant–Appellant.

Teresa Baumann, AUSA, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Brion Dodd Johnson appeals the GPS-monitoring condition of his supervised release. We conclude the district court ¹ did not abuse its discretion by imposing this condition, and we therefore affirm.

Johnson pleaded guilty to possession and attempted possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court sentenced him to 97 months' imprisonment followed by fifteen years of supervised release. The court revoked Johnson's supervised release after he committed twenty-one violations of his release conditions, including failure to comply with sex-offender treatment, unauthorized possession of a computer, possession of pornography, and use of illegal drugs. Finding that Johnson committed these violations, the court sentenced him to a second, eleven-month term of imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release.

The district court revoked Johnson's second term of supervised release after he committed another fourteen violations, including associating with someone involved in criminal activity, failing to answer his parole officer truthfully, possessing drug paraphernalia, possessing pornography, and using photographic equipment to produce pornography. The court then sentenced Johnson to eleven months' imprisonment followed by a third, eight-year term of supervised release. In addition to the standard supervised-release conditions, the district court required that Johnson be subject to electronic monitoring via a global-positioning satellite system (“GPS monitoring”) and that Johnson pay the costs of this monitoring as determined by the United States Probation Office. Johnson asked the court to reconsider the GPS-monitoring condition. The court denied his request. Johnson now appeals.

“[S]entencing judges are afforded ‘wide discretion when imposing terms of supervised release.’ ” United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556, 557 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir.1999)). The district court has the power to impose any condition it considers to be appropriate, so long as the condition complies with the limits set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), namely, the condition must “(1) [be] reasonably related to the pertinent § 3553(a) sentencing factors, (2) involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a), and (3)[be] consistent with any pertinent policy statements

[773 F.3d 908]

issued by the United States Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Mefford, 711 F.3d 923, 926 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 242, 187 L.Ed.2d 179 (2013). “We review a district court's imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2013).

Johnson first argues that the district court abused its discretion because the Sentencing Commission's recommended supervised-release conditions do not include GPS monitoring. However, the district court is not limited to the recommended conditions, and it retains wide discretion to impose any condition it considers to be appropriate so long as the condition complies with the limits set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921, 933–34 (8th...