United States v. Johnson
Decision Date | 01 April 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 208,Docket 29122.,208 |
Citation | 343 F.2d 5 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wilfred JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Jerome Lewis, Brooklyn, N. Y., for defendant-appellant.
Michael J. Gillen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Eastern District of New York (Joseph P. Hoey, U. S. Atty., Eastern District of New York, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before FRIENDLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BLUMENFELD, District Judge.*
Wilfred Johnson appeals from a sentence of imprisonment on conviction on trial to the jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Leo F. Rayfiel, District Judge, on one count of conspiracy to possess and sell counterfeit money in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2 and 472. Appellant assigns as error the existing rule that the testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to support a conviction, a charge that the principal government witness was an accomplice, conviction on inaudible testimony and the charge on reasonable doubt. We find the charge on reasonable doubt inadequate and reverse and remand for new trial.
The instructions on reasonable doubt were as follows:
This was inadequate. Ordering the jury to convict if it arrive at a stage where it is morally convinced of guilt leaves the test altogether too indefinite. It could be taken to mean morally convinced that it was slightly more likely that defendant was guilty than not, and "morally convinced" might mean by some means other than reason. To be convinced to a "moral certainty" would have a somewhat different meaning, but not even that expression is found here. While no set form of words may be prescribed as the one acceptable definition, United States v. Davis, 328 F.2d 864, 867-868 (2 Cir. 1964), one acceptable formulation is that a reasonable doubt is not a vague, speculative, imaginary doubt but such a doubt as would cause prudent men to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to themselves, see Bishop v. United States, 71 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 107 F.2d 297 (1939). Alternatively, the rule may be put as conventionally charged, see United States v. Davis, supra 328 F.2d at 867 n. 1.1 "Morally convinced" leaves the standard too much at large.
During the charge, the court indicated that ordinarily it would give the jury a brief resume of the testimony, but hesitated to do so "because frankly I have missed so much of it that I don't think it would be accurate and more likely it would be confusing rather than helpful." In view of this, it must be doubtful that the court could properly pass on defense motions to dismiss. In any case on retrial the court should make certain that the witness can be heard by court and jury or at the least that the court reporter can hear and read it back.
The other rulings attacked...
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Johnson v. Louisiana 8212 5035
...cases have defined a reasonable doubt as one "based on reason which arises from the evidence or lack of evidence." United States v. Johnson, 343 F.2d 5, 6 n. 1 (CA2 1965). Accord, e.g., Bishop v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 132, 138, 107 F.2d 297, 303 (1939); United States v. Schneiderman, 1......
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United States v. Kelly
...it. United States v. Accardi, 2 Cir., 1965, 342 F.2d 697, 699; United States v. Davis, 2 Cir., 1964, 328 F.2d 864; cf. United States v. Johnson, 2 Cir., 1965, 343 F.2d 5. By way of contrast, the Government Request on the subject of the character proof elicited from some of the Government wi......
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Ritter v. Smith, Civ. A. No. 83-0457-H.
...360, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1623, 32 L.Ed.2d 152, 158 (1972), and not a vague, speculative, or imaginary doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 343 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir.1965). The constitutional defect in this instance is clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court has already conclude......
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Gaines v. Kelly
...doubt standard that permitted the jury to convict merely upon being "morally convinced of [the] defendant's guilt." United States v. Johnson, 343 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir. 1965). But Johnson involved direct review of a federal conviction, not collateral habeas review of a state conviction, and as ......
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ON REASONABLENESS: THE MANY MEANINGS OF LAW'S MOST UBIQUITOUS CONCEPT.
...of the constitutional standard." United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1990). (17.) See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 343 F.2d 5, 6 n.1 (2d Cir. 1965) (cited with approval in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972)); Sand et al., supra note 11 at (18.) See Chalmers ......