United States v. Johnson, 72-2477 Summary Calendar.
Citation | 478 F.2d 1129 |
Decision Date | 17 May 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-2477 Summary Calendar.,72-2477 Summary Calendar. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Harold JOHNSON and Hugh Don Smith, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Andrew A. Smith, Atlanta, Ga. (Court-appointed), for Joseph Harold Johnson.
Henry Gonzalez, Tampa, Fla., for Hugh Don Smith.
Robert L. Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BELL, GODBOLD and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.
Hugh Don Smith and Joseph Harold ("Butterball") Johnson appeal from their conviction by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 4721 in connection with the passing of counterfeit Federal Reserve notes. We affirm Smith's conviction but reverse and remand for a new trial as to Johnson.
Smith's appeal is based on the sole contention that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he passed the admittedly counterfeit money with the requisite intent to defraud. We decline to elaborate on this contention other than to say that we have read the record of his one and one-half day trial and find more than ample evidence to support the jury verdict, even apart from the rule that we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). See Local Rule 21.
Appellant Johnson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a severance, made and denied before trial, and renewed and again denied at trial; he also asserts that a mistrial should have been declared because the government prosecutor used a "birds of a feather" argument to the jury. We will discuss only the first of these claims.
Johnson timely filed his pre-trial motion for severance pursuant to F.R. Crim.P. 14.2 This motion was denied.
Whether to sever the trial of a defendant who has been properly joined, F.R.Crim.P. 8(a) and (b), for trial with other defendants is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 75 S. Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670 (5th Cir., 1972). A trial court's denial of severance will not be lightly overturned, and a defendant has an extremely difficult burden of showing on appeal that the lower court's action was an abuse of discretion. Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 935 (5th Cir., 1969). See C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 223 at 441-42 (1969). On the facts present in this case, however, the trial court abused its discretion.
A severance of Johnson's case was required when at trial it appeared, as Johnson's well-briefed pre-trial motion for severance had predicted, that he could not obtain a fair trial in a joint trial with Smith.3 The pre-trial motion revealed that Johnson's theory of defense would be completely antagonistic to that of his co-defendant Smith; and furthermore, the motion pointed out that Smith had made a confession directly incriminating Johnson. Johnson's defense was that he was not present when the crime charged was committed. His guilt or innocence, therefore, depended on an absence of convincing identification testimony. Smith, however, took an altogether different approach in his defense. He did not deny passing the bills but contended that he did not pass them with the requisite intent to defraud. Indeed, Smith confessed to passing the bills on the day in question. His theory was that, because he was an informer for an Atlanta police detective and because White, the third person in this transaction, accepted the money with knowledge that it was counterfeit, he (Smith) was not criminally liable because he lacked the necessary mens rea to violate the statute.
As previously mentioned, Smith's confession directly incriminated Johnson and completely contradicted Johnson's theory of defense. In his confession Smith stated that Johnson was the person who was with him on the night that the bogus bills were passed to White. And almost equally as damaging, Smith said that Johnson was the procurer and original possessor of the counterfeit money. A copy of Smith's statement was, very appropriately, attached to Johnson's motion for severance. It was thus apparent prior to trial that there was a distinct probability that Johnson and Smith would offer conflicting and antagonistic theories of defense. While Smith would not be highly prejudiced in the presentation of his defense by Johnson's presence at trial, Smith's presence would cause definite hardship to Johnson as he endeavored to prove that he played no part in the crime and was not present when it was committed.
Any doubt as to whether the potential prejudice to Johnson—which, we repeat, was forecast in his pre-trial motion—would come to fruition was dissipated at the trial. Although finding no prejudice from the joint trial in the case before it, the Supreme Court emphasized that in joint trials "the trial judge has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear." Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516, 80 S.Ct. 945, 948, 4 L.Ed. 2d 921 (1960). See Flores v. United States, 379 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1967); Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017, fn. 1 at 1019 (5th Cir., 1970).
In his opening remarks to the jury Smith's attorney characterized Smith as a "white hat" government informer whose only purpose was to help lead law enforcement officers to the persons responsible for stealing and dealing in stolen unregistered firearms. Counsel described "Butterball" Johnson as having a "sack full of counterfeit money" and intimated that Smith, acting as his "own Dick Tracy," had a secondary goal of seeing that Johnson was apprehended for his activity with the counterfeit money. Counsel then commented on the transaction out of which the indictment arose and said that Johnson was present at the scene and was the one who had brought the bogus money to Smith. Smith's position was thus obvious: he was the good guy—only along for the ride—in order to see that criminals such as White and Johnson were removed from circulation.
After counsel closed, Johnson's attorney moved for a mistrial and renewed his motion for severance, pointing out that Smith's theory of defense was now clear and obviously prejudicial to his client. The motion was denied.
The district court was thus apprised before any testimony that Smith had given a confession directly incriminating Johnson, that there was no reason to expect that the government would not introduce this confession, that the theory of Smith's defense was directly in conflict with Johnson's, and that Smith had, quite properly,4 no qualms about casting Johnson as the major culprit in the counterfeit transaction.
Additionally, the accuracy of Johnson's pre-trial prediction of prejudice was further substantiated by the course of the trial. White, the seller of the unregistered firearms and receiver of the counterfeit money, testified that he believed it was "Butterball" Johnson who was present when the bills were passed to him. However, he related that it was dark when the transaction occurred, that he had neither met nor talked with Johnson for any length of time prior to the instant transaction, and that his identification was based on surmise— from Johnson's size as well as comments by Smith. Suffice to say that his testimony, while it would be enough to support Johnson's conviction, was clearly not sufficient to compel it. See, e. g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the remainder of the trial—a brief summary is sufficient. A study of the record reveals that Smith's attorney implicated Johnson at every opportunity. Moreover, Smith's confession was introduced with no deletions of the incriminating statements concerning Johnson.5 When Smith took the stand, he affirmed his out-of-court statement and also took every available opportunity to further incriminate Johnson as a generally bad person and as the prime mover in the counterfeit transaction. In sum, Smith was the government's best witness against Johnson.
In Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir., 1955), this court recognized that the granting of a motion for severance is within the trial court's discretion, and that "what constitutes an abuse of discretion necessarily depends upon the facts in each particular case." The court also recognized that a severance was not required simply because one co-defendant had made a confession implicating the other.6 The court held, however, that the lower court erred in not granting a severance.
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