United States v. Johnson

Citation990 F.3d 661
Decision Date09 March 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-1610,19-1610
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Rene L. JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Gary Lee Delorme, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, District of North Dakota, Bismarck, ND, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Irvin B. Nodland, NODLAND LAW OFFICES, Bismarck, ND, Monte L. Rogneby, Jesse Walstad, VOGEL LAW FIRM, Bismarck, ND, for Defendant - Appellant.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Rene L. Johnson was indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, and making false statements to a federal agent. She made her initial appearance before the district court on September 15, 2017, but her trial did not begin until October 29, 2018—14 months after her initial appearance. During this 14-month period, the court ordered four continuances, the last of which was ordered sua sponte because of a scheduling conflict. Prior to trial, Johnson moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging violations of the Speedy Trial Act and her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion. At trial, the jury convicted Johnson of wire fraud. Johnson appeals, asserting that her rights under the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial were violated when the district court granted an ends-of-justice continuance based on general congestion of the court's calendar. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

On September 7, 2017, Johnson was indicted for mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ; wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 ; and making material false statements to a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. On September 15, 2017, the district court held Johnson's initial appearance and arraignment; the speedy trial clock began on this date. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (requiring trial to begin within 70 days after a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance).The district court scheduled Johnson's trial for November 14, 2017.

On October 24, 2017, Johnson filed a motion for discovery. On November 3, 2017, the government moved to continue the trial date for up to 120 days and moved to exclude the delay from the Speedy Trial Act in response to Johnson's discovery motion ("first continuance"). The government asserted that the quantity of materials that Johnson requested could not be reviewed and prepared prior to the trial date.

The district court granted the government's first continuance motion on November 6, 2017. The court determined that the government promptly and diligently acted in bringing the matter to the court's attention and concluded that "there is good cause to continue the trial, and ‘the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.’ " Order Granting Government's Mot. to Continue Trial ("First Continuance Order") at 1, United States v. Johnson , No. 1:17-cr-00186-PDW (D.N.D. 2017), ECF No. 22 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) ). The court rescheduled Johnson's trial for March 27, 2018. It found that "[a]ll time which elapses from the date of this order until trial shall be excluded from any Speedy Trial Act calculation." Id. at 2.

On December 18, 2017, the district court denied in part and granted in part Johnson's discovery motion.

On February 7, 2018, the government filed a superseding indictment against Johnson. The superseding indictment added one count of making false statements on a loan application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.

On February 15, 2018, Johnson filed a second discovery motion. Five days later, on February 20, 2018, the government moved for a 60-day continuance because an essential witness was unable to travel following surgery and thus unavailable for trial ("second continuance"). On February 28, 2018, the district court granted the government's second continuance motion. It found that "there [was] good cause to continue the trial, and ‘the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.’ " Order Granting Government's Mot. to Continue Trial ("Second Continuance Order") at 1, United States v. Johnson , No. 1:17-cr-00186-PDW (D.N.D. 2018), ECF No. 33 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) ). The court rescheduled a three-day trial for June 18, 2018. It determined that "[a]ll time which elapses from the date of this order until trial shall be excluded from any Speedy Trial Act calculation." Id.

On May 21, 2018, the court held a status conference. The parties requested an additional seven days to try the case—extending the trial time to ten days. The ten-day trial request conflicted with the court's trial calendar. On June 11, 2018, the district court issued an order recognizing that "a scheduling conflict has arisen involving other obligations of the [c]ourt[,] and the [d]efendant[’s] trial needs to be rescheduled" ("third continuance"). Order ("Third Continuance Order") at 1, United States v. Johnson , No. 1:17-cr-00186-PDW (D.N.D. 2018), ECF No. 39. The court acknowledged Johnson's "constitutional right to a speedy trial," but it determined that "briefly delaying the trial will not cause any undue prejudice or harm." Id. The court found that "there [was] good cause to continue the trial and that ‘the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.’ " Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) ). The court rescheduled the anticipated ten-day trial to begin on August 6, 2018. The court determined that "[a]ll time which elapses from the date of this order until trial shall be excluded from any Speedy Trial Act calculation." Id.

Then, on July 10, 2018, the court sua sponte continued the ten-day trial to October 29, 2018 ("fourth continuance"). Like the June 11 order, the court explained that "a scheduling conflict has arisen involving other obligations of the [c]ourt, and the [d]efendant[’s] trial needs to be rescheduled." Order Continuing Trial ("Fourth Continuance Order") at 1, United States v. Johnson , No. 1:17-cr-00186-PDW (D.N.D. 2018), ECF No. 44. The court again recognized Johnson's speedy trial rights but determined that the delay would not cause her "any undue prejudice or harm." Id. As it did in the June 11 order, the court "excluded from any Speedy Trial Act calculation" "[a]ll time which elapses from the date of this order until trial." Id.

Johnson moved to dismiss the indictment based on violations of her right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. The district court denied Johnson's motion to dismiss. The Speedy Trial Act required Johnson's trial to begin within 70 days after Johnson made her initial appearance on September 15, 2017. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). But, as the district court noted, "[t]he Act provides a detailed list of instances that toll the speedy trial clock." Order Den. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5, United States v. Johnson , No. 1:17-cr-00186-PDW (D.N.D. 2018), ECF No. 58 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) ). To comply with the Act, the district court kept tally on the unexcluded days and excluded days. The court determined that 39 unexcluded days elapsed between Johnson's initial appearance on September 15, 2017, and the filing of Johnson's initial discovery motion on October 24, 2017. The filing of the discovery motion, however, tolled the speedy trial clock until December 18, 2017, when the district court ruled on the discovery motion. Next, the district court excluded from the speedy trial clock the time period between December 18, 2017, and June 18, 2018. During this time period, Johnson filed an additional discovery motion, and the government filed its two continuance motions. Finally, the district court excluded from the speedy trial clock the time period up to and including the rescheduled trial date of October 29, 2018. During this time period, the court granted the parties’ request for an additional seven days to try the case, and the court sua sponte continued the case "because of a scheduling conflict." Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) ).

The court rejected Johnson's argument that it "violated the Speedy Trial Act by making insufficient findings and granting continuances because of general docket congestion." Id. at 8. According to the court, it granted continuances

because of (1) the large amount of discovery involved in this case and the parties’ need for additional time to prepare for trial; (2) the unavailability, due to recovery from surgery, of a necessary witness; (3) the parties’ request for seven additional days of trial; and (4) specific scheduling conflicts that arose after the Court accommodated the parties’ request for an extended trial.

Id. (emphasis added). The court explained that all of these continuances "served the ends of justice and outweighed the best interests of the public and Johnson in a speedy trial." Id . at 10.

The court denied Johnson's contention that it granted continuances "merely because of ‘general congestion of the court's calendar’ as prohibited by Section 3161(h)(7)," stating:

Admittedly, the Court has a congested calendar . The oil boom in North Dakota dramatically increased the number of cases before this Court. Further, the Judicial Conference has declared a judicial emergency for this District, which has only one active judge and no senior status judges. But the delay in this case was not due to general docket congestion . Specific conflicts arose when it became apparent that the parties needed more time to try their case. Rather than forcing the parties to try the matter in summary fashion in three days, the Court found that accommodating the parties’ request served the ends of justice.
Pursuant to this District's Speedy Trial Plan, which complies with the Speedy
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