United States v. Jones
| Decision Date | 30 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 4:13cv195/RH/CAS,Case No.: 4:10cr70/RH/CAS |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. SHANE JONES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This matter is before the court upon Defendant's amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and supporting memorandum of law, (docs. 134, 135), the Government's response thereto (doc. 143), and Defendant's reply. (Doc. 146). Defendant has also filed a separate motion to amend/correct his § 2255 motion and a memorandum in support, to which the Government has responded and Defendant has replied. (Docs. 144, 145 148, 149). The Government also filed a supplemental response pursuant to court order and Defendant replied. (Docs. 156, 161, 165). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has not raised any issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the § 2255 motion should be denied. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases 8(a) and (b).
Defendant Shane Jones was charged in a two count indictment with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing cocaine ("Count One"), and a substantive count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base on a date certain ("Count Two"). (Doc. 1). The charges stemmed from Defendant's arrest after a controlled buy between a confidential informant and co-Defendant Marcus Knight, who identified Jones as his source of supply. Jones was arrested in possession of 33.6 grams of alleged cocaine base. (Doc. 61). The Government filed notice of its intent to seek enhanced penalties based on Defendant's prior felony offenses, which it identified as including three drug offenses and one charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. (Doc. 7).
On March 2, 2011, represented by CJA counsel Clyde Taylor, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Count Two of the indictment pursuant to a written plea agreement and statement of facts. (Docs. 60-63). In exchange for Defendant's guilty plea on Count Two, the Government agreed to dismiss the conspiracy charge. A footnote to the plea agreement noted that although the indictment charged Defendant with more than five grams of cocaine base, for purposes of the plea and the potential application of themandatory minimum sentence pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), the Government asserted that the offense conduct involved in excess of twenty-eight (28) grams of cocaine base, which was the new threshold for the application of the minimum mandatory set forth in § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). (Doc. 62, at 1, n.1). Despite this footnote, defense counsel advised the court that dispute remained as to the kind and quantity of drugs, as his client believed that 28 of the 33.6 grams was actually powder rather than crack cocaine. (doc. 105 at 7--8).
A draft Pre-sentence Investigation Report (PSR) was prepared in anticipation of sentencing, and both parties filed objections thereto before the final PSR was completed. . In the final version of the PSR, Defendant was held accountable for 33.6 grams of cocaine base, which corresponded to a base offense level of 26. (Doc. 85 at ¶ 22). Because Defendant had two prior qualifying felony offenses, he was classified as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the guidelines, which raised his offense level to 37. (Doc. 85 at ¶ 28). After a three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, Defendant's total offense level was 34. (Doc. 85 at ¶¶ 29, 30). Defendant had 18 criminal history points, which equated to a criminal history category of VI. (Doc. 85 at ¶ 54). The applicable guidelines range was 262 to 327 months imprisonment.
Both parties objected to the drug weight, and the defense also objected to several paragraphs pertaining to Defendant's criminal history and the subsequent impact of the Career Offender treatment (Doc. 85 at ¶¶ 106-119). At sentencing, the Government conceded that its objection did not make any difference with respect to sentencing. (Doc. 106 at 4). The defense withdrew its objection to the identity of the drugs, and accepted the base offense level of 26, although Defendant later complained about this concession in his remarks to the court. (Id. at 4-5, 30).
Defendant's criminal history was thoroughly discussed at sentencing. Defendant objected to the assessment of seven points for the convictions listed in paragraphs 44-46 of the PSR, two of which occurred in July of 2001 and one of which occurred in July of 2002. The court overruled the objection due to the intervening arrests, which allowed each offense to count separately. Defense counsel noted that after further investigation, the assessment of points for the offenses in paragraphs 48 and 51 was correct. (Id. at 6-7). Defense counsel cited national and district-wide sentencing statistics and argued that Defendant's criminal history category grossly overstated the seriousness of his criminal record, and that a 120 month sentence, rather than the 262 to 327 month range under the guidelines, was appropriate. (Id. at 19-21). Five of Defendant's family members spoke in his behalf, as did he. (Id. at 22-29).
After lengthy argument from both the Government and the defense, the court found that Defendant's criminal history was properly calculated as a Category VI. (Id. at 42). However, the court found that classifying Defendant as a career offender based on two drug-trafficking offenses that were committed within a two week period when he was 19 years old overstated the seriousness of his prior criminal history. (Id.). The court calculated that absent the application of the career offender guideline, Defendant's guidelines range would have been 92 to 115 months. The court stated that although 120 months was above the high end of that range, it was required to impose at least the statutory minimum mandatory term of 120 months. (Id. at 43).
Clyde Taylor moved to withdraw after sentencing and Michael Robert Ufferman was appointed to represent Defendant on appeal. (Doc. 93). Defendant sent a letter to the court requesting copies of the plea and sentencing transcripts, and also asking that the drugs seized in his case not be destroyed until they could be tested. (Doc. 95). The court denied the motion, noting that the Defendant's motion had "put the Government on notice of the need to preserve the evidence" and that Defendant's new attorney could obtain the transcripts. (Doc. 100).
On appeal, Defendant argued that his sentence must be vacated because of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. He claimed that the district court did not find, and he did not admit, the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to support a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). The Government acknowledged that the FSA applied to Defendant but also noted that Defendant conceded the drug quantity in the district court at sentencing, a position with which the Eleventh Circuit agreed. (Doc. 121 at 3). The appellate court rejected his argument that his sentence was improperly enhanced because the § 851 notice incorrectly described two of his prior convictions, finding that the notice was "sufficiently clear about 'the government's intent.'" (id. at 5). Finally the court declined to address Defendant's challenge to the validity of one of the convictions identified in the § 851 notice, because only one conviction was needed to support the mandatory minimum, and Jones had not challenged the validity of any of the other three convictions. His sentence was thus affirmed. (Doc. 121). The Supreme Court of the United States denied Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari on February 21, 2013. (Doc. 129).
Defendant's § 2255 motion was timely filed pursuant to the prison mailbox rule on April 8, 2013. He filed an amended motion in June of 2013 in which he raises myriad claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The Government opposes the motion in its entirety.
Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and therefore the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2011). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent . . . ."
The law is well established that a district court need not reconsider issues raised in a section 2255 motion which have been resolved on direct appeal. Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994). Once a matter has been decided adversely to a...
To continue reading
Request your trial