United States v. Jones
| Decision Date | 19 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-1644,19-1644 |
| Citation | 962 F.3d 956 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry J. JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Brian L. Reitz, Attorney, James M. Warden, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff - Appellee
Peter W. Henderson, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Urbana, IL, Thomas W. Patton, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, for Defendant - Appellant
Before Flaum, Barrett, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.
In 1998, a federal jury convicted Jerry Jones of two carjackings, an armed bank robbery, and using firearms during those crimes of violence. The district court sentenced him to 840 months in prison. Twenty years later, the district court vacated its original sentence and ordered resentencing because Jones no longer qualified as a career offender under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
At resentencing, Jones's effective Guidelines range was 348–390 months. The district court deviated from the Guidelines and once again sentenced Jones to 840 months in prison. That was an increase of 450 months, approximately 215% above the high end of Jones's Guidelines range. Jones now appeals his sentence. Because the district court did not sufficiently justify the extent of its deviation from the Guidelines, we vacate its judgment and remand for resentencing.
In September 1997, Jerry Jones and two others robbed a bank in central Indiana. As part of their plan, they first confronted a UPS driver at gunpoint, took his uniform, and hijacked his truck. The men then restrained the driver with plastic handcuffs in the back of the truck.
Upon arriving at the bank, one of them posed as the UPS driver and pretended to make a delivery to distract the bank manager from the heist. The supposed UPS driver then tied the manager's ankles together. Meanwhile, Jones brandished his firearm, ordered everyone in the bank to the floor, and demanded that someone open the vault. Jones emptied the vault, and with his gun drawn, took additional cash from a teller station. The thieves loaded over $105,000 into their get-away car and sped off, leaving the real UPS driver handcuffed in the back of the truck.
Witnesses soon spotted the robbers in their 1991 red Oldsmobile Toronado. From these reports, law enforcement received the relevant description and accordingly positioned themselves on the nearest interstate. Upon seeing Jones and his crew, state troopers tried to stop the car; instead of stopping, however, the car crossed a median and lanes of oncoming traffic, ending up in a ditch. Jones and the others, still armed, fled on foot. They crossed through a cornfield where the police lost track of them. Coming across a farmhouse, the bandits snuck inside while the owners (a married couple) were working outside and their 18-year-old daughter was still at school. Jones and the others hid in the house for nearly six hours; one of them stashed himself in the daughter's closet.
That evening, the daughter entered her bedroom and noticed her closet door was ajar. When she opened it, a man she did not know pointed a gun in her face. The daughter screamed and her parents ran toward her. Before they could reach her, the two other men grabbed them, and at gunpoint, ordered them to sit down in the hallway. The intruders eventually corralled the entire family into the daughter's bedroom and tied them up. The three men then coerced the father of the family to drive them back to Indianapolis. Jones told the mother that, if she called the police, he and the others would kill her husband.
The father drove the robbers in his pickup truck to Indianapolis. Jones rode in the cab of the car, training his gun on the father and directing him where to go. The other two rode in the truck's covered bed. After letting all three out, the father returned home to his wife and daughter. Tragically, the memories of these events have haunted the family. The father has stated that "it goes through my mind ... two, three times a week." He has further explained that, on the day it all happened, "the first thing ... if I can remember right, I heard my daughter scream." His wife has recalled that "it was torture" and that "I'll never be the same." She has gone on to say that her daughter "was so devastated that she never recuperated."
A federal grand jury indicted Jones for one count of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) ; two counts of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 ; and three counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). A trial jury convicted Jones of all those charges. Based on his two prior convictions for breaking and entering and armed robbery (during which Jones discharged his weapon), Jones qualified as a career offender under Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1. The district court's 300-month sentence on the bank robbery and carjacking counts reflected that enhancement. Additionally, the three § 924(c) counts imposed a cumulative mandatory-minimum sentence of 540 months that had to run consecutively to the 300 months on the other counts. The district court therefore sentenced Jones to 840 months in prison.
In 2018, Jones petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing he was no longer a career offender based on intervening Supreme Court precedents. The district court agreed, vacated Jones's sentence, and ordered resentencing. At resentencing, Jones's Guidelines range was 168–210 months on the three counts of bank robbery and carjacking. As to the three firearms counts, the government and the probation office both contended the same aggregate 540-month mandatory minimum sentenced applied. But Jones, invoking the First Step Act, asserted that the mandatory minimum was 180 months now. Reading the plain language of the statute, the district court decided that the change in the law applies "to any offense that was committed before" December 2018 "if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed" as of December 2018. That included Jones, the court found, overruling the government's objection. Accordingly, Jones's effective Guidelines range was 348–390 months in prison.
The government initially recommended a 480-month sentence; however, upon learning that the carjacking and robbery counts could run consecutively, the government changed its recommendation to 840 months. The government and the district court both may have mistakenly thought that this was a lower sentence than Jones originally received. As it happens, Jones's first sentence was 840 months.
The court next considered the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court explained that Jones had a "history as a violent predatory individual" and the offenses were "horrific crimes of violence." Recounting Jones's conduct, the court maintained:
The defendant put the victims in great fear, threatened ... violence to members of the victims’ family, tied them up, pointed guns at them, shotgun -- fired the firearms in the house during one of the break-ins in the victims’ homes after the bank robbery.
Some of that statement was inaccurate. Jones did not use a shotgun, did not discharge any firearm, and broke into only one home after the robbery.
Still, the court "believe[d] the statutory maximum sentence" was appropriate. The court stressed three more factors that bolstered its conclusion: (1) Jones "would be a risk of serious criminal activity based on his prior criminal history"; (2) Jones's co-defendants, "with similar records [and] similar conduct," had received sentences of 675 months and 728 months under the mandatory Guidelines regime; and (3) after his original federal sentencing, Jones received a 273-year sentence in Indiana for murder and robbery.
Adding the prison terms up count-by-count, the court concluded that the "total is 675 months." That was a mathematical error. The probation officer informed the court that the total was 840 months. The court recalculated and reached the same result. In doing so, the court reiterated its "intention ... to give the statutory maximum on Counts 1, 3, and 5." The court confirmed that 840 months "reflects the Court's intention and its discretion here."
This timely appeal followed.
Jones argues that the district court procedurally erred when it: (1) failed to justify the extent of its 450-month deviation from the Guidelines; (2) relied on inaccurate information regarding Jones's offense conduct; and (3) neglected to adhere to the paradigm that a sentence must be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the general purposes of sentencing. We review these alleged procedural errors at sentencing de novo. See, e.g. , United States v. Griffith , 913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019).
A district court must adequately explain its sentence, including any deviation from the Guidelines. See United States v. Ballard , 950 F.3d 434, 436–37 (7th Cir. 2020). In other words, a deviating court "must consider the extent of the deviation from that range and satisfy [it]self that there is a compelling justification for it." United States v. Vallone , 752 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). The further a sentence deviates from the Guidelines, "the more detailed the district court's explanation must be." United States v. Padilla , 520 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2008).
In this case, the effective Guidelines range was 348–390 months and the district court sentenced Jones to 840 months in prison. That is a 450-month, or 215%, deviation from the high end of the Guidelines range. A deviation of such magnitude is significant. See Ballard , 950 F.3d at 437 (); United States v. Henshaw , 880 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2018) (); United States v. Ferguson , ...
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