United States v. Jones

• Decision Date: 13 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-30525.,16-30525.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Byron JONES, Also Known as Big Baby Jones; Deloyd Jones, Also Known as Puggy Jones; Sidney Patterson, Also Known as Duda Man Patterson, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

873 F.3d 482

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Byron JONES, Also Known as Big Baby Jones; Deloyd Jones, Also Known as Puggy Jones; Sidney Patterson, Also Known as Duda Man Patterson, Defendants–Appellants.

No. 16-30525.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED October 13, 2017

Kevin G. Boitmann, Diane Hollenshead Copes, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Rachel Isabel Conner, Conner & Sothern, Claude John Kelly, III, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Eastern District of Louisiana, Autumn Alycia Town, Law Office of Autumn Town, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants–Appellants.

Before SMITH, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Byron Jones ("Byron"), Deloyd Jones ("Deloyd"), and Sidney Patterson appeal their convictions of numerous felonies related to their membership in a group called Ride or Die ("ROD"). They challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of certain evidence, the refusal to adopt proposed jury instructions, and application of the sentencing guidelines. We affirm, except with respect to Counts 9, 10, 13, and 14, as to which we reverse, and we remand for resentencing.

I.

The government claimed that ROD, which operated in New Orleans's Eighth Ward, was a criminal gang whose members conspired to distribute crack cocaine, possess firearms, and commit a variety of violent crimes for the group's benefit. The appellants and nine other alleged members of ROD were charged with murder, assault, racketeering, drug trafficking, using a firearm in the commission of a violent crime, and related offenses.¹ All except the appellants pleaded guilty. The government accused the appellants of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), the Federal Gun Control Act, the Federal Controlled Substances Act, and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act ("VICAR"). At trial, the prosecution focused on six incidents: the February 24, 2010, murder of Travis Arnold and shooting of Isaac Rowel; the April 29, 2010, shooting of Ernest Augustine; the November 9, 2010, murder of Rodney Coleman; the January 6, 2011, shooting of Marquisa Coleman and Jimmy Joseph; the January 17, 2011, murder of Devin Hutton, shooting of Victor Guy, and assault of Krystal Collier; and the January 18, 2011, murder of Corey Blue.

The jury convicted all three appellants on the RICO, drug-trafficking conspiracy, and gun-conspiracy counts; convicted Byron and acquitted Patterson on counts relating to the Arnold murder; convicted Byron on counts relating to the Augustine shooting and determined that the gun was discharged; acquitted Deloyd on counts relating to the Rodney Coleman murder; convicted Deloyd on counts relating to the shooting of Marquisa Coleman and Joseph and determined that the gun was discharged; convicted Deloyd on counts relating to the Hutton murder and the assaults of Guy and Collier; and convicted Deloyd and Patterson on counts relating to the Blue murder. The district court sentenced all three appellants to life imprisonment and consecutive sentences of 120 months' and 300 months' imprisonment for using firearms in furtherance of their crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

II.

On the sufficiency challenge, "we view the evidence and all inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine if a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Delgado , 401 F.3d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Posada-Rios , 158 F.3d 832, 855 (5th Cir. 1998) ). Because appellants moved for acquittal at trial, our review is de novo but "highly deferential to the verdict." United States v. Beacham , 774 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Isgar , 739 F.3d 829, 835 (5th Cir. 2014) ).

Count 1 (RICO Conspiracy)

The evidence is sufficient on the RICO convictions. Conspiracy to violate any of RICO's substantive provisions is a crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). "To prove a RICO conspiracy, the government must establish (1) that two or more people agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense and (2) that the defendant knew of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense." Posada-Rios , 158 F.3d at 857–58. "The agreement, a defendant's guilty knowledge and a defendant's participation in the conspiracy all may be inferred from the development and collocation of circumstances." Id. at 857. A co-conspirator needs only to have known of, and agreed to, the overall objective of the RICO offense. Salinas v. United States , 522 U.S. 52, 61–66, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997).

The substantive RICO provision prohibits "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." § 1962(c). The government must prove that (1) such an enterprise existed; (2) the activities of the enterprise affected interstate or foreign commerce; (3) the defendant was "employed by" or "associated with" the enterprise; (4) the defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs; and (5) the participation was through "a pattern of racketeering activity." Posada-Rios , 158 F.3d at 855.

The statute defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." § 1961(4). RICO reaches "a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." United States v. Turkette , 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). To establish the existence of an enterprise, the government must present "evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and ... that the various associates function as a continuing unit." Id. The term "enterprise" encompasses "an amoeba-like infrastructure that controls a secret criminal network" as well as "a duly formed corporation that elects officers and holds annual meetings." United States v. Elliott , 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978). A jury may "infer the existence of an enterprise on the basis of largely or wholly circumstantial evidence." Id.

The government claims that ROD was an informal, association-in-fact enterprise. "[T]he very concept of an association in fact is expansive," but it "must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose." Boyle v. United States , 556 U.S. 938, 944–46, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009).

The government points to the various crimes that appellants allegedly committed as evidence of a "pattern of racketeering activity." The term "racketeering activity" encompasses a wide range of state and federal offenses, including murder, robbery, extortion, and drug-dealing. § 1961(1). A "pattern of racketeering activity" exists where an offender has committed at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years. § 1961(5).

Appellants challenge this charge on three grounds. First, they claim that ROD was not an enterprise. Patterson describes ROD members as "lone wol[ves]" and cites testimony denying that ROD members shared money, drugs, or guns.² One former member testified that "Ride or Die is just a bunch of young men who really like hanging out."

That is inaccurate. ROD had a clear purpose—selling drugs and protecting those drug sales and the group's members—and its members were associated with one another. Members used a house on Mandeville Street to store guns and drugs and to prepare and package the drugs for resale, working in shifts. The owner of the house testified that on at least one occasion, members pooled their money to buy crack for resale. A former member testified that members sold drugs at specific locations, that only members could sell drugs in certain territories, and that members stashed guns for other members' use. Members committed a large number of violent crimes alongside other members.³ The evidence, which included hours of testimony from law-enforcement officers and former members, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that ROD fell within RICO's expansive definition of "enterprise."

Second, appellants claim that several of the criminal acts they committed during ROD's existence were unrelated to ROD and therefore were not part of a pattern of racketeering activity. But appellants' theories on this point are conclusional. Byron notes only that "[t]he government ... failed to establish through any competent evidence that [Byron's criminal convictions] and [the government's] allegations are related to any common purpose other than establishing the criminality of Byron Jones." Patterson contends that one of the traffic stops mentioned in the indictment was unrelated to ROD. No appellant casts serious doubt on the government's claim that appellants committed at least two predicate acts in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy. The government presented sufficient evidence that appellants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.

Finally, Byron suggests that even if the other appellants committed crimes on behalf of ROD, he did not. He notes that to establish that ROD members had a common purpose, the government relied heavily on testimony about the house on Mandeville Street, which ROD controlled while Byron was in prison. But the government also presented evidence that ROD behaved like a gang long before it took over that house (at which time Byron was already an ROD member): controlling territory, sharing resources, and engaging in violence to promote the...