United States v. Jones

• Decision Date: 07 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-1263. Summary Calendar.,71-1263. Summary Calendar.
• Citation: 457 F.2d 697
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ottis Mayo JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

457 F.2d 697 (1972)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ottis Mayo JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 71-1263. Summary Calendar.^*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 14, 1972.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1972.

S. Gunter Toney, Tallahassee, Fla. (Court Appointed), for defendant-appellant.

William Stafford, U. S. Atty., Pensacola, Fla., Stewart J. Carrouth, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

Ottis Mayo Jones was convicted under a three count indictment charging him with uttering three forged United States Postal Money Orders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500. On this appeal he claims first that evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure was used to convict him, and second that his rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated by the government's failure to provide him with a speedy trial. We find that neither of these contentions is supported by the record and affirm appellant's conviction.

The Facts

On February 15, 1969, three stolen postal money orders were cashed in Tallahassee, Florida, at two motels and a clothing store. The money orders were payable to "Thomas O. Peters" and were cashed by a man who identified himself by means of a Carte Blanche credit card issued in the name of Thomas O. Peters.

Exactly one week later appellant Jones attempted to cash a postal money order at an A & P grocery store in Knoxville, Tennessee. This money order was also payable to Thomas O. Peters and a Carte Blanche credit card bearing that name was given to the store manager. The manager checked the serial number of the money order and discovered that it was stolen. He kept the money order and called the police. Jones, meanwhile, retrieved the credit card, left the store and drove away.

The store manager was able to give the police the make, model and license number of the car Jones was driving. Shortly after this information was broadcast over the police radio, an officer stopped Jones' car. The officer asked Jones his name and Jones replied, "Thomas O. Peters." While the police officer was reporting this information to headquarters, Jones fled in the car. He was caught a few blocks away and placed under arrest.

After the arrest, the car was searched at the police station and a quantity of physical evidence was seized. Among the items found in Jones' car were a number of stolen money orders, room keys to the two Tallahassee motels where stolen money orders had been cashed on February 15th, and a brown suit which had been purchased at the clothing store in Tallahassee with a stolen money order.

When Jones was tried in Tennessee for attempting to cash the stolen money order at the A & P, the district court ruled that the items taken from his car were obtained with an invalid search warrant and not admissible in evidence, following Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Nonetheless, Jones was convicted and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir. 1971).

After this Tennessee trial, Jones was convicted in the Northern District of Florida of passing the three stolen money orders in Tallahassee. It is from this conviction that he now appeals.

Search and Seizure

Jones first argues that the evidence seized in the search of his car in Tennessee was used in his Florida trial. Although the district judge denied a motion to suppress this evidence on the ground that the Tennessee search was valid under Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), it is not necessary for us to consider appellant's attack on this ruling because the record shows that none of this evidence was introduced in the Florida trial. The only piece of evidence introduced below which had ever been in the hands of the Knoxville police was the Carte Blanche credit card. The court below found that the credit card was not obtained during the search of Jones' car, but fell out of his pocket while he was being transported to the police station after his arrest. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the motion to suppress was properly denied. United States v. Ogle, 418 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970).

Jones next contends that his indictment should have been dismissed because evidence seized in Tennessee provided leads which connected him with the money orders passed in Tallahassee. He says that this enabled the government to try him and that his conviction is tainted by the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

However, even without the evidence found in the car, there was evidence to link Jones with the money orders cashed in Tallahassee. The Carte Blanche credit card, the money order which Jones left with the A & P store manager, and his statement to the Knoxville police officer that his name was Thomas O. Peters, all provided ample evidence to link Jones to the credit card and money orders in the same name used in Tallahassee. As stated before, the Carte Blanche card fell from Jones' pocket. The money order was not seized at all but was turned over to the police by the store manager, a private citizen, so that the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921). The district court correctly ruled that Miranda warnings did not have to be given before the Knoxville police officer asked Jones his name. United States v. LeQuire, 424 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970). The authorities having been led directly to the Tallahassee offenses by evidence legally obtained, it is of no consequence that illegally obtained evidence would also have led to those crimes. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); United States v. Hull, 437 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1971); Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1967).

Speedy Trial

Jones was indicted on May 6, 1969, but not brought to trial in Florida until December 8, 1970. He contends that he was thus denied the speedy trial guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

During the eight months following Jones' indictment, ...