United States v. Jones, CRIMINAL ACTION NO: 10-284
| Decision Date | 03 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO: 10-284 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. RONALD MITCHELL RAY JONES |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Defendant Ronald Mitchell moves for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 291 and a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.2 For the following reasons, Mitchell's motions are DENIED.
This case arises out of testimony given in a civil deposition by two members of the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") in connection with the September 3, 2005 death of Danny Brumfield. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, defendants Ronald Mitchell and Ray Jones were patrolling the area around the Convention Center in downtown New Orleans in a marked police car. Jones drove, and Mitchell accompanied him in the front passenger seat. As they drove past the Convention Center, Danny Brumfield approached their vehicle. Mitchell ended up shooting Brumfield.
In response to the shooting, Brumfield's family filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Mitchell, former Mayor Ray Nagin, the New Orleans Police Department, and former Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department Eddie Compass.3 They asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought relief "for injuries and damages arising out of intentional and outrageous acts of law enforcement."4 In addition, they brought tort claims under Louisiana law.5 The Brumfields contended that Mitchell and the NOPD's acts or omissions constituted "criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct that caused the assault and death" of Brumfield.6
The complaint alleged that when Brumfield approached the officers' car to seek assistance, the police car "bumped Mr. Brumfield."7 The complaint alleged that the officers' car then "ran into Brumfield at a greater speed, throwing him onto the hood of the trunk."8 The complaint further alleged that 9 Instead, plaintiffs alleged that the police vehicle ran over Brumfield's body. The Brumfields requested damages for assault, wrongful death, survival claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium.10 They also asked for damages for mental and physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, and economic loss for the negligent and intentional acts of the defendants.11 Finally, they sought general and specific damages, as well as punitive damages.
Mitchell and Jones testified in conjunction with this lawsuit in depositions on November 8, 2007 and June 4, 2008, respectively. Relevant to these motions, Mitchell engaged in the following exchange at his deposition:
On September 30, 2010, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Mitchell and Jones, charging each with obstruction of justice and perjury in connection with their deposition testimony in Civil Case 06-4834.16 The indictment charged Mitchell with obstruction of justice and perjury for stating that Brumfield jumped off the hood of a patrol car and lunged at him with a shiny object (Counts 1 and 2) and for stating that he exited the vehicle to check Brumfield's pulse after shooting him (Counts 3 and 4). The indictment also charged Jones with obstruction of justice and perjury for stating that Mitchell exited the patrol car to check on Brumfield (Counts 5 and 6).
Both defendants pleaded not guilty, and the Court conducted a trial, which began on December 5, 2011. Mitchell moved to continue the trial on the morning it was set to begin based onlate disclosures by the Government of potentially exculpatory material.17 The Court ordered the Government to make the witnesses at issue available to the defense before they were called to testify at trial and denied the motion to continue.18 On December 8, 2011, both the Government and the defense rested. After deliberating for nearly eight hours, the foreman of the jury sent a note to the Court stating that the jury was deadlocked at that time as to two counts of the indictment. The Court sent the jury home for the night and told the jury to return the next morning. At that point, Mitchell moved for a mistrial, which the Court denied. On December 9, 2011, the jury found Mitchell guilty of Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment and found him not guilty of the other counts. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty for Jones.
Mitchell now moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 3 and 4. Mitchell contends that (1) no reasonable juror could have found that the allegedly false statements at the center of Counts 3 and 4 were material, or obstructed or impeded justice, and (2) the "widely divergent and fractured descriptions" of the shooting could not have convinced anyreasonable juror that the statement was false.19 The Government opposes this motion; it argues (1) that the statements were material and (2) that the witnesses' testimony agreed on the essential facts.20
Alternatively, Mitchell moves the Court for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mitchell reurges his grounds for a judgment of acquittal and further argues: (1) that his motion to continue trial should have been granted; (2) that a mistrial should have been granted after the jury had been deliberating for eight hours; and (3) that the verdicts are multiplicitous and should be set aside.21 The Government opposes this motion for the same reasons it opposes the motion for judgment of acquittal. In addition, it contends that (1) Mitchell was not prejudiced by the timing of the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence; (2) the Court acted within its discretion in denying Mitchell's motion for a mistrial; and (3) Mitchell's argument on multiplicitous verdicts is (a) untimely and (b) even if timely, each count contains unique elements, which reflects Congressional intent to create two separate offenses.22
"A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict." United States v. Lucio, 428 F.3d 519, 522 (5th Cir. 2005)(quoting United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1998)). When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d 750, 757 (5th Cir. 2005)(applying Jackson). The same test applies whether the Government's case depends on direct or entirely circumstantial evidence. United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 151 (5th Cir. 2010)(citing United States v. Clayton, 506 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court considers the evidence, all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d at 605. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis ofinnocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. Id. ; see also Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d at 911. The jury "retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses." United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mitchell argues that a rational trier of fact could not find that the false statements at the root of both the obstruction of justice count and the perjury count had a meaningful effect on the outcome of the civil lawsuit. In addition, Mitchell argues that the "widely divergent and fractured" testimony by the Government witnesses could not have convinced a reasonable trier of fact that the statements were false.23
Mitchell contends that the witnesses' testimony that led to his conviction varied so widely that no reasonable jury could have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were false.24 Although witnesses gave varying accounts of the events on the evening of the shooting, the record reflects thatnot one witness testified that the car carrying Mitchell and Jones stopped after Mitchell shot Brumfield.
Christopher Howard, a friend of Danny Brumfield's niece, Africa Brumfield, testified that he was sitting in a chair outside the Convention Center when Brumfield was shot.25 Although the darkness...
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