United States v. Jones, 18369.
Decision Date | 21 July 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 18369.,18369. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marlyn Lee JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Ronald P. Alwin, Terence MacCarthy, Director, Joseph Beeler, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
William J. Bauer, U. S. Atty., Richard F. Sprague, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee; John Peter Lulinski, Jeffrey Cole, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel.
Before HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge, and FAIRCHILD and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
Marlyn Lee Jones appeals his conviction by the district court, sitting without a jury, for failure to submit to induction into the armed forces, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462.
Jones, who had been classified I-A since January, 1967, was ordered on April 16, 1968, to report for induction. On May 1, 1968, he appeared at the induction station, but refused to submit to induction. He presented a short written statement to the officials:
In July, 1968, Jones was indicted for failure to submit to induction, and his case was continued until July 30, 1969. Jones submitted a conscientious objector form (SSS Form 150) to his local draft board along with a letter explaining why he did not apply for a I-O classification prior to the mailing of the induction order, and requesting a reopening of his classification. On July 29, 1969, the day before the trial was to commence, the district court again continued the case because the board had taken no action. Upon joint motion of the parties, the court returned the selective service file to the board to allow it to review the case.
On September 30, 1969, the registrant, accompanied by a minister, appeared before the board for a "courtesy interview" and, for nearly 45 minutes, answered questions about the source and content of his conscientious objector beliefs. The board concluded, as summarized by the clerk, that Jones' "beliefs were based more on a `political, a sociological or philosophical view, or a merely personal code.'"
On the following day, the board sent Jones this letter:
Board members determined after lengthy discussion that there was no change in classification. All evidence considered. No change in the registrant\'s status resulting from circumstances over which he had no control. Classification not reopened.
Shortly thereafter, Jones was ordered to report for induction and again refused.1 His conviction followed.
The issue before us is whether the board properly refused to reopen Jones' classification.
After reviewing the selective service file before us, we conclude that Jones was not entitled to a reopening since he had filed his claim for I-O classification after the mailing of the induction order to him. Section 1625.2 of the Selective Service Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2, provides in part:
* * * the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induction * * * unless the local board specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant\'s status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control.
In Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 91 S.Ct. 1319, 28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971), the Supreme Court held that conscientious objector claimants who file their request for I-O reclassification after the mailing of the induction order must be denied reopening.
It is undisputed in the case at bar that the defendant had not filed any claim for I-O classification before the mailing of the induction order to him on April 16, 1968. While the board could have been explicit, we believe that it intended lateness as a basis for its decision denying reopening. The board's letter to Jones advising of its refusal to reopen makes reference to the lateness regulation by paraphrasing part of it.
We realize that a reading of the board's letter additionally reveals that it decided that Jones did not present a prima facie case for I-O classification. The letter states, "All evidence considered." This must include references to Jones' statements at the courtesy interview concerning his conscientious objector beliefs. The board's characterization of them in the summary of the interview as "merely personal" as a basis for denying reopening, indicates a misunderstanding of the law. It is now settled that a registrant who deeply believes that he cannot participate in war is entitled to a I-O classification. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965). Conscientious objector beliefs do not have to be...
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