United States v. Jones
| Decision Date | 08 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 5:10-78-JMH-12 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF, v. DEMARCUS HAMILTON JONES, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
On October 21, 2013, Defendant, Demarcus Hamilton Jones, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a supporting memorandum. [Rs. 669, 669-1]. The United States filed its response on April 18, 2014. [R. 716]. Defendant filed a reply on June 30, 2014. [R. 736]. Consistent with local practice, the matter has been referred to the undersigned for preparation of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence be DENIED.
On June 15, 2010, Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of conspiracy to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846, and one count of distribution of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack cocaine), in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). [R. 1 at2-3, 15]. The grand jury issued a superseding indictment on August 19, 2010, but it did not materially alter the charges against Defendant. [R. 151 at 2, 10]. During Defendant's initial appearance and arraignment in this District, Lucas Joyner was appointed as defense counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. [R. 230]. Soon after Defendant's initial appearance, the grand jury returned a second superseding indictment, but, once again, it did not materially alter the charges against Defendant. [R. 243 at 2, 9-10]. Subsequently, the court conducted a second arraignment to address the new charges. [R. 258].
A few weeks later, Defendant appeared in court for a change-of-plea hearing. [R. 317]. At the hearing, Defendant stated that he had read his plea agreement, but he requested additional time to "read it again." [R. 354 at 4]. Following an approximately hour-long recess, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base (Count 2 of the second superseding indictment) and one count of distribution of cocaine base (Count 20 of the second superseding indictment). [R. 317]. Subsequent to his rearraignment, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that counsel had pressured him into pleading guilty [R. 350], which the court denied, [R. 355].
Prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum challenging Defendant's status as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines and asserting that the court should sentence Defendant to the mandatory minimum because of his limited involvement in the drug conspiracy. [R. 436]. At sentencing, the district court rejected the arguments in Defendant's sentencing memorandum and sentenced him to 262 months' imprisonment with 8 years of supervised release to follow. [Rs. 450, 481 at 8-13]. Defendant's sentence was at the low end of his advisory guideline range of 262-367 months. [R. 481 at 8-13].
After judgment was entered against Defendant, he filed a notice of appeal with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. [R. 463]. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's decision not to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, his designation as a career offender, and the reasonableness of his sentence. See United States v. Jones, 489 F. App'x 57 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. Id.
Defendant now brings the instant motion seeking to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [R. 669]. Since Defendant is a pro se movant, the undersigned will liberally and leniently construe his arguments. See Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) () (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, a prisoner has a statutory right to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence. Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999) (). For a federal prisoner to prevail on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claim, he must show that "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
If the movant alleges a constitutional error, he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006), that the error "had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings." Watson, 165 F.3d at 488 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)). If the movant alleges a non-constitutional error, he "must establish a fundamental defect which inherently results in acomplete miscarriage of justice, or, an error so egregious that it amounts to a violation of due process." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, each of Defendant's grounds for relief falls under an overarching theory of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1994). First, in order to prove deficient performance, a defendant must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. In applying this test, reviewing courts must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance . . . ." Id. Second, Defendant must establish prejudice by showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694-95. In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice element is only satisfied when defendant shows "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Significantly, "[w]hen deciding ineffective-assistance claims, courts need not address both components of the [deficient performance/prejudice] inquiry 'if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.' " Campbell v. United States, 364 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). With these standards in mind, the undersigned will now address Defendant's claims.
Essentially, Defendant's memorandum in support of his § 2255 motion consists of two general claims presented under two headings, each of which falls under a predominating theoryof ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) counsel failed to fully inform him of the facts of his case and his options during the plea process, and (2) counsel failed to challenge the use of Defendant's prior attempted-murder conviction to classify him a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. [R. 669-1 at 12-17]. In the first couple of pages following Defendant's first major heading, he presents a rapid-fire string of claims relating to his plea-process argument, [R. 669-1 at 3-5], some of which he argues further in the later pages of his memorandum and some of which he does not. In the latter pages of his memorandum, under his second heading, Defendant presents several arguments pertaining to his prior convictions. [R. 669-1 at 12-17].
It is apparent to the undersigned that Defendant's two major argument headings house numerous subclaims that are not always presented linearly and are best suited to individual discussion. In keeping with this Court's policy of liberal construction of pro se pleadings, the undersigned has endeavored to connect the various fragments of arguments dispersed through Defendant's motion into several discrete, cohesive allegations of error. To that end, the undersigned will break Defendant's two major headings into numerous subheadings and address each argument in turn.
The undersigned discerns seven distinct allegations of error concerning ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process. They are paraphrased as follows: (1) counsel did not adequately explain the criminal charges and their elements to Defendant; (2) counsel failed to apprise Defendant of the application of federal sentencing guidelines and statutory sentencing; (3) counsel failed to show Defendant discovery materials before trial; (4) counsel failed to sufficiently investigate and prepare for the case; (5) counsel made no effort to seek a pleaagreement that did not involve cooperation; (6) counsel coerced Defendant into pleading guilty; and (7) counsel failed to advise Defendant that he could plead guilty without a plea agreement. Each allegation will be addressed, in turn, below.
Defendant asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because trial counsel failed to explain the criminal charges against him and the elements of the particular offenses charged. [R. 669-1 at 4, 10-11]. The Sixth Circuit has held that, "[a]t a minimum, the defendant must understand the 'critical' or 'essential' elements of the offense to which he or she pleads guilty." United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Defendant's trial attorney has submitted an affidavit asserting that he did, in fact, discuss Defendant's criminal charges with him. [R. 771-1]. In the affidavit, counsel...
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