United States v. Jones

• Decision Date: 15 December 1953
• Docket Number: No. 14575.,14575.
• Citation: 207 F.2d 785
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. JONES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

207 F.2d 785 (1953)

UNITED STATES v. JONES.

No. 14575.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

November 18, 1953.

Rehearing Denied December 15, 1953.

James L. Guilmartin, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., Herbert S. Phillips, U. S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., Warren Olney III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur B. Caldwell, Sydney Brodie, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Pat Whitaker, Tampa, Fla., Mark R. Howes, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Fla., Tom Whitaker, Tampa, Fla., Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen. of Fla., Whitaker Brothers, Tampa, Fla., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and HOLMES and BORAH, Circuit Judges.

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment of dismissal by the district court of a two-count information charging the appellee with the violation of Section 242 of Title 18 of the United States Code, commonly known as the civil rights act. The trial court construed the information to charge the defendant, an officer in a Florida state prison, with having whipped certain prisoners entrusted to his custody for the purpose and with the intention of disciplining them. The court held that mere disciplinary action by state prison officials was no offense under the federal statute.

On direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 3731 of Title 18 of said code, the Government sought reversal of the judgment of dismissal on the ground that the information charged more than the court below construed it to charge. It contended that the information charged the appellee with having willfully extorted confessions of violations of prison rules from the prisoners and having willfully inflicted summary corporal punishment upon them in violation of the laws of Florida and the constitution of the United States. Since the Government's theory of the prosecution was based upon a construction of the information that differed materially from the construction put upon it by the district court, the Supreme Court, for reasons stated in its opinion reported in 345 U.S. 377, 73 S.Ct. 759, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a construction of the information and such further proceedings as might be appropriate to a review of the judgment on appeal.

The opinion of the district court sets out in full count one of the information; it also states that count two is identical with count one except as to the name of the prisoner and as to the omission of any allegation of an attempt to extort information by coercion. This opinion is reported in 108 F.Supp. 266, and holds that Florida officials, having custody of convicted felons serving prison sentences, violated no federal law by whipping them for disciplinary reasons. The Government concedes that the state has the power to manage the affairs of its penal institutions and to enforce discipline among its prisoners; and we hold that the federal government has no power to control or regulate the internal discipline of the penal institutions of its constituent states. All such powers are reserved to the states, and the 14th Amendment does not authorize Congress to legislate upon such matters. In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835; Siegel v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 180 F.2d 785, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 990, 70 S.Ct. 1015, 94 L.Ed. 1391.

Nevertheless, federal laws may be violated within prison walls, and federal crimes committed therein, as well as elsewhere within the territorial limits of a state; and the fact that state officers are violating state as well as federal laws does not exonerate them from penalties under the latter. Facts are stubborn things when proven or admitted in the disposition of a case; and, paradoxical as it may seem, the defendant was whipping these prisoners under color of law although doing it in violation of law. Color of law, as used in the statute, means pretense of law: it may include, but does not necessarily mean, under authority of law.

The first half of the first count of the information before us is duplicitous, ambiguous, and argumentative, which renders it or parts of it liable to be stricken out by a motion; but the last sentence in count one expressly alleges that the state officer, under color of state law, did willfully and knowingly strike said prisoner for having escaped and to coerce information concerning alleged offenses, etc., "for the willful purpose and with the intent to impose illegal summary punishment upon, and to deprive the said named prisoner of, his said constitutional rights; in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242." The second count alleges all the preliminary facts pertinent or necessary to the charge, some of which were unnecessary, and then it expressly alleges the crucial facts that the defendant while acting under color of state law as aforesaid, willfully and knowingly with his fists and feet did beat, bruise, batter, and injure the said Aubrey Lee Tuck, for having escaped, etc., "all for the willful purpose and with the intent to impose illegal summary...