United States v. Jones, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 13-205 SECTION: "E" (2)
| Decision Date | 06 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 13-205 SECTION: "E" (2) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. BYRON JONES, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Defendant Byron Jones's ("Byron") motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a new trial.1 Byron seeks a judgment of acquittal with respect to Counts 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10 of the Indictment, and a new trial on Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8.2 The Government opposes Byron's motion.3 The Court has reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law and now issues its ruling. For the reasons that follow, Byron's motion is DENIED.
On August 17, 2015, this criminal matter proceeded to a trial by jury with respect to Defendants Deloyd Jones, Sidney Patterson, and Byron.4 After a trial which lasted approximately a week-and-a-half, the jury returned verdicts on August 28, 2015, on all counts against the aforementioned Defendants. Of present importance, the jury found Byron guilty on all of the charges which were then-pending against him.5
On September 11, 2015, Byron filed the instant motion for (1) a post-verdict judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10, and (2) a motion for new trial with respect to Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8 under Rule 33. Byron contends that, with respect to Counts 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10, the guilty verdicts against him on those counts "are not supported by the evidence adduced during the six days of testimony and the admitted exhibits."6 As for Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8, Byron moves for a new trial, arguing the Court committed error by "not instructing the jury on the definition of accessory after the fact under Louisiana law."7
Counts 1, 2, and 3 charged Byron with conspiracy offenses. Specifically, Count 1 charged Byron with a RICO conspiracy offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Count 2 charged Byron with conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and Count 3 charged Byron with conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o).8
Byron argues, with respect to Count 1, that the Government failed to prove the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise, which is a necessary element of a RICO conspiracy.9 According to Byron, "[t]here simply was not sufficient evidence admitted at the trial to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Byron Jones was a member of a groupof associates who functioned as a continuing unit striving for a shared purpose."10 For that reason, Byron argues he should be acquitted on Count 1 post-trial under Rule 29.
Byron also challenges his convictions on Counts 2 and 3, but unlike Count 1, it is unclear from Byron's motion what his specific arguments are with respect to Counts 2 and 3. In his motion, Byron seems to argue that, because the Government failed to prove the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise, which is an element of the crime charged in Count 1, his convictions on Counts 2 and 3 also should not stand.11 However, the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise is not a required element of the drug and gun conspiracies charged in Counts 2 and 3.12 The Government argues, and the Court agrees, that Byron has failed to "provide any additional legal or factual argument to support his request that the Court invalidate the jury's verdict as to the gun and drug conspiracies."13 The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that when a party does not address an issue in his brief to the district court, that failure constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal.14 "By analogy, failure to brief an argument in the district court waives that argument in that court."15 Because Byron failed to brief his arguments with respect to Counts 2 and 3, the Court considers only Byron's arguments with respect to Count 1 and whether he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on Count 1 under Rule 29.
A motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 "is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction." 16 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must determine whether "a rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the offense to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt."17 The court determines "only whether the jury made a rational decision, not whether its verdict was correct on the issue of guilt or innocence."18 "[I]f the fact finder was presented with sufficient evidence to support the verdict reached, that verdict must be upheld."19 20
In Boyle v. United States, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that, in order to prove the existence of a RICO conspiracy, the Government must prove the existence of an "association-in-fact enterprise."21 The Supreme Court held, in the context of a RICO conspiracy, "it is apparent that an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise,and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose."22 The Boyle Court made clear that the term "enterprise" is defined broadly, noting that "the very concept of an association in fact is expansive."23 "In addition, the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."24
In the present motion, Byron contends the Government failed to prove the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise and, as a result, that his conviction on Count 1 cannot stand.25 The Government disagrees and, in opposing Byron's motion, points to the evidence and testimony offered at trial to prove the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise—i.e., in this case, the "Ride or Die" gang ("ROD").26
Perry Hall, a resident of the Eighth Ward neighborhood in which ROD operated, testified for the Government and explained that ROD members regularly packaged and sold drugs from his Mandeville Street home.27 Hall testified, specifically, that he knew these individuals to be members of ROD.28 Hall further testified that, on various occasions, "16" or "17" ROD members gathered at his home to cut, package, and prepare-for-sale illegal narcotics.29 According to Hall, ROD members "stashed" drugs and guns in his Mandeville Street residence and frequented the residence on a daily basis to sell those drugs.30 Hall even testified that, on at least one occasion, ROD members "put the[ir] money together" to purchase crack cocaine for resale in the Eighth Ward.31
Also testifying for the Government were several police officers with the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD"). For example, Officer Travis Brooks, a former NOPD narcotics detective, offered testimony with respect to undercover narcotics operations which the NOPD conducted at Perry Hall's Mandeville Street residence.32 According to Officer Brooks, Hall's residence was targeted because officers had "observed hand-to-hand drug transactions" taking place within and around the residence.33 Officer Brooks testified that, as a result, he supervised a "controlled purchase" of narcotics from Hall's residence.34 Officer Brooks further testified that, after conducting the controlled purchase, he obtained a search warrant for the residence.35 Officer Brooks explained that, during the execution of the search warrant, two semi-automatic firearms with extended magazines were found hidden in a toilet bowl.36 Present in Hall's residence during the execution of the search warrant were known members of the ROD gang.37 Officer Willard Pearson also testified for the Government.38 During his testimony, Officer Pearson—a veteran officer in the NOPD's Fifth District, which encompassed ROD territory—expressed a familiarity with Perry Hall's residence located at 1632 Mandeville Street.39 Officer Pearson testified that "several narcotics arrests" had been made at that location, and that Hall's residence was known for "cooking and storing crack cocaine and other narcotics, and also weapons."40
The Government also presented testimony from several former ROD members and associates. Erick Garrison testified that he was a founding member of the ROD gang and that Byron, among others, was also an ROD member.41 Garrison testified that ROD members sold crack cocaine "every day" near the intersection of Mandeville Street and N. Derbigny Street and the intersection of Port Street and Urquhart Street in the Eighth Ward.42 Garrison also testified that ROD members used Perry Hall's Mandeville Street residence to "chop down and bag up cocaine."43 Moreover, according to Garrison, only members of ROD were able to sell drugs in those locations, as the Eighth Ward was ROD territory.44 Throughout his testimony, Garrison conveyed an intimate knowledge of illegal drugs and the drug trade and explained that he, personally, had witnessed other ROD members sell drugs on numerous occasions.45 Garrison also confirmed that ROD members regularly carried firearms.46 Garrison specifically stated, when referring to the male members of ROD, that: "I seen all of us with a gun before."47 Garrison testified that ROD members would stash guns under houses, in the grass, or in gutters and that the guns could be used by any ROD member for "protection" when selling drugs.48
Andrealie Lewis, also a former ROD member, offered similar testimony.49 As did Garrison, Lewis identified Byron as a member of the ROD gang.50 During her testimony, Lewis evinced her knowledge of ROD, explaining that she (...
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