United States v. Jones
| Decision Date | 06 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | No. 21-1293,21-1293 |
| Citation | 22 F.4th 667 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry A. JONES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Nathaniel Whalen, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Hammond, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Hampton Hunter Bruton, I, Jeffrey R. Johnson, Attorneys, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Erin M. McGinley, Attorney, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before Easterbrook, Scudder, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.
Larry Jones entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after law enforcement discovered a gun during a warrantless search of his motel room. A magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and recommended denying his motion to suppress the gun. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, concluding that Jones had not been seized, that he consented to the search, and that the search was within the scope of his consent. Jones appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that he was seized when officers knocked on his motel room door and displayed an arrest warrant for a woman reportedly staying in his motel room. Alternatively, he argues any consent he provided was not voluntary and that the search exceeded the scope of his consent. We affirm.
On November 16, 2017, Allen County Sheriff Warrants Division Officers Andrew Brenneke and Duane Romines received an arrest warrant for Whitney Gosnell. Gosnell, listed as 5'3? and 130 to 140 pounds, had allegedly violated the terms of her probation. Following up on an anonymous tip that Gosnell was staying at the Deluxe Inn Motel in Fort Wayne, Indiana, Officers Brenneke and Romines went to the motel around 8:45 p.m. The motel manager informed them that Gosnell was staying in a room with Larry Jones and his son. The officers ran a warrant check, which revealed that Jones had arrests dating back to the 1990s and was listed as a "known resister," "convicted felon," and "substance abuser."
Officers Brenneke and Romines went to Jones's motel room and listened at the door for voices. Not hearing any, they knocked on the door several times and called out "Larry," but did not hear a response. Officer Brenneke knew Jones's street name, so he called out, "Hey, Crunch," and Jones responded, "What?" One or both officers said, to which Jones said, At this point, the officers had not yet explained that they had an arrest warrant for Gosnell.
The officers asked Jones to open the door, and he requested some time before opening it. Both officers estimate that approximately 30 to 60 seconds elapsed between the first knock and when Jones opened the door, fully dressed. The officers were in full uniform with their guns holstered, and there is no dispute that they spoke in conversational tones throughout the encounter. The officers reiterated that they were not there for Jones, showed him the arrest warrant for Gosnell, and explained that they would like to "verify" Gosnell was not there. Officer Brenneke estimates they spent approximately 15 to 20 seconds explaining they would like to search where a person could be or would hide. Jones repeated that Gosnell was not there but eventually said, "That's fine," and moved away from the door. Officer Romines estimated they talked to Jones for less than a minute before entering. At some point, Officer Romines told Jones they "would not open small drawers and things like that."
After entering the motel room, the officers looked in the kitchenette, bathroom, and shower. Officer Romines then lifted up one of two beds but found nothing underneath. There was a six-to-ten-inch gap between the beds and the floor. Before Officer Brenneke checked under the second bed, Jones stated, "Well, she couldn't be under there." Officer Romines responded, "She could be under there, just like she could have been under the first one." Officer Brenneke proceeded to lift the second bed and saw the firearm.
Jones was eventually indicted and arrested in 2019 for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress evidence of the gun. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on November 13, 2019. During the hearing, Officers Brenneke and Romines testified regarding the events at the motel room. They further explained that they had found people hiding in or under beds when attempting to serve warrants. Jones did not testify. Of relevance to this appeal, Jones made two primary arguments: First, the government did not meet its burden of showing that Jones consented to the search of his motel room; second, any arguable consent was tainted by an impermissible seizure. Jones did not argue, however, that the officers' presentation of the arrest warrant for Gosnell constituted a seizure. In his reply brief in support of the motion, Jones added that the search under the bed exceeded the scope of any consent.
The magistrate judge made the following factual findings: the officers' testimony was "not contested in any meaningful way at the hearing," and their testimony was "entirely credible"; a minute and a half passed between the first knock on the door and when Jones opened it; Officer Brenneke twice stated they "would like to verify [Gosnell's] not inside"; Jones said "That's fine" and moved away from the door; Officer Romines explained they would look where "a person can hide"; and the door was left open during the search.
Turning to Jones's legal arguments, the magistrate judge recommended that Jones was not seized, that he had consented to the search, and that the search did not exceed the scope of his consent. The magistrate judge recommended that the officers' knocking did not amount to a seizure. The magistrate judge also found Jones had consented to the search by affirmatively stating "That's fine" and stepping away from the door. The magistrate noted: "it is unclear if the officers explained to Defendant that he had the right to refuse to cooperate," but concluded the officers' conversational tone of voice, lack of force, and minimal number of requests to enter (twice) suggested Jones's consent was not coerced. Finally, the magistrate judge recommended that the search was within the scope of consent because "a reasonable person would likely consider the space [under the bed] within the scope of where a person may hide."
Jones specifically objected to the following findings: (1) that no seizure occurred when the officers spoke with Jones at the door, (2) that Jones consented to the search of his motel room, (3) that Jones's consent was voluntary, (4) that a reasonable person would consider the space under the motel bed as within the scope of "where a person may hide," (5) that the officers did not exceed the scope of Jones's consent, and (6) that the search of the motel room did not violate his constitutional rights.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied the motion to suppress. The court observed that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires the court to "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Although the district court did not discuss each of Jones's objections explicitly, it did adopt the magistrate judge's factual findings, concluding "they aren't in dispute and are otherwise supported by the record."
Regarding Jones's objection to the conclusion that he was not seized, the district court observed that Jones "develops no sound basis for finding [that conclusion] erroneous." Similarly, the court concluded Jones "offers no compelling argument to show the recommendation" that he consented to the search was "erroneous." The district court agreed with the magistrate judge that Jones expressly and voluntarily consented to such a search. The court believed Jones's "real objection" was to the scope of the search, and the court again concluded the magistrate judge's finding on this front "hasn't been shown erroneous." Like the magistrate judge, the district court concluded, "While the space underneath the bed would have been a tight squeeze, it is not unreasonable to believe a person, especially one of petite build, might be hiding under the bed." The district court interpreted Jones's remark that Gosnell "couldn't be under" the second bed not as a withdrawal of consent but as a recognition of the scope of his initial consent.
When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review the court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Jackson , 962 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 2020). Jones raises four issues on appeal: First, whether the district court erred by concluding he was not seized prior to any arguable consent to search his motel room; second, whether the district court erred in concluding that he voluntarily consented to such a search; third, whether the district court erred in concluding that looking under a bed was within the scope of Jones's arguable consent; and fourth, whether the district court correctly applied a de novo standard of review to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. We address each argument in turn.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable" seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whether a seizure occurred is a legal determination that we review de novo. United States v. Tyler , 512 F.3d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ); see also ...
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