United States v. Jones
| Docket Number | 3:21-cr-00008-5 (VAB) |
| Decision Date | 21 July 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. TRAVON JONES. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
On May 3, 2021, the Government secured a superseding Indictment charging Mr. Jones with conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, with a special circumstance of murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 52 (“Indictment”). At his initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Farrish, Mr. Jones pled not guilty. Min. Entry, ECF No. 82.
On August 29, 2022, Mr. Jones appeared before this Court to enter a change of plea. Min. Entry, ECF No. 246 (“Plea Hrg.”). In accordance with a written plea agreement filed with the Court, Mr. Jones pled guilty to Count One which charged him with conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, with a special circumstance of murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). See Plea Agreement, ECF No. 247 (“Plea”).
On March 9, 2023, Mr. Jones filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea, ECF No. 322 (“Mot.”).
On July 7, 2023, after the original motion was fully briefed, Mr Jones filed a supplemental motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Suppl. Memo Re: Mot. to Withdraw Plea of Guilty, ECF No. 357 ( ).
For the following reasons, Mr. Jones's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is GRANTED.
On April 6, 2020, Mr. Jones turned eighteen. Suppl. Mot. at 1.
On May 3, 2021, a grand jury returned a superseding Indictment charging Mr. Jones with conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, with a special circumstance of murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Indictment.
At the time the superseding Indictment was returned, Mr. Jones was incarcerated at Manson Youth Institution (“Manson Youth”), a state facility in Cheshire, Connecticut, so, on May 11, 2021, the Government filed an application for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum, ECF No. 71.
On May 11, 2021, Magistrate Judge Farrish granted the application and issued the writ. Order, ECF No. 72; Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 73.
On May 12, 2021, Mr. Jones pleaded not guilty during his initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Farrish. Min. Entry, ECF No. 82.
On July 7, 2021, the Government filed a consent motion for a pre-trial scheduling order.
Mot. to Adjourn Pre-Trial & Trial Scheduling Order, ECF No. 144.
On July 12, 2021, the Court granted the motion and adopted a pre-trial schedule. Order, ECF No. 155.
On April 6, 2022, the Government filed a motion for a status conference. Mot. for Telephonic Status Conf., ECF No. 210.
On April 7, 2022, the Court granted the motion and scheduled a status conference for April 21, 2022. Order, ECF No. 211.
On April 21, 2022, the Court held a status conference regarding the pre-trial schedule.
On April 21, 2022, the Court entered an order directing the parties to file motions to sever by May 13, 2022 and continuing the trial date until April 2023. Order, ECF No. 216.
On August 29, 2022, the Court held a change of plea hearing and Mr. Jones changed his plea to guilty. Plea Hrg.; Plea.
On October 27, 2022, the Court received a letter from Mr. Jones in which he requested new counsel and stated that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea.
On November 23, 2022, the Court received a second letter from Mr. Jones, reiterating much of the content of his first letter and stating that he first realized he wanted to withdraw was one month after he pleaded guilty.
On December 14, 2022, the Court scheduled a hearing about Mr. Jones's dissatisfaction with his counsel of record. Notice, ECF No. 258.
On December 16, 2022, the Court received a third letter from Mr. Jones again requesting to withdraw his plea and proceed either with new counsel or without his prior counsel.
On January 24, 2023, the Court held a hearing about Mr. Jones's representation, much of which went forward on an ex parte basis without the Government counsel due to issues that may have involved attorney-client privileged information. Min. Entry, ECF No. 271.
On February 8, 2023, Mr. Jones's prior counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a motion for appointment of CJA counsel. Mot. to Withdraw & for Appt. of CJA Counsel, ECF No. 279.
On February 9, 2023, the Court granted both motions. Order, ECF No. 280.
On February 10, 2023, Attorney W. Theodore Koch, III was appointed as Mr. Jones's new counsel.
On March 9, 2023, Mr. Jones, with the assistance of his new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mot.
On March 23, 2023, the Government filed its opposition to the motion to withdraw. Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Withdraw, ECF No. 337 (“Opp'n”).
On March 27, 2023, Mr. Jones filed a reply brief in support of his motion to withdraw. Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Withdraw, ECF No. 338 (“Reply”).
On June 7, 2023, Mr. Jones filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw. Suppl. Mot.
On June 8, 2023, the Court ordered the Government to file a response to the supplemental motion by June 16, 2023. Order, ECF No. 358.
On June 14, 2023, the Government filed a memorandum in opposition to the supplemental memorandum. Mem. in Opp'n to Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 359 ( ).
On June 29, 2023, Mr. Jones filed a reply brief in support of his supplemental memorandum. Reply in Supp. of Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 366 ( ).
Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty “after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “[A] defendant who seeks to withdraw his plea bears the burden of satisfying the trial judge that there are valid grounds for withdrawal, taking into account any prejudice to the government.” United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A defendant has no automatic entitlement to have such a motion granted, for society has a strong interest in the finality of guilty pleas, and allowing withdrawal of pleas not only undermines confidence in the integrity of our judicial procedures, but also increases the volume of judicial work, and delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.” United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1529 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[t]he fact that a defendant has a change of heart prompted by his reevaluation of either the Government's case against him or the penalty that might be imposed is not a sufficient reason to permit withdrawal of a plea.” Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1100.
When determining whether the defendant has presented a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal under Rule 11, the Court considers the following factors: “(1) whether the defendant has asserted his or her legal innocence in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea; (2) the amount of time that has elapsed between the plea and the motion (the longer the elapsed time, the less likely withdrawal would be fair and just); and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea.” United States v. Schmidt, 373 F.3d 100, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2004). Courts also “consider whether the defendant ‘has raised a significant question about the voluntariness of the original plea.'” United States v. Albarran, 943 F.3d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Schmidt, 373 F.3d at 103).
In his motion, Mr. Jones argues that his guilty plea should be withdrawn because each of the Schmidt factors weigh in his favor. See generally Mot.; Suppl. Mot.
The Court will address each Schmidt factor in turn.
Under Rule 11(b)(3), a district court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea before entering judgment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3); United States v. Pattee, 820 F.3d 496, 509 (2d Cir. 2016). This rule requires the district court “to assure itself simply that the conduct to which the defendant admits is in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which he is pleading guilty.” United States v. Lloyd, 901 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In making this determination, the district court “is not required to rely solely on the defendant's own admissions,” Maher, 108 F.3d at 1524; however, “the factual basis for the plea must be developed on the record at the time the plea is taken,” United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 502 (2d Cir. 2006). See also United States v. Andrades, 169 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) ().
Mr. Jones argues that he is legally innocent because there is an insufficient factual basis to find that, under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, the Government can properly prosecute him in federal court. Suppl. Mot. at 1.
“The [Juvenile Delinquency Act] governs the federal prosecution of a defendant who is indicted before he reaches the age of twenty-one and who is accused of having committed federal crimes before the age of eighteen.” United States v. Scott, 681 Fed.Appx. 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2017) abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Ramirez, 297 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2002)). “The relevant ‘act' for purposes of determining federal...
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