United States v. Joyner
| Decision Date | 15 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:20-CR-11-FL,2:20-CR-11-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DEANGELO MAURICE JOYNER, Defendant. |
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Deangelo Maurice Joyner's motion to suppress. [DE-28]. The Government responded in opposition to the motion [DE-29], and the court held an evidentiary hearing on January 22, 2021. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion to suppress be denied.
A Grand Jury sitting in the Eastern District of North Carolina returned an indictment charging Joyner with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. Joyner filed the instant motion to suppress, contending that a search of his vehicle and a subsequent search of his person violated the Fourth Amendment. [DE-28] at 2-5. At the suppression hearing, the Government presented two witness and submitted two exhibits, a video clip and full-length video from the body camera of Kill Devil Hills Police Sergeant Rodney Rawls.
On February 8, 2020, Deputy Sherrod of the Dare County Sheriff's Department was on routine patrol and was dispatched to investigate a hit and run. She was told that the suspect vehicle was a white work truck with ladder racks leaving Marshy Ridge Road in Collington, North Carolina. Deputy Sherrod observed a vehicle matching the description and initiated a traffic stop.
The driver was unable to roll down the window of the vehicle, so Deputy Sherrod approached slowly and gave a command to open the door. The driver cracked open the door, and Deputy Sherrod pushed it further open. Mr. Joyner was the driver and lone occupant in the vehicle. Deputy Sherrod detected the odor of alcohol and asked Mr. Joyner to step out of the truck. He moved slowly, so she assisted him out.
Deputy Sherrod took Mr. Joyner to the rear of the vehicle and asked him about the hit and run, where he was coming from, and whether he had a driver's license. Mr. Joyner said he had a driver's license but it was not on him. Deputy Sherrod later checked, and Mr. Joyner's license was revoked. According to Deputy Sherrod, Mr. Joyner was fidgety and kept reaching into his pockets. Mr. Joyner told Deputy Sherrod he was coming from Marshy Ridge. Deputy Sherrod determined that the owner of the truck was a construction company, not Mr. Joyner. She asked Mr. Joyner if he was authorized to drive the truck, and he said that he was not. Deputy Sherrod smelled the odor of marijuana on Mr. Joyner's person, so she asked him if he had anything illegal on him, and he answered that he did not. From where she was standing, Deputy Sherrod could not see anything in the cab of truck.
Deputy Sherrod ultimately charged Mr. Joyner with hit and run, driving while license revoked ("DWLR"), and open container, all of which Deputy Sherrod testified are arrestable offenses. Deputy Sherrod testified further that she would have arrested Mr. Joyner on those offenses standing alone, and he would have been searched. She also testified that in a typical hit and run investigation, there would be no need to search the interior of a vehicle because there would be no evidence located there. Deputy Sherrod stated that there were no specific facts thatwould have led her to believe Mr. Joyner was armed and dangerous. Deputy Sherrod said that she has discretion whether to arrest someone or issue a citation for hit and run, DWLR, and open container.
Sergeant Rawls arrived on the scene when Mr. Joyner was still in the truck. He heard Mr. Joyner say something to the effect of "you didn't have to grab me" as he exited the truck. Sergeant Rawls saw that Mr. Joyner had a cell phone in his hand, so Sergeant Rawls took the cell phone and placed it on the seat of the truck. The interior of the cab was not illuminated, so Sergeant Rawls testified that he used a flashlight to see into the cab of the truck, but he was not leaning into the vehicle initially. He could clearly see a blue liquor bottle through the open door, and he immediately recognized it as a vodka bottle. He testified that the seal was broken on the bottle and the bottle was opened. Next to the vodka bottle, Sergeant Rawls saw a small, clear plastic bag, which he testified is indicative of possible narcotics. Sergeant Rawls could not recall whether he could see inside the bag from where he was standing outside the truck.
Sergeant Rawls reached into the truck and picked up the bag and the liquor bottle to examine them more closely. After he lifted the bag up, he thought he could see a white powder residue inside, but the bodycam footage shows that Sergeant Rawls later corrected himself and told another officer that he did not see white powder in the bag. Sergeant Rawls placed the bag back on the seat, went to the rear of the vehicle, and advised Deputy Sherrod of what he had found. Sergeant Rawls patted down Mr. Joyner and felt a firearm at his left hip area. Sergeant Rawls said, "Now I'm pissed; he has a gun," placed Mr. Joyner in handcuffs, and removed the firearm from his waistband. Law enforcement later discovered that the firearm was stolen and that Mr. Joyner did not have a concealed carry permit. Sergeant Rawls also testified that there is no protocol thatwould justify taking a suspect's cell phone and that he did not believe Mr. Joyner was armed and dangerous before he found the gun. Finally, Sergeant Rawls testified that at the time of the pat-down of Mr. Joyner, there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Mr. Joyner for the hit and run or driving while impaired ("DWI").
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause is "per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such exception to the warrant requirement for searches is the automobile exception. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); United States v. Lowing, 703 F.3d 229, 239 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. White, 549 F.3d 946, 949 (4th Cir. 2008). Additionally, an exception to the warrant requirement for seizures is the plain view doctrine. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (). Accordingly, the issues here are whether a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred; whether any exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as the automobile exception or the plain view doctrine; and whether the gun found in Mr. Joyner's waistband should be suppressed.
When he was standing at the open door of Mr. Joyner's truck, Sergeant Rawls shone his flashlight into the cab to better observe its contents, as the cab was not otherwise illuminated. TheGovernment argued in its brief and at the hearing that shining a flashlight into the truck was permissible. Gov't's Resp. [DE-29] at 6. However, Mr. Joyner takes issue with Sergeant Rawls leaning into the cab of the truck rather than shining his flashlight from the doorway. Def.'s Mem. [DE-28] at 3 ().
The Supreme Court has held that shining a flashlight into a vehicle is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (citations omitted) ("Maples' action in shining his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amendment. . . . the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection."). Accordingly, when Sergeant Rawls stood at the door of the truck and shone his flashlight inside, no search occurred.
There are two definitions of a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. First, under the traditional trespassory definition, a search occurs when there is an unlicensed physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013). Second, "[a] 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (). If there is a physical intrusion, the question of whether the intrusion was a search is often a straightforward one under the trespassory test. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11 ().
After shining his flashlight into the truck, Sergeant Rawls placed or tossed Mr. Joyner's cell phone onto the front seat, and he saw a liquor bottle and plastic bag. He physically reached into the car to pick up the bottle and bag to better examine them. The act of reaching into a vehicle to investigate potential contraband is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, as it is a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. See New York...
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