United States v. Judice, 71-2526 Summary Calendar.

• Decision Date: 23 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-2526 Summary Calendar.,71-2526 Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alex J. JUDICE and W. R. Merritt, Sr., Defendants-Appellants.

457 F.2d 414 (1972)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alex J. JUDICE and W. R. Merritt, Sr., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 71-2526 Summary Calendar.^*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

February 16, 1972.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied March 23, 1972.

Albert S. Johnston, III, Alfred Lee Felder, Johnston & Felder, Pascagoula, Miss., for defendants-appellants.

Robert E. Hauberg, U. S. Atty., E. Donald Strange, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before GEWIN, AINSWORTH and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 23, 1972.

SIMPSON, Circuit Judge:

On this appeal from judgments of conviction and sentence imposed following jury verdicts of guilty returned in their joint trial for violations of Title 26, U.S.C., Section 5861, receiving or possessing a firearm (as defined in the Act) not registered to him in The National Firearms Registration Record (under Sec. 5861(d), Count I) and transferring a firearm (as defined in the Act) in violation of the Act without having paid a transfer tax as provided for in Title 26, U.S.C., Section 5811 (under Sec. 5861(e), Count II), the Messrs. Judice and Merritt urge two grounds of claimed error on the part of the trial court. We conclude that error is not demonstrated in either particular and accordingly affirm.

The first contention is that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were infringed by the time lag of twenty-one months between the date of the alleged offenses and the date they were brought to trial, relying upon Ross v. United States, 1965, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 349 F.2d 210. This contention is specious. This Circuit has repeatedly rejected the Ross rationale in holding that delay between the dates of the offense and indictment is controlled exclusively by the applicable Statute of Limitations.¹ The correctness of our view has recently been vindicated by the December 20, 1971 decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Marion, et al., 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (decided December 20, 1971). Kroll, Grayson, Harlow and Bruce, with several other Fifth Circuit cases, and numerous cases from other Circuits, are cited by the Supreme Court in its Footnote 8 to its statement in Marion² that "the Courts of Appeal that have considered the question in constitutional terms have never reversed a conviction or dismissed an indictment solely on the basis of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial provision where only pre-indictment delay was involved."

The remaining contention advanced by Judice and Merritt is that they were entrapped, as a matter of law, by agents of the Internal Revenue Service into commission of the offenses charged, and were hence entitled to direction of a judgment of acquittal, for which they timely moved. We find this point equally without substance, for reasons we now briefly set forth.

The government's evidence was that after being furnished information as to automatic weapons at Paps Furniture, Reloading and Supply Store at Biloxi, Mississippi, operated by Arthur Parker, Revenue Agent Owens went to that establishment in an undercover capacity and was successful without any inducements to Parker in purchasing an automatic carbine from Parker.³ This sale took place April 15, 1969. Agent Holt who was stationed at Meridian, Mississippi, was called down to Biloxi to work undercover with Owens and they discussed the case on the night of April 15. On the following day, April 16, the two agents went to Parker's store where Agent Holt met Parker. After a discussion of automatic guns Holt gave Parker a list of the type guns he was interested in purchasing. The appellant Judice was present in the store and was introduced to Holt. In an ensuing conversation about automatic weapons Judice asked "whether he would be interested in a 9-mm. German Schmeisser."⁴ Judice told Holt that he could procure the type weapons Holt had listed and an appointment was made for Holt and Judice to meet at the gunshop about 5 P.M. on April 17.

When Holt returned the afternoon of the 17th Parker was in the store but Judice was not. After Holt had waited fifteen or twenty minutes Parker called him to the telephone where he discussed guns with a person later identified by him as the appellant Merritt. After first offering Merritt $125.00 for an automatic carbine for which Merritt's asking price was $260.00, Holt agreed to pay Merritt $250.00 for the weapon provided Merritt was able to supply other automatic weapons in good condition. They agreed to meet about 8 P.M., which they did along with Parker and Judice. Merritt delivered the automatic carbine and prices for other illegal weapons were discussed and an agreement reached as to price. Holt later called Merritt at a telephone number furnished by Merritt and agreements were reached as to the price and meeting place where the additional weapons would be delivered to Holt and the money paid. Under this agreement Holt and Owens met the appellants Judice and Merritt about 1 A.M., April 18, in a desolate area about four miles east of Pascagoula, Mississippi, where the exchange took place.

Judice's testimony was to the effect that he was introduced to Holt at Parker's shop and was told that Holt was looking for automatic weapons for an invasion of Cuba and that a premium price would be paid for such weapons. Judice denied discussing automatic weapons with Holt at this time and testified that he did not own any or know where any could be located. He testified that he went back to Pascagoula to Merritt's home and during a casual conversation Merritt remarked that a Mr. Paul Woods had discussed some automatic guns with him. Merritt then called Woods, found that he had such guns, and phoned Parker to arrange for a meeting on the following day. Judice admitted that he and Merritt carried an automatic carbine to this meeting and that this was at a time prior to the acquisition of the other weapons from Woods. Judice's testimony as to the transfer of the guns at 1 A.M. on April 18 did not differ materially from the testimony of Holt and Owens. He further testified that he and Merritt received $500.00 each as their part of the bargain. He testified that at this meeting he was wearing gloves and had a shotgun.

Merritt's testimony was similar in material respects to that of Judice as to the meeting at Merritt's home, the discussion about machine guns and the call about guns to Mr. Woods and the ensuing call to Parker's gunshop setting up the meeting with Holt. He further testified that he took the automatic carbine to Parker's where he first met Holt and that he was armed with a pistol during that discussion. He admitted the transfer of the firearm, that he knew the transaction was illegal, and that he had committed a crime. In his testimony Merritt related no acts or declarations of either government agent susceptible of being construed as an unlawful inducement to sell the firearms.

The motion for directed verdict on the basis of entrapment was made after both sides rested, the court holding that the defense of entrapment should be submitted to the jury. The sufficiency of the instructions on this point was not excepted to by either appellant and no request for additional instructions was made. The appellants' sole contention is that under the facts of the case the trial court should, as a matter of law, have ruled that the appellants were entrapped and entered a judgment of acquittal on their behalf.

In this connection, the appellants rely primarily on Sherman v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848. That case held that Sherman was entrapped by the use of an informer and that the government cannot disassociate itself from his acts. In Sherman, however, there was repeated persuasion, including an appeal to sympathy and an inducement offered to the defendant himself to return to the use of narcotics on an habitual basis. Sherman thus is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar since Holt's offer was couched strictly in business terms and was made only once. The agents testified that they offered no inducements and that the prices they paid were reasonable in the underworld firearms business. It would appear that the jury was justified in deciding that the appellants simply were afforded the opportunity to violate the law, which they did, and that no entrapment by the government's agents took place. We hold that under the facts of this case the defense of entrapment was a proper matter for submission to the jury and that since the defense was submitted to the jury in unassailed language error is not made to appear.

The judgments appealed from are affirmed.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

PER CURIAM:

Our attention is called by the Petition for Rehearing to the following language appearing in the text of United States v. Marion, et al., 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) appe...