United States v. Kahriger
| Decision Date | 06 May 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 16672.,16672. |
| Citation | 105 F. Supp. 322 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. KAHRIGER. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Gerald A. Gleeson, U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Jacob Kossman, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
The defendant, Joseph Kahriger, was proceeded against criminally by Information filed on March 17, 1952. The Information alleged that the defendant was in the business of accepting wagers and that he willfully failed to register for and pay the occupational tax as required by the Act of October 20, 1951, C. 521, Title IV, Sec. 471(a), 65 Stat. 529, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3290 and 3291. The defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on the ground that the law is unconstitutional for various reasons set forth in his briefs. The question presents many features in connection with taxation that have been the subject of dispute and decisions for the Appellate Courts of the land. At the outset, we decide to recognize the principle that the power of the Congress of the United States to levy taxes is and should be free from judicial control unless the fundamentals of the Constitution of the United States are violated. We recognize the exclusive power of the Congress in the field of legislative enactment, and we recognize it as the only vehicle to express the judgment of our people on the delicate matter of finance. We also are scrupulously meticulous in confining to the Judiciary their peculiar and limited responsibilities in interpreting such legislation. This concept of the judiciary however, requires a recognition of the fact that while the judiciary can express no opinion as to the wisdom of tax legislation or any motives that might have prompted such legislation, the Judiciary has the sacred responsibility of guarding the people against invasion of constitutional rights and protecting the States from an invasion of their Sovereign rights under the guise of taxation when the constitutional safeguards are endangered.
A careful consideration of the cases cited in the briefs submitted by both sides convinces this Court that the subject matter of this legislation so far as revenue purposes is concerned is within the scope of Federal authorities. In other words it is quite clear that the revenue objective of the legislation in question is clearly within the scope of the powers of Congress to express. We desire to say that at the outset, because if there was nothing more to the case than the question of vagueness of the tax, and the discriminatory nature of the tax, the defendant's position would be untenable. But the legislation goes much further than a piece of taxing legislation. It imposes a tax deemed by the Congress fair and reasonable, exempts certain types of wagering and wagerers, which to Congress seemed wise, and requires certain information which appear to be constitutionally legitimate. This, we think, fairly summarizes the revenue and taxing features of the legislation. If it stopped there the legislation would undoubtedly be sound, but it does not stop there.
When the Act departed from the field of taxable legislation and went into the field of morals and invaded the sanctuary of State control it then became and now is the subject of judicial inspection. In the remarks that we feel constrained to make on this measure we feel it our duty, due to the critical conditions prevailing in our social life of today, to say that we recognize the high purposes of the Congress to curb a present and a growing evil. A person would indeed be blind today if he were not to recognize that the great increase in gambling and forms of related vice has reached a stage that unless controlled or curtailed will undermine the very pillars of our social order and sap the very lifeblood of our National body. We are convinced from our long contact with the Congress and its members that they must have been appalled by the conditions existing, especially in our big cities, by the revelations of their own congressional investigations.
Now, notwithstanding the laudable and even holy purposes to curb this growing evil, had they the right under the guise of a taxing power to also require that certain information be furnished which is peculiarly applicable to the applicant from the standpoint of law enforcement and vice control? The applicant for registration among many things is required to give the names of other persons, both real and alias, or style, with address of business and residence. Failure to give this information and to comply with the law in certain respects would subject the applicant to a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and an imprisonment of five (5) years. This feature of the legislation is presented to throw light on the question as to whether this portion of the measure is a...
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United State v. Kahriger
...was an infringement by the Federal Government on the police power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. United States v. Kahriger, D.C., 105 F.Supp. 322, 323. The result below is at odds with the position of the seven other district courts which have considered the matter,2 and, in......
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United States v. Nadler
...482; Alston v. U. S., 274 U.S. 289, 47 S.Ct. 634, 71 L.Ed. 1052; Sonzinsky v. U. S., supra. 5 See note 2. 6 See note 2. 7 U. S. v. Kahriger, D.C., 105 F.Supp. 322. ...
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United States v. Kahriger
...register to pay the tax. Kahriger first made an attack on the constitutionality of the statute and succeeded in the court below. See D.C., 105 F.Supp. 322. The Supreme Court reversed, three Justices dissenting. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754. On reman......
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United States v. Calamaro
...the Internal Revenue Code involved in the present case were held to be unconstitutional by Judge Welsh of this court. United States v. Kahriger, D.C., 105 F. Supp. 322. The decision of Judge Welsh was reversed and the constitutionality of the statute was upheld by a decision of the United S......