United States v. Kamra

• Decision Date: 21 May 2021
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 18-253
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANMOL SINGH KAMRA
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANMOL SINGH KAMRA

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 18-253

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAY 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM

SURRICK, J.

After a ten-day jury trial, Defendant Anmol Singh Kamra was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Defendant worked at a pharmacy and processed fake oxycodone prescriptions. He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, which was a significant downward departure from the sentencing guideline range he faced. Defendant appealed the judgment and sentence. He now moves for bail pending appeal, or in the alternative, an extension of his voluntary surrender date. (ECF No. 145.) He contends that "exceptional reasons" warrant release pending his appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2018, the Government filed an Indictment charging Defendant with conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, outside the usual course of professional practice and for no legitimate medical purpose, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The Government alleged that from December 2012 through about March 2016, Defendant, a pharmacist assistant at Campus Pharmacy in Philadelphia, conspired with George Fisher, a physician, and Frank Brown, to illegally distribute thousands of oxycodone pills to drug users. (ECF No. 1.) Pursuant to the scheme, Defendant would fill fake oxycodone prescriptions containing sham patient names. The scripts were written by Fisher. Defendant would give the oxycodone pills to Brown, who in turn sold the pills in street level drug deals. (Id.) Fisher and Brown were charged separately. Both pleaded guilty to their involvement in the conspiracy and cooperated with the Government.

After ten days of evidence and testimony and two days of deliberations, the jury found Defendant guilty.

On March 9, 2021, Defendant's motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 was denied. (Court's Mar. 9 Mem., ECF No. 135.) A more in-depth recitation of the facts of this case can be found in the Court's March 9 Memorandum. (Id.) After reviewing all the evidence and testimony, we concluded that the jury verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. (Id.)

On March 11, 2021, Defendant was sentenced to 18 months of incarceration followed by three years of supervised release. (ECF Nos. 137, 139.) At the sentencing hearing, the Court did not order that Defendant be detained. Instead, the Court permitted pretrial release to continue and scheduled a date for Defendant to voluntarily surrender to the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). (ECF No. 138.)

On March 23, 2021, Defendant received notice that he was designated to serve his sentence at North Lake Correctional Institution, in Baldwin Michigan, which is approximately 770 driving miles from Defendant's home in Newtown Square. At Defendant's request, and with no objection from the Government, the Court made a recommendation to the BOP "that the defendant be designated to a facility close to his family, specifically his wife and his brother, in Newtown Square, Pennsylvania." (ECF No. 142.) Notwithstanding the Court's recommendation, the BOP advised counsel for Defendant that it would not change Defendant'sdesignation. (Def.'s Mot. 4, ECF No. 145.)

Defendant now moves for bail pending the outcome of his appeal to the Third Circuit. He contends that his BOP designation, which is 770 miles from his family, and the fact that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") will place a detainer on him once he is in the BOP's custody constitute "exceptional reasons" warranting his continued release pending his appeal. The Government opposes the Motion. (ECF No. 147.)

II. DISCUSSION

The statute addressing bail pending appeal, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2), mandates that a defendant be detained if he has been convicted of an offense described in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) of 18 U.S.C. § 3124(f)(1) and has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment.¹ Subparagraph (C) if § 3142(f)(1) includes "an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) . . . ."

Defendant does not dispute that his conviction and sentence mandate his detention under § 3143(b)(2). He was convicted of a controlled substances offense that carries a statutory maximum of ten years or more. He argues instead that a safety valve provision found in 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) permits his release pending appeal. Section 3145(c), entitled "Appeal from a release or detention order" provides:

An appeal from a release or detention order, or from a decision denyingrevocation of amendment of such an order, is governed by the provisions of section 1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of this title. The appeal shall be determined promptly. A person subject to detention pursuant to section 3143(a)(2) or (b)(2), and who meets the conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1) or (b)(1), may be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, by the judicial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person's detention would not be appropriate.

18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).

The Government argues that district courts lack the authority to grant release pending appeal under § 3145(c) because the provision itself limits that authority to appellate courts.² The Government also argues that even if Defendant could avail himself of § 3145(c), he has failed to meet the statute's heavy burden of establishing that bail pending appeal is appropriate.

A. Court's Authority to Grant Release Pending Appeal under § 3145(c)

We will first address whether 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) permits district courts the authority to grant release pending appeal. The Government contends that, by its language, § 3145(c) applies to courts of appeals and not to district courts. In other words, the "judicial officer" who may order a release for a person subject to detention refers to circuit court judges and not district court judges.

The Third Circuit has not yet weighed in on whether district courts have discretionary authority to apply § 3145(c). However, the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that district courts do possess discretionary authority under § 3145(c).Each court of appeals that has addressed the issue has concluded that district courts have the authority. See United States v. Meister, 744 F.3d 1236, 1237 (11th Cir. 2013) ("We now explicitly hold, given the unambiguous statutory language and unanimous agreement of our sister circuits that have considered the issue, that a district court has the authority to release a defendant being detained pursuant to § 3143(a)(2) upon a showing of 'exceptional reasons' under § 3145(c)."); United States v. Christman, 596 F.3d 870, 871 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Goforth, 546 F.3d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that "district judges unambiguously qualify as 'judicial officers' under § 3145(c)"); United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1014 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mostrom, 11 F.3d 93, 95 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that a district court had initial authority to make a § 3145(c) determination); United States v. Carr, 947 F.2d 1239, 1240 (5th Cir. 1991) ("We see no reason why Congress would have limited this means of relief to reviewing courts. Thus we conclude that the "exceptional reasons" language of § 3145 may be applied by the judicial officer initially ordering such mandatory detention, despite its inclusion in a section generally covering appeals."); United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); United States v. Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).

District courts within the Third Circuit are divided. However, the majority of district courts that have addressed the issue have determined that they have the authority to examine whether exceptional circumstances warrant release under § 3145(c). See United States v. Stevens, 454 F. Supp. 3d 472, 477 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (concluding that district courts have authority to apply § 3145(c) and considering merits of defendant's arguments); United States v. Porter, 442 F. Supp. 3d 903, 906-07 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2020) (holding that the court haddiscretionary authority to apply § 3145(c)); United States v. Wilson, No. 17-0077, 2017 WL 1351399, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2017) (concluding that it has the authority to release defendant for "exceptional reasons" under § 3145(c)); United States v. Williams, 903 F. Supp. 2d 292, 301 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (providing statutory and legislative analysis on § 3145(c) and concluding that it "possesses the discretion to release a defendant pending sentencing or appeal for 'exceptional reasons'"); United States v. Gagliardi, No. 04-0796, 2008 WL 155057, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2008) (assuming without deciding that the court had authority to grant release under § 3145(c)); United States v. Lieberman, 496 F. Supp. 2d 584, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (assuming that the court had "the power to apply the 'exceptional reasons' provision of § 3145(c)"). A few district courts in our Circuit have adopted the minority view in concluding that § 3145(c) is meant for appellate courts and not for district courts. See United States v. Castro, No. 15-362, 2016 WL 3446660, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2016) (holding that the court lacked authority to hear defendant's argument under § 3145(c)); United States v. Salome, 870 F. Supp. 648, 652 (W.D. Pa. 1994) ("[T]he court finds that the jurisdiction established by § 3145(c) is appellate jurisdiction.").

We believe that if presented with the question, the Third Circuit would align itself with the nine other Circuit Courts that have addressed this issue and conclude that a district Court has the...