United States v. Kaufman

Decision Date22 July 1970
Docket Number34348.,No. 564-567,Dockets 33979,33980,34004,564-567
Citation429 F.2d 240
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Paul M. KAUFMAN, Steven Burns, Alan Florea, and Irving Garber, Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Daniel J. Sullivan, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U. S. Atty., S. D. New York, William B. Gray, Arthur A. Munisteri, Asst. U. S. Attys., on the brief), for appellee.

Jacob W. Friedman, New York City (Slotnick & Narral, Arnold E. Wallach, New York City, on the brief), for appellant Kaufman.

Geoffrey M. Kalmus, New York City (Kramer, Lowenstein, Nessen & Kamin, Maurice N. Nessen, Charlotte Fischman, New York City, on the brief), for appellant Burns.

Jerome J. Londin, New York City (Carro, Spanbock & Londin, New York City, on the brief), for appellant Florea.

Burton S. Cooper, New York City (Shatzkin & Cooper, Edwin L. Smith, New York City, on the brief), for appellant Garber.

Before MOORE and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges, and BONSAL,* District Judge.

BONSAL, District Judge:

Paul M. Kaufman, Steven Burns, Alan Florea and Irving Garber appeal from judgments of conviction entered against them on July 29, 1969 after a seven-week trial before Judge Tyler and a jury. The indictment (68 Cr. 485) was filed on June 3, 1968 and charged ten defendants in seventeen counts. Five defendants, including the four appellants, went to trial, and twelve counts went to the jury. Count 1, the conspiracy count, charged a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to violate the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) and 77x). The eleven substantive counts charged violations of these sections in sending confirmations of stock transactions through the mails. The substantive counts are also described as overt acts in the conspiracy count as acts done pursuant to the alleged conspiracy. Defendant Seigenfeld was acquitted by the jury with respect to the conspiracy count, the only one in which he was charged.

The jury convicted all four appellants under the conspiracy count; Kaufman and Burns on counts 3, 5, 8 and 9, in which they alone were charged; and Kaufman on counts 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17, in which he alone was charged.1 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the convictions of each of the appellants.

Statement of Facts

Daniel Kroll, who died in August 1963, was the former president of Donbar Development Corporation (Donbar), which was engaged in the development, building and sale of interracial residential real estate on Long Island and in New Jersey. In January 1963, Kroll lost a proxy fight and was removed from the presidency of Donbar. He owned 82,000 unregistered shares of Donbar, a thinly traded stock selling in the over-the-counter market. A part of his holdings was tied up in a voting trust agreement.

In March 1963, with the assistance of appellant Kaufman's law firm, Kroll obtained a no-action letter from the S.E.C., and later in the month began selling some of his available Donbar stock. He encountered difficulties and, in early April, asked for assistance from Mark Binstein, the chief Government witness, who, at the time, maintained an office under the name of National Market Relations, Inc. and employed a Mrs. Eveline Gold on a part-time basis.

Kroll, Binstein and appellant Garber, the owner and operator of an unincorporated over-the-counter securities firm, called Nassau Securities Service, worked out a scheme to sell some 40,000 shares of Kroll's Donbar stock to the public. The scheme involved the paying of cash bribes to salesmen, selective buying to raise and support the market price of the stock, controlled selling so as not to depress the market, and the "squeezing" of short sellers. Appellant Garber was to cause enough Donbar shares to be bought to raise its price from 3-3½, to 4¼-4¾. Appellant Kaufman joined the scheme and brought in S. C. Burns & Co., Inc. and its president, the appellant Steven Burns, to participate in the distribution of the Kroll stock. Cash payments were made to Burns in return for retail sales by his firm, and the payments were escrowed with Kaufman until the Burns sales had been completed. Kaufman introduced the principals of Harris, Clare & Co., clients of his law firm, to Kroll, and told them they would receive $1.00 cash per share for Kroll stock they sold to customers. Appellant Florea agreed to find brokers to take Donbar stock, and was to receive from Binstein 25¢ in cash for each share so taken. One of these brokers was Seigenfeld, who was acquitted of conspiracy by the jury. Florea was paid in cash by Binstein for his services.

The scheme was carried out during May and June, 1963. The selling of Kroll's available Donbar stock was substantially completed in June, 1963. His shares were sold at prices ranging from $3.00 to $4.00 per share, and thereafter the price dropped to $1.50 to $2.00 per share. None of the retail purchasers who bought Donbar stock were told of the cash payoffs which were made to salesmen to stimulate their recommendations or that the price of the stock was being rigged while they were buying.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The jury having found each of the appellants guilty, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the Government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Bowles, 428 F.2d 592 (2d Cir., June 16, 1970); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 530; United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Keogh v. United States, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963). So viewed, the evidence established an unlawful conspiracy to sell Kroll's Donbar stock through the use of fraudulent and manipulative devices, and the participation of each of the appellants in the conspiracy.

The Government was not required, as appellants contend, to prove that each appellant was involved in all phases of the conspiracy. It was sufficient for the Government to prove that each of them knowingly joined the conspiracy to sell the stock by the use of fraudulent and manipulative devices. United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 327 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 50 (1964) and cases cited therein. The evidence establishes that Garber aided Binstein and Kroll in setting up the scheme and undertook to supervise the distribution of the Donbar stock. Mrs. Gold and Binstein went to Garber's office to obtain information concerning the market operations. Kaufman, as Binstein and Kroll's attorney, actively participated in the conspiracy and acted as escrow agent for the cash payments to be made to appellant Burns and received cash from Binstein for that purpose. Burns does not deny that he was to receive payments from Kaufman, but he contends that he did not know of the market rigging aspect — "one prong of the prosecution's two-pronged scheme and conspiracy theory." As stated above, it is immaterial that he may not have known of all of the facets of the conspiracy.

Appellant Florea strenuously contends that he was not a member of the conspiracy, and we consider the evidence as to his participation in more detail.

Florea asserts that there is no evidence of his agreement to effect fraudulent sales of Donbar stock to the public, and that his participation was limited to the "buy" function. Binstein testified that following his first meeting with Kroll, he met with Florea and told him in detail what was contemplated — "that Mr. Kroll would pay $100 per 100 shares for anybody who wanted to participate in the corner, and in the run-up of the stock of Donbar Development Corporation." Binstein testified that,

"The brokers were told to buy the stock, to put in for clients or trading accounts or anything, but to be put away, not to be sold immediately thereafter, immediately after buying it,"

and that this was in substance what he told Florea.

Binstein testified that Florea visited his office on a number of occasions in May-June, 1963 in connection with the sale of Donbar stock. He testified that Florea "was coming to both collect money for himself and the people he had brought into the Donbar situation, and on a couple of occasions just to come to check Binstein's daily progress report * * * to see what buying was done by whom, to make sure he received what he thought he was entitled to." Binstein also testified that Florea had introduced him to Seigenfeld and Dietz Securities. Binstein testified that Florea demanded compensation for his services with respect to Harris Clare and Dietz Securities and that he made a number of cash payments to Florea in connection with Dietz and Harris Clare. Mrs. Gold testified concerning discussions between Florea and Binstein in Binstein's office that,

"He Florea was discussing the amount of money that Binstein owed him for putting certain buying into Donbar although I never actually saw him get paid,"

and that

"Mr. Florea was claiming compensation for Dietz buying."

Florea testified that he had never heard of Kroll and that he first heard of the Donbar company in 1967, in the U. S. Attorney's office. Florea conceded only that he knew Binstein, as they had been at West Point together. He testified that he never introduced any brokers to Binstein for the purposes of buying or selling Donbar, and he denied receiving any payments from Binstein in connection with Donbar stock. On cross-examination, Florea testified that he occasionally went to Binstein's office, where he saw Binstein and Mrs. Gold. Florea conceded that he could have heard about Donbar in 1963, that he may have told the U. S. Attorney in 1968 that Donbar was represented by Binstein in a public relations capacity, and that he may have heard Kroll's name mentioned in Binstein's office. He also testified that he knew Kaufman and may have seen Burns socially.

The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
29 cases
  • Douglas v. United States
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • February 13, 1985
    ...States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 903-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843, 100 S.Ct. 86, 62 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979); United States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 185, 27 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). The trial court should, of course, make every effort in......
  • Booth v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1984
    ...remanded for further proceedings in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).9 In United States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d 240, 246 (1970), the Second Circuit said in dictum that to the extent that some of the pro se defendant's statements "might be construed......
  • State v. Bontempo
    • United States
    • Superior Court of New Jersey
    • July 20, 1979
    ...judge's comments were proper since defendant had testified in the guise of propounding questions to witnesses. In United States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d 240 (2 Cir. 1970), Cert. den. 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 185, 27 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), defendant appeared Pro se and repeatedly made statements dire......
  • U.S. v. McPartlin
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • April 23, 1979
    ...returned by the jury in this complex case demonstrate that the jury studied the evidence with great care. See United States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 185, 27 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). We decline to disturb their verdict, holding that the indepen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT