United States v. Keown
Decision Date | 09 June 1937 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. KEOWN et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Bunk Gardner, U. S. Atty., and Eli H. Brown, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff.
Rodes K. Myers, of Bowling Green, Ky., for defendants.
The defendants were indicted in the Bowling Green Division of this court on May 17, 1937, for having in their possession 155 gallons of whisky without stamps affixed to the containers showing the quantity and payment of tax. They were also charged, in the second count of the indictment, with concealing the liquor in a 1936 Ford Coach automobile, motor No. 18-3265263, on one of the public highways of the commonwealth of Kentucky.
The defendants waived trial by jury, submitted the law and facts to the court, and moved to suppress the evidence on which the indictment was obtained because the arresting officer stopped and searched the car without warrant, and, as a result of the illegal search, found in the car the liquor which is the subject of this prosecution. The motion to quash was heard on the trial of the case, and at the conclusion of the evidence was overruled; the defendants found guilty; and the imposition of sentence postponed to December 13, 1937.
Defendants have filed motion and grounds for a new trial, insisting the court committed an error in overruling the motion to suppress. It is conceded by them that if the evidence was legally obtained, they are guilty of the charges laid in the indictment.
It is further urged as grounds for a new trial that the court erred in not requiring the arresting officer to disclose, on cross-examination by defendants' counsel, the name of his informant, who had theretofore told him the time and place where the defendants would possess and transport the liquor, and on which information the arrest and subsequent search of the car were made.
Lester Witherspoon, an agent for the Alcohol Tax Unit, testified the defendant Keown was known to him as a bootlegger and had been arrested November 1, 1934, for manufacturing and possessing untaxpaid distilled spirits, but the charge against him had at that time been ignored by the grand jury. The witness further testified that two or three days before this defendant's arrest a person with whom he was well acquainted and who had theretofore given him similar information, which he had always found to be true, informed him that Keown would transport over Highway 31-W, about April 21, 1937, moonshine liquor in a 1936 Ford Coach automobile, with Kentucky license No. 295-M-6, and on this date, while he was patroling the highway pursuant to his informant's directions, the defendants passed him in the car bearing said license, and he and another agent, Henry Wehmhoff, pursued the car, and it being in the nighttime flashed their light into it, and saw some covered objects in the rear part thereof. The car was heavily loaded and going at a rapid rate of speed. The agents compelled the driver to stop, searched the car, and found 115 gallons of untaxpaid spirits in 23 5-gallon wood jacketed cans in the rear of the car, and also a tank in the back of the car with 8 5-gallon wood jacketed cans.
The defendants were immediately placed under arrest and the car and its contents seized. Agent Witherspoon was asked by defendants' counsel, on cross-examination, the name of his informer. He refused to answer and the court ruled he was not required to disclose the name of the person who had given him the information concerning the defendants' violation of the internal revenue laws.
The arrest of the defendants without a warrant and contemporaneous search of the car were valid, if there was probable cause. Compare: Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 704, 51 S.Ct. 240, 242, 243, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407. In this case, the arresting officer was asked the name of his informer, but refused to answer and was not required to do so by the lower court. The Supreme Court refused to rule on the competency of the question and on this subject said:
It is a general rule of law that the duty rests on every citizen to communicate to his government any information he has of the commission of crimes against it, and to encourage such laudable conduct, the information thus given is a government secret and will not be disclosed.
In the case of Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 317, 4 S.Ct. 12, 14, 28 L.Ed. 158, Gruaz sued Bircher, Vogel's testator, to recover damages for the speaking by Bircher of false, malicious, scandalous, and defamatory words of Gruaz. The specific charge was that Gruaz had stolen money, a felony under the laws of Illinois. Bircher had communicated the facts showing the commission of the alleged crime to the prosecuting attorney of the state of Illinois, and defense was made that the language used was privileged. The court, in upholding this contention, said:
In the case of In re Quarles and Butler, Petitioners, 158 U.S. 532, 538, 15 S.Ct. 959, 960, 39 L.Ed. 1080, Henry Worley informed the United States Marshal that one George Terry was violating the internal revenue laws. Defendants with others, as reprisal, went to Worley's house in disguise, took him from his house, beat, bruised, shot at, and otherwise mistreated him. Indictments were returned against them, and they were tried and convicted of a conspiracy to injure, oppress, etc., said Worley.
Defendants moved for arrest of judgment on the following grounds:
The court, in denying the writ, said:
In the case of United States v. Moses, 27 Fed.Cas. page 5, No. 15,825, the defendant was arrested without a warrant on information by a deputy marshal for the crime of counterfeiting. The court, in holding the officer was not required to disclose the name of his...
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