United States v. Kilpatrick
Citation | 575 F. Supp. 325 |
Decision Date | 25 August 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-CR-222.,82-CR-222. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. William A. KILPATRICK, et al., Defendants. |
Court | United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado |
William Waller and Richard K. Rufner, Wagner and Waller, Englewood, Colo., for defendant Kilpatrick.
James L. Treece, Treece, Zbar, Webb & Kenne, Littleton, Colo., for defendant Declan O'Donnell.
James Nesland, Ireland, Stapleton & Pryor, Denver, Colo., for defendant Bank of Nova Scotia.
H. Alan Dill, Dill & Dill, P.C., Denver, Colo., for defendant Sheila Lerner.
Linda Surbaugh and Robert Miller for U.S. Atty's. Office, D. Colo., Denver, Colo., and Charles J. Alexander, Dept. of Justice, Tax Div., Washington, D.C., for U.S.
This case was started with a multiple count, multiple defendant indictment returned after an investigation spanning the lives of two grand juries. Judge Kane dismissed all except one count, which left a one defendant charge of obstruction of justice case to try. It was prosecuted by three attorneys employed by the Tax Division of the Department of Justice in Washington. The single remaining count of the indictment had absolutely nothing to do with tax law, and the trial could have been handled competently and with aplomb by any assistant United States Attorney living in Denver, but the administrative decision of the Department of Justice was to send three lawyers from the Tax Division to try an obstruction of justice case, a prosecution unrelated to their professed area of expertise.
I mention this fact for one very important reason. Following a jury verdict of guilty, defendant moved for dismissal or a new trial, and the pending dismissal motions rest on accusations of IRS and prosecutorial misconduct during the grand jury proceedings and during trial. There is absolutely no suggestion of any improper conduct on the part of the United States Attorney for the District of Colorado or on the part of any of his assistants. Defense counsel carefully point out that neither they nor their client complain about anything other than acts of the IRS and Department of Justice Tax Division lawyers who ran the grand jury and tried the case. Based upon my review of the record and participation in the trial, I share their view that the Colorado United States Attorney's Office is absolutely blameless in this case so fraught with problems. Also, it should be emphasized that no one is critical of government counsel now handling the post trial motions.
To fully cover all of the headaches of this case would require a volume, and I don't plan to write that book for reasons which will appear presently. Instead, I shall highlight some of the things which occurred during the investigation and during the trial of the case. But, there are so many things to cover that this opinion won't be short. Many of the accusations are disputed by the accused government counsel and agents, but they are forced to admit a few instances of "mistake", and their denials of facts run contrary to testimony of a large number of witnesses. To accept the testimony of government witnesses at full value would require that I effectively decide that quite a few reputable lawyers and citizens of this community and other communities are guilty of perjury, and I make no such determination. The record made to date is incomplete. A full evidentiary hearing was scheduled, but, as will be explained later, present government counsel was not able to prepare for the first hearing, and the testimony of essential government witnesses was put over for three weeks. It was ordered that a summary of the testimony of government witnesses be furnished in advance of a hearing scheduled some three weeks later. The summary was furnished, but the government witnesses weren't called although I and defense counsel wanted them called. Therefore, at this point, all I have to rely on is the summary of proposed testimony, but the witnesses have not been sworn nor have they been cross examined.
With that, then, I set the stage for some of the bizarre happenings in this case, and I do so by mentioning a frequently quoted case. In 1935, in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314, Justice Sutherland, speaking for a unanimous court, criticized the misconduct of the prosecutor in that case. The prosecutor had injected his personal belief concerning the facts of the case (so did a prosecutor here) and he had unfairly cross-examined witnesses. That which the court said concerning reliance by a jury on a prosecutor's integrity is even more applicable to the reliance of a grand jury on a prosecutor. As to a prosecutor's duties, the Court said:
Perhaps the thing which disappoints me the most is the forgetfulness of the grand jury itself in going along with having two IRS agents in charge of the IRS investigation sworn as "agents of the grand jury". Yet, I can understand, as Justice Sutherland said in Berger v. United States, that grand jurors rely on Justice Department lawyers for their legal advice. They should do this, but because I empanelled the first of these two grand juries, I know what those jurors were told, and I strongly suspect that the second grand jury was told about the same thing. I orally, and on the record, stressed that a grand jury has a duty to protect the innocent and I emphasized that a grand jury is an independent body, separate and apart from investigative agencies and that grand juries are not an arm of the prosecution but instead, they have a duty to examine the government's case carefully. I didn't tell them that they couldn't appoint IRS agents as their own "agents", because it never occurred to me that there could be such a blurring of the "investigative agency", "prosecuting attorney" and "grand juror" functions. However, I did supply each grand juror with a copy of the recommended instructions to grand jurors authored under the auspices of the Judicial Center, and I urged each grand juror to read the instructions frequently to be sure that they adequately performed their duties. (I now urge that Justice Department prosecutors read them). Those instructions say in important part:
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United States v. Kilpatrick
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U.S. v. Kilpatrick
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