United States v. King
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 04-CR-285-20-JPS |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JARVIS KING, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
In July 2006, Defendant Jarvis King was tried by a jury and adjudged guilty of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 826, and 851, and 18 U.S.C. § 2, for his involvement in “a loosely organized, long-running drug-trafficking ring” known as the Cherry Street Mob. ECF Nos. 849, 852, 1079; see also United States v. James, 540 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2008). The jury made affirmative findings as to the drug quantities, answering “yes” as to whether the offense involved 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and “yes” as to whether the offense involved 50 grams or more of cocaine base. ECF No. 852. In May 2007, the Court sentenced Defendant to a total term of life imprisonment, which was a statutory mandatory minimum at the time because Defendant had two qualifying prior felony drug offenses, to be followed by 10 years' supervised release. ECF Nos. 1078, 1079. Defendant has now served approximately 17 years of his sentence. ECF No. 1625-1 at 8; ECF No. 1632 at 1.
On May 24, 2022, Defendant filed a combined motion for a reduction in his sentence and for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act, along with a motion to seal the same. ECF Nos. 1624, 1625.[1] The Court set a briefing schedule on the motion and, following an extension of time, the motion is now fully briefed. ECF Nos. 1625, 1632, 1635. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant the motion and reduce Defendant's sentence to a total term of 288 months' imprisonment (of which he has already served approximately 17 years) to be followed by five years' supervised release.
2.1 Section 404
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 269 (2012).
In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, § 404, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (“Section 404”), which made it possible for already-sentenced defendants to request that the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act be applied to their case retroactively. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (). Section 404(b) provides that:
A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.
The inquiry under Section 404(b) is two-step: United States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2020).
As to the first prong of the Court's inquiry under Section 404(b), the parties agree that Defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. ECF No. 1625-1 at 17; ECF No. 1632 at 2.[2] The parties further agree that a sentence reduction is appropriate in Defendant's case, but they disagree on the extent of such a reduction. Id. Defendant requests a reduced sentence of time served, while the Government requests a reduced sentence longer than time served, but of course, less than life. Id. 2.2 Compassionate Release
The Court can modify a term of imprisonment “upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf” or thirty days after the warden at the defendant's facility has received such a request for release, “whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). There must also be “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ing] such a reduction[.]” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
While § 3582(c)(1)(A) instructs that a reduction must also be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the [United States] Sentencing Commission,” this circuit recently held that the relevant policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, is inapplicable to prisoner-initiated motions for compassionate release. United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020). Therefore, a court has discretion when determining what constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting compassionate release. Id. ( ). A district court may also “make the same determinations that would normally be left to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [under the catchall provision at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 n.1(D)].” United States v. Brown, Case No. 01-CR-196-JPS, 2020 WL 4569289, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 7, 2020).
Yet, this Court will evaluate prisoner-initiated motions for compassionate release with due regard for the guidance provided in § 1B1.13 because it “provide[s] a working definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons' . . . [which] can guide discretion without being conclusive.” Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180; see also United States v. Mays, Case No. 1:08-cr-00125-TWP-DML, 2020 WL 7239530, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 9, 2020) (). The Court will also consider whether “the defendant is not a danger” to others or the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Id. § 1B1.13(B)(2). After determining eligibility, and prior to modifying a term of imprisonment, the Court must also consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), if applicable. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The Government contests the applicability of Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Government argues that controlling Seventh Circuit precedent has rejected Defendant's first argument in support of compassionate release: that, inter alia, intervening changes in the law and the draconian nature of his original sentence constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranting compassionate release. The Government additionally disputes Defendant's second argument regarding his medical circumstances and the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing that such factors do not rise to the level of “extraordinary and compelling.”
3.1 Section 404 - Sentencing Parameters
The Court begins with the sentencing parameters. When considering sentence-reduction motions under the First Step Act, courts' discretion “must be informed by a calculation of the new sentencing parameters.” United States v. Blake, 22 F.4th 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Corner, 967 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2020) () (emphasis in original). First, as to the sentencing guidelines, even under the Fair Sentencing Act, the guideline range of 360 months to life as calculated and applied at Defendant's May 2007 sentencing remains unchanged. ECF No. 1632 at 2; ECF No. 1078 at 1. Specifically, at the time of Defendant's original sentencing, Defendant's base offense level was 38, with a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm, and an additional two-level enhancement for his role in the offense, for a total offense level of 42, and a criminal history category score of VI based on 14 criminal history category points. ECF No. 1619 at 44, 136; ECF No. 1078. The Fair Sentencing Act decreases Defendant's base offense level by two points, for a total offense level of 40. ECF No. 1632 at 8 n.4. A total offense level of 40, combined with a criminal history category score of VI, still results in a guidelines range of 360 months to life.
The Court next turns to the applicable statutory range, on which the parties agree. While the amount of crack for which Defendant was adjudged guilty-50 or more grams-carries a lower base statutory range following the Fair Sentencing Act the amount of powder cocaine for which Defendant was adjudged guilty-5 or more kilograms-does not. The latter still falls under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and carries a base statutory range of 10 years to life. The parties further agree that “today, a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison would not be required”; “[i]nstead, the mandatory minimum sentence would be [the base statutory range of] just ten years.” ECF No. 1632 at 8; see also ECF No. 1625-1 at 14. In support of its agreement thereto, the Government concedes that the two prior felony convictions, which served as the predicates for Defendant...
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