United States v. Knights, 19-10083

• Decision Date: 10 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-10083,19-10083
• Citation: 989 F.3d 1281
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony W. KNIGHTS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

989 F.3d 1281

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Anthony W. KNIGHTS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10083

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 10, 2021

Holly Lynn Gershow, U.S. Attorney Service - Middle District of Florida, U.S. Attorney's Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Aliza Hochman Bloom, Federal Public Defender's Office, Tampa, FL, for Defendant - Appellant.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, and MOORE,^* District Judge.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

Anthony Knights moved for rehearing en banc of our opinion that issued on August 3, 2020. We construe his motion as a petition for both rehearing en banc and panel rehearing. Fed. R. App. P. 35, 11th Cir. I.O.P. 2. We grant the motion for panel rehearing, vacate our original opinion in this appeal, and substitute in its place the following opinion.

This appeal requires us to decide whether officers violated Anthony Knights's right to be free from unreasonable seizures, under the Fourth Amendment, by conducting an investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion. Two officers saw Knights and Hozell Keaton around 1:00 a.m. in a car that was parked in the front yard of a home. Suspecting that the men might be trying to steal the car, the officers parked near it and approached Knights, who was in the driver's seat. When Knights opened the door, an officer immediately smelled marijuana. The ensuing search of Knights and the car revealed ammunition and firearms. Because Knights had felony convictions, a grand jury charged him with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Knights moved to suppress the evidence the officers found and the statements he made as fruit of an unlawful seizure. The district court denied the motion, convicted Knights, and sentenced him to 33 months of imprisonment. We affirm because Knights's interaction with the officers was a consensual encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

I. BACKGROUND

Late at night, Anthony Knights, Hozell Keaton, and Knights's nephew were smoking marijuana and listening to music while sitting in or standing near an Oldsmobile sedan in Tampa, Florida. The car was parked in a grassy area between the street and the white fence of a home that belonged to one of Keaton's relatives. The driver's side of the car was near the street and the passenger's side was near the fence.

On a routine patrol around 1:00 a.m., Officers Andrew Seligman and Brian Samuel of the Tampa Police Department saw two of the car's doors open with Knights and Keaton leaning into the car. The officers believed that Knights and Keaton might be stealing something from the car. They knew the area to be "high crime" and to have gang activity from their experience responding to multiple shootings and narcotics crimes. So they drove past the Oldsmobile for a better look. Knights and Keaton then "gave the officers a blank stare," and according to Officer Seligman, "kind of seemed nervous." The officers then heard someone unsuccessfully try to start the car. Thinking that Knights and Keaton "might be actually trying to steal the vehicle," the officers decided to investigate further.

Officer Seligman decided to turn around and park the patrol car near the Oldsmobile, which was parked on a grassy area next to the street in the direction of traffic for that side of the road. Officer Seligman parked on the street next to the Oldsmobile in the wrong direction for traffic so that the trunk of the patrol car was nearly aligned with the trunk of the Oldsmobile. As Officer Seligman was parking, he trained his flashlight on Knights. According to Knights and Officer Seligman, the patrol car was parked in a way that would have allowed Knights to drive away. Officer Samuel left the patrol car and attempted to talk to Keaton, who was walking toward the house, but Keaton entered the house without responding.

The officers then approached Knights, who sat in the driver's seat and closed the car door. Officer Seligman approached the car with his flashlight and knocked on the driver's window. When Knights opened the door, Officer Seligman "was overwhelmed with an odor of burnt marijuana." Officer Seligman asked Knights if he owned the car, and Knights said that he and his wife owned it and gave Officer Seligman his driver's license and possibly the registration for the car. The officers later confirmed that his wife owned the car. When Officer Seligman asked Knights if he had marijuana, Knights said, "I'll be honest with you. It's all gone."

Officer Seligman then began to search for narcotics. He searched Knights's person and found a pill bottle containing several different kinds of pills. Officer Seligman arrested Knights and searched his car, starting with a backpack that Knights said contained a prescription for the pills. He found medical documents, a firearm cartridge, and a ski mask. He also found a scale, smoked marijuana, marijuana residue, a handgun, a rifle, and another firearm cartridge. Knights agreed to an interview after the officers warned him of his rights, see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and he then admitted that he owned the handgun. Knights and the officers described the entire encounter as calm and amicable.

A grand jury indicted Knights on one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Before trial, Knights moved to suppress his admissions and the evidence the officers found during the search. He argued that they were fruit of an illegal seizure that occurred when—without reasonable suspicion—the officers parked behind his car or, at the latest, when they walked up to his car. The government responded that the incident "began as a police-citizen encounter" and did not turn into a "seizure" until the officers started searching for narcotics based on probable cause that Knights possessed marijuana, and alternatively, the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.

The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge who held a hearing and recommended granting the suppression motion. The magistrate judge recommended ruling that the officers conducted an investigatory stop because "the officers' show of authority, especially Officer Seligman, their locations as they approached the car, and the patrol car impeding Mr. Knights's ability to drive away, [established that] no reasonable person in Mr. Knights's position would feel free to leave or disregard the two officers." And because the magistrate judge determined that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion and the physical evidence and statements were fruit of the unlawful seizure, she recommended granting the motion.

The district court, after considering briefing and oral argument, accepted the magistrate judge's recitation of the facts but disagreed with her recommendation and denied the suppression motion. It explained that the constitutionality of the officers' conduct turned on when they seized Knights because the odor of marijuana provided a lawful basis for seizing him. It ruled that the officers did not seize him when they parked their patrol car and walked up to Knights because "it was a police-citizen encounter involving no detention and no coercion." The district court found that Knights could have either driven away "with skilled driving" or walked away. It also relied on the absence of the police questioning Knights, displaying their weapons, touching him, asking for his identification, or having a verbal exchange with him.

Knights proceeded to a bench trial at which he and the government stipulated to the relevant facts. The district court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to a below-guideline sentence of 33 months of imprisonment.

On appeal, Knights argued that his perspective as a young black man was relevant to the question whether a seizure occurred. In our original opinion, we agreed that "the age and race of a suspect may be relevant factors," but we concluded that they were not decisive in Knights's appeal. Because a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave, he was not seized, and so we affirmed his conviction. Knights then petitioned for rehearing en banc. In his petition, he argued that we erred by not treating his identity as "a factor that matters." According to Knights, the correct inquiry was whether a reasonable young black man would have felt free to drive or walk away from the police. Upon reconsideration, and with the benefit of additional briefing by the parties, we substitute this opinion to address that issue.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"A district court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." United States v. Perez , 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review its legal conclusions de novo , and we accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. We construe the facts in the light most favorable to the government because it prevailed in the district court. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A "seizure" does not occur every time a police officer interacts with a citizen. Officers are free to "approach[ ] individuals on the street or in other public places and put[ ] questions to them if they are willing to listen." United States v. Drayton , 536 U.S. 194, 200, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002). In these consensual encounters, the officers need no suspicion because the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ; Perez , 443 F.3d at 777–78. But officers need reasonable suspicion if an encounter becomes an investigatory stop. See Bostick , 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 ; United States v. Jordan , 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011)....