United States v. Koplik

• Decision Date: 15 May 1907
• Citation: 155 F. 919
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. KOPLIK.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

155 F. 919

UNITED STATES v. KOPLIK.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. New York.

May 15, 1907

Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Atty., and Francis W. Bird, Asst. U.S. Atty.

Clarence S. Houghton, for defendant.

CHATFIELD District Judge (the facts having appeared by the testimony substantially as above), charged the jury as follows:

The province of a juror is not a simple one. The decision upon questions of fact is not of itself easy, but, when these questions that are laid before you are involved with interpretations of law, the government asking the jury to try to assume what its ideas may be as to the aspect of a certain statute or certain law, while the defendant tries throughout the case to have the jury understand that the law is to be construed in a different way, which he claims the court will charge, when later the court takes a third position in explaining what its idea of the law is, and then the jury is called upon to remember and sift out these different questions as to what the statute means, and what the law is and as to whether the defendant is to be treated from the standpoint of what this law, as a law, is intended to be, it seems to me entirely wrong to ask a jury to carry the testimony in their minds, not having it to read, not having the law before them, and having none of these questions so that they can pass upon them as the attorneys who have worked up the case, and I, as judge, who must instruct on that law can do and to apply this testimony to all of these various views of the statute. It is needlessly making the duty of the juror arduous to inject into the case such questions as whether a business man should be sent to prison. That is something that the jury need not worry about. As to questions of public policy, questions as to what situation the statute is called upon to meet, those are the points of view from which the jury is to look at the evidence in the case. But beyond that, if the jury have not confidence in the court, or if you have not the willingness and ability to pass upon the facts as the law is laid down, you should not try to correct the situation by the individual views of jurors. I say that because throughout the case I have tried to indicate that these matters should not be brought in to complicate. The jury must take the law as charged by the court. Much argument in this case has been directed to the different phases of life, as questions of fact. But the testimony of the witnesses upon the stand was comparatively short, and you will remember, in looking upon that testimony and weighing it, that this defendant, a man of good reputation, and a man presumed therefore to be of good character, comes here presumed to be innocent and with all the benefits of that good reputation. He is charged under an indictment with having done something which makes him responsible under this statute, and that evidence is presented to you, with the burden upon the government of satisfying you beyond a reasonable doubt that he did the act with which he is charged. Your province is to say whether you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a man with such a character or with such a presumption, has been shown by the evidence to have committed the act, and on that you will base your verdict.

Now, as to the statute, we have had discussions enough so that you can presume that it

is a comprehensive, a drastic, statute. You have seen the witnesses for the government, these recruits; you have been able to judge, from the manner of giving their testimony, what the facts were, what weight you will give their testimony. You have heard the testimony of the sergeant who gave his evidence after service in the army, not as a recruit. And under all of these circumstances you can see what the situation of the soldier is, when he attempts to pledge his clothing. And then, the statute forbids the pledging or selling by a soldier, or a sailor in the case of the navy, of the arms, the equipment, ammunition, the clothing, any other public property which he does not have the lawful right to pledge or sell.

You have heard read into the case a statute giving government officers the right to seize such public property. I charge you that that section refers as well to clothing which the soldier has paid for as to powder, cartridges, rifle, and these other articles which have only been handed to him for use. The authority under this section as to the right of an army officer to go in and seize this property wherever found is a civil right. The government has a right to take possession of what is the government's, and any person disputing that right must prove it. When you come to a criminal case, the government still has the right to seize. It has the right to charge the men with the crime. It must then show the possession of the goods. It must show the circumstances by which the act is alleged to be brought within the criminal section, and if that is shown the defendant is then put upon his proof; the question being whether the charge is proved to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The section under which the defendant is charged speaks of this particular matter in the following language:

'Any person who knowingly purchases or receives in pledge for any obligation or indebtedness from any soldier, clothes or other public property (I have left out the other words that do not apply to this particular matter), such soldier not having the lawful right to pledge or sell the same.'

As to that last clause, 'not having the lawful right to pledge or sell,' the word 'knowledge' or 'knowing' does not apply. Whether the soldier had a right is a question of fact. If the soldier did not have the right, then the property could not be legally sold, and if a person buys that property he buys it with the prospect of its being seized. He buys it running the chances of being shown to have had knowledge that he was purchasing it from a soldier, or under such circumstances that the word 'knowledge' applies, and he takes his chances as to whether the person had the lawful right to pledge or sell the same. The word 'knowing' applies only to the question as to whether the man who purchased and receives in pledge the property knew that the person offering it was a soldier. You see, a soldier might be sent to sell something that might have been condemned, and, having the lawful right to sell that, knowledge as to whether he was a soldier or not, if all the circumstances were understood, would have nothing to do with the case. But if he did not have the lawful right to sell (and I charge...