United States v. Krapf
Decision Date | 10 February 1960 |
Docket Number | Crim. A. No. 251-59. |
Citation | 180 F. Supp. 886 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Howard KRAPF, d/b/a Krapf Trucking Service. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Chester A. Weidenburner, U. S. Atty., by John Jay Mangini, Asst. U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J., for plaintiff.
Arthur J. Piken, Jamaica, N. Y., for defendant.
A criminal information in twelve counts was filed against defendant for violation of the Motor Carriers chapter of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S. C.A. § 322(a), both as enacted in 1949 and as thereafter amended in 1957. Upon the imposition of sentence on a plea of guilty to seven counts, the United States Marshal in charge of fingerprinting in this District attempted to fingerprint the defendant, to which the defendant objected. Thereupon counsel on both sides submitted to the Court the question of the propriety of such fingerprinting.
Defendant's prime objection to being fingerprinted is based upon his contention that his violations do not constitute an offense or crime of such a nature that the Marshal is authorized to fingerprint him, plus some ancillary objections hereinafter alluded to.
The original Act only fixed a maximum penalty for each offense so that a fine of but $1 was lawful. The amendment cured this apparent defect by fixing a minimum penalty as well. Both acts only penalized violations which were "knowingly and willfully" done, and provided for a fine "upon conviction", and that "each day of such violation shall constitute a separate offense."
The Congressional statutes are searched in vain for any authority in express words for the fingerprinting of anyone. The only action taken by the Congress in that regard apparently is the Annual Appropriations Act for the Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and related agencies, which for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959 appropriates "for expenses necessary for the detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States * * * acquisition, collection, classification and preservation of identification and other records and their exchange with, and for the official use of, the duly authorized officials of the Federal Government, of State, cities, and other institutions * * *" P.L. 85-474; 72 Stat. 244; U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 1958, p. 292. The only additional Congressional authority impliedly existing for Federal fingerprinting is the provision that "The United States Marshal and his deputies, in executing the laws of the United States within a state, may exercise the same powers which a sheriff of such state may exercise in executing the laws thereof." Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 549; Act June 25, 1948, Chap. 646, 62 Stat. 912. In other words, a United States Marshal has the same powers in executing the laws of the United States in the state where the Marshal serves, as the Sheriff of such state has in executing the state laws. So the question, is, what fingerprinting power does a New Jersey Sheriff have under the State law, which, by appropriate analogy under the Federal law, inheres in the United States Marshal?
But it cannot be validly argued that the absence of a Federal statute expressly authorizing United States Marshals to fingerprint deprives them of the right to do so, this on the theory that a statute which imposes the duty to convict persons of Federal criminal violations carries with it by implication every reasonable means necessary to effectuate that conviction. United States v. Kelly, 2 Cir., 1932, 55 F.2d 67, 83 A.L.R. 122. The Court there said, at page 70:
"We find no ground in reason or authority for interfering with a method of identifying persons charged with crime which has now become widely known and frequently practiced both in jurisdictions where there are statutory provisions regulating it and where it has no sanction other than the common law."
But the question still remains, what is the general authority of the New Jersey Sheriff to fingerprint, now vested in the United States Marshal by analogy under the above mentioned Federal Act?
The New Jersey statute in question provides:
The New Jersey statutes further provide:
"The supervisor of the state bureau of identification shall cooperate with the bureaus in other states and with the bureau in the department of justice of the United States and shall develop and carry on an interstate, national and international system of identification within the requirements of the state bureau of identification." N.J.S.A. 53:1-19.
Accordingly, the United States Marshal, irrespective of other authority here inapplicable, is authorized, as is a New Jersey Sheriff, to "take the fingerprints of * * *" any person arrested "for an indictable offense." The immediate question for decision therefore is whether or not Section 322(a), of the violation of which the defendant here was convicted, creates "an indictable offense."
It is, of course, well settled that there are many offenses of a criminal nature, both State and Federal, which are not common law crimes nor constitutional crimes within the provisions of the United States Constitution, Article III, or Amendment VI.1 Such offenses do not require a jury trial. Callan v. Wilson, 1888, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223; "Petty Federal Offenses and Trial by Jury", Frankfurter and Corcoran, 39 Harv.L.Rev. 917.
In short, not only must an indictment be used for the two first stated classes of more serious offenses, but an indictment may be used to prosecute "any other offense". Thus at Federal law the commission of any "offense" is "indictable", to use the terminology of the above State statute. See also Barron, Federal Practice & Procedure, Vol. IV, p. 55, 1951.
The question at issue thus becomes whether the violations of which the defendant was convicted under Section 322(a), supra, were "Federal offenses." We turn to the language of that statute.2 That the violations of both the statute as originally enacted and its amendment, under both of which the defendant was convicted, constitute Federal "offenses" is clear. Such is the very word used by the statute. Further, such a violator is subject to "conviction thereof." The fine imposed upon him as a result of such conviction is to be a certain amount "for the first offense", of a further amount "for any subsequent offense", each day of such violation to constitute "a separate offense." This clearly constitutes defendant as one convicted of a Federal "offense." It contradistinguishes defendant from one subject to a "writ of injunction" for a violation of subsection (b) of the same statute, or of subsection (h) of such statute, where the forfeiture of $100 imposed on its violator is to be "recoverable in a civil suit."
True, Section 322(a), supra, does not expressly call the offense to which it alludes "a misdemeanor", as do subsections (c) and (d) of Section 322. So we turn to the general provisions of the Federal Criminal Code, which clarify offenses generally, Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 1. These provide, notwithstanding any act of Congress to the contrary:
Thereunder it is quite clear that, even in the absence of the use of the term "misdemeanor" in defining the nature of the offense of which defendant was convicted, his conviction was of "a petty offense." But that a petty offense is an "offense" of a criminal nature against the United States has already been shown by Callan v. Wilson, supra. In fact, it is well settled that, even if not called a crime, if punishment is imposed, as distinguished from a civil remedy, the offense is criminal in nature. Mossew v. U. S., 2 Cir., 1920, 266 F. 18, 11 A.L.R. 1261; United...
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