United States v. Kuehl

Citation706 F.3d 917
Decision Date19 February 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–2598.,12–2598.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Tommy KUEHL, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

706 F.3d 917

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
Tommy KUEHL, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 12–2598.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 14, 2012.
Filed: Feb. 19, 2013.


[706 F.3d 918]


Raphael M. Scheetz, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellant.

Timothy T. Daux, AUSA, argued, Sioux City, IA, Sean R. Berry, Acting U.S. Attorney, on the brief, Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellee.


Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Tommy Kuehl was indicted for failure to register as a sex offender pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Kuehl was required to register his address under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Kuehl moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that section 16913(d) of SORNA violates the nondelegation doctrine of the United States Constitution. The district court 1 denied Kuehl's motion to dismiss, and we affirm this denial.

[706 F.3d 919]

In 1991, Kuehl was convicted of two counts of attempted sexual conduct and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Fifteen years later, in 2006, the United States Congress passed SORNA, which imposed registration requirements on offenders with certain sex convictions.2Section 16913(d) of SORNA delegated authority to the Attorney General to determine whether SORNA applied retroactively. In 2007, the Attorney General declared that SORNA applied retroactively to offenders convicted before SORNA's effective date. Thus, SORNA's registration requirements applied to Kuehl.

In September 2011, Kuehl was arrested in Iowa for trespassing. The authorities discovered that Kuehl had recently moved to Iowa and failed to register his new address as SORNA required. In November 2011, a grand jury indicted Kuehl for failure to register as a sex offender. Kuehl moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Congress improperly delegated legislative authority to the Attorney General to determine whether SORNA applied retroactively. The district court ruled that SORNA was a valid delegation of authority to the Attorney General and denied the motion to dismiss. Kuehl then entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court sentenced Kuehl to 22 and one-half months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Kuehl appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss.

Kuehl asserts that SORNA, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Kuehl argues that in section 16913(d), Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Attorney General to determine SORNA's retroactivity. Section 16913(d) provides:

The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section.

42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).


The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers. It is derived from Article I, section I of the United States Constitution: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States....” U.S. Const. art. I, § I. “Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate

[706 F.3d 920]

or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.” Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935). However, not all delegations of legislative authority are prohibited. “So long as Congress ‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or...

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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • June 9, 2017
    ...v. Cooper , 750 F.3d 263, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Goodwin , 717 F.3d 511, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Kuehl , 706 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Sampsell , 541 Fed.Appx. 258, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Parks , 698 F.3d 1, 7–8 (......
  • United States v. Nichols
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • December 30, 2014
    ...conveys the intelligible principles upon which the Attorney General's delegated authority must be based. See United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir.2013) (concluding that SORNA's broad policy statement contained in § 16901 is “sufficient to provide an intelligible principle for ......
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    • February 24, 2017
    ...v. Cooper , 750 F.3d 263, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Goodwin , 717 F.3d 511, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Kuehl , 706 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Sampsell , 541 Fed.Appx. 258, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Parks , 698 F.3d 1, 7–8 (......
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    • December 30, 2014
    ...conveys the intelligible principles upon which the Attorney General's delegated authority must be based. See United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir.2013) (concluding that SORNA's broad policy statement contained in § 16901 is “sufficient to provide an intelligible principle for ......
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