United States v. Kuhl

• Decision Date: 19 February 1898
• Citation: 85 F. 624
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. KUHL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

85 F. 624

UNITED STATES v. KUHL.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Western Division.

February 19, 1898

Charles D. Fullen, U.S. Atty.

D. B Dailey, for defendant.

WOOLSON District Judge.

The indictment is based upon that portion of section 5430, Rev St., which provides that:

'Every person * * * who has in his possession or custody, except under authority from the secretary of the treasury or other proper office, any obligation, or other security, engraved and printed after the similitude of any obligation or other security issued under the authority of the United States with intent to sell or otherwise use the same, * * * shall be punished,' etc.

The 'obligation' with whose unlawful possession defendant is charged is shown by the indictment to be what is commonly known as a 'Confederate States Note,' the wording on its face being as follows:

'Two years after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States, the Confederate States of America will pay to bearer five dollars.

H. Richmond, for Treasurer.

'February 17th, 1864.'

The motion to quash, though containing various grounds, amy be summed up in the last ground stated, which is:

'Because the instrument set out in the indictment is not in the similitude of any note, bank bill, obligation, or security of the United States, and the same is not calculated to impose or be put off upon any person as an instrument, obligation, or security resembling or in the similitude of any obligation of the United States.'

Section 5413, Rev. St., declares that:

'The words 'obligation or other security of the United States' shall be held to mean all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national currency, coupons, United States notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United States, stamps and other representatives of value, of whatever denomination, which have been or may be issued under any act of congress.'

The instrument whose terms are set out in the indictment has been submitted to the court on the argument of the motion to quash, and is in all general respects similar to the Confederate States notes or bills whose appearance is familiar to the public generally.

The point first to be determined is as to the contention of the district attorney that 'whether the note is in the similitude of any obligation of the United States' is a question to be submitted to the jury, and cannot be raised or determined in the manner now attempted. The general proposition that the determination of the facts in a case is for the jury cannot be disputed. But, if carried to its extreme, this proposition would forbid the court to instruct a jury to return a verdict for the defendant in any case where evidence is introduced. Under this view, the court must send the case to the jury, even when the evidence is so slight as that the court, on its conscience, could not sustain a verdict of guilty, but would be compelled, if such verdict were returned, to set it aside immediately, and order a new trial. The district attorney would not, and does not, urge this extreme view. The practice in this district is, so far as I am informed, in harmony with that in all other districts. When the government has failed to present such a case against a defendant as would, upon a verdict of guilty, satisfy the conscience of the court, I have not hesitated to direct a verdict of not guilty. In such a case, if a verdict of guilty were allowed to stand, the court must pass sentence. And will any judge permit himself to be placed in the position of imposing sentence when satisfied in his conscience that the evidence does not and cannot sustain such a verdict? I am not considering a case where the jury, by discrediting one line of testimony or one set of witnesses, and holding credible another line or set, may find a verdict of guilty. In this last supposed case there is a conflict of evidence, which is rightly submitted to the decision of a jury. But where there is no such conflict, where reasonable men cannot differ, but must come to the same conclusions as to the facts, I know of no good reason why the judge may not-- why the judge should not--direct a verdict of not guilty, when these facts cannot sustain the opposite verdict. Surely, in this respect, where the liberty of a defendant is involved, the court ought, with regard to a verdict of not guilty, to be as free to act in directing such a verdict as in cases where a man's property rights only are involved. And there can be no difference of opinion as to the duty of the court in a civil action when the plaintiff's pleading fails to state a cause of action, or when the evidence submitted must lead all reasonable men to a verdict against plaintiff.

In Rosen v. U.S. (decided January 27, 1896) 161 U.S. 29, 42, 16 Sup.Ct. 434, 439, the court say:

'It has long been the settled doctrine of this court that the evidence before the jury, if clear and uncontradicted upon any issue made by the parties, presented a question of law, in respect of which the court could, without usurping the functions of the jury, instruct them as to the principles applicable to the case made by such evidence.'

In Sparf v.U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 99, 15 Sup.Ct. 273, the court say:

'If there are no facts in evidence bearing upon the issue to be determined, it is the duty of the court, especially when so requested, to instruct them as to the law arising out of that state of the case. So, if there be some evidence bearing upon a particular issue in a cause, but is so meager as not, in law, to justify a verdict in favor of the party producing it, the court is in the line of duty when it so declares to the jury.'

In Railway Co. v. Gentry (decided May 18, 1896) 163 U.S. 365, 16 Sup.Ct. 1104, Mr. Justice Harlan, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, says:

'If, looking at all the evidence, and drawing such inferences therefrom as were just and reasonable, the court could have said, as matter of law, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, an instruction to find for the defendant would have been proper.'

It is true that the extract just quoted from the latest deliverance of the supreme court on this matter was given in a civil case. But, with reference to its application to a criminal case, we may use the language of the supreme court in Sparf v. U.S., supra, with reference to cases there cited at the conclusion (page 100, 156 U.S., and page 292, 15 Sup.Ct.) of the extract above given from that case: 'The cases just cited were, it is true, of a civil nature; but the rules they announce are, with few exceptions, applicable to criminal cases, and indicate the true test for determining the respective functions of court and jury.'

The circuit court of appeals for this circuit have also stated the rule applicable to this matter. In Sipes v. Seymour (decided August 24, 1896) 40 U.S.App. 85, 22 C.C.A. 90, and 76 F. 116, that court, speaking through Circuit Judge Sanborn, say:

'The direction to the jury to return a verdict for the defendants was therefore right. It is the duty of a trial court to direct a verdict for the defendants, when the evidence is such that, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, it would be compelled to set aside a verdict returned in favor of the plaintiff.'

In Marshall v. Hubbard, 117 U.S. 415, 419, 6 Sup.Ct. 806, the supreme court were reviewing a verdict for the defendant, wherein the circuit court, in directing such verdict, used this language, as quoted on page 417, 117 U.S., and page 806, 6 Sup. Ct.:

'I think, therefore, that, upon the proofs, the case is within the rule laid down by the supreme court of the United States, namely, that the court can now see * * * that, if the jury were to render a verdict against the plaintiff, it would have to set that verdict aside. If that be so, the court ought not to hesitate in directing a verdict.'

In approving this action of the circuit court, the supreme court say (page 419, 117 U.S., and page 806, 6 Sup.Ct.):

'Giving the defendant the benefit of every inference that could have been fairly drawn from the evidence, written and oral, it was insufficient to authorize a verdict in his favor. Such being the case, a peremptory instruction for the plaintiff was proper.'

In the case just cited, it is true that the direction for a verdict was given at the close of the evidence. Such direction-- verdict for plaintiff-- could not have been given when plaintiff rested in chief. But had the evidence at that point been insufficient, within the rule just quoted, to have sustained a verdict for plaintiff, a motion to direct verdict for defendant must have been sustained. And why may not the same reasoning be applied on the pending motion to quash the indictment?

In Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 122, Justice Miller was considering the argument that, instead of a direction for a verdict, the court should await the verdict, and then set it aside if it was unsupported by evidence, having stated (page 120):

'As was said by this court in the case of Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 448, recent decisions of high authority have established a more reasonable rule,-- that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.'

-- The learned justice, after stating the general 'duty of a court in its relation to the jury to protect parties from unjust verdicts,' etc., proceeds (page 122) to say:

'In the discharge of this...