United States v. Labrador-Peraza

• Decision Date: 27 September 2021
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 6:20-CR-00072
• Citation: 563 F.Supp.3d 563
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Sisi LABRADOR-PERAZA (01), Gabriel Rodriguez-Pedraza (02)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

563 F.Supp.3d 563

UNITED STATES of America

v.Sisi LABRADOR-PERAZA (01), Gabriel Rodriguez-Pedraza (02)

CASE NO. 6:20-CR-00072

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lafayette Division.

Signed September 27, 2021

Craig R. Bordelon, Assistant US Attorney, U.S. Attorneys Office, Lafayette, LA, for United States of America.

Cristie Gautreaux Gibbens, Public Defender, Federal Public Defenders Office, Lafayette, LA, for Sisi Labrador-Pedraza.

Gerald J. Block, Lafayette, LA, for Gabriel Rodriguez-Pedraza.

RULING

ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Motions to Suppress filed by Defendants Sisi Labrador-Peraza and Gabriel Rodriguez-Pedraza. [ECF Nos. 39, 43; see also ECF No. 46]. The motions were referred to the Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the motions be granted. [ECF No. 57]. The Government objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation [ECF No. 58], and Defendants have responded to the Government's objection. [ECF Nos. 59, 61]. For the reasons that follow, the Court overrules the Government's objection and adopts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge set forth in the Report and Recommendation.

The Magistrate Judge found that the initial stop of Defendants’ vehicle was unlawful, and therefore the motions to suppress should be granted. [ECF No. 57 at 11]. The Government objects to this conclusion, arguing that: (1) "the plain text of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 63-7-59 does not preclude that a vehicle registered in another state can violate the statute," and (2) the Magistrate Judge's finding "that Section 63-7-59 could not reasonably be interpreted by a law enforcement officer as being applicable to the subject vehicle under the circumstances" is erroneous. [ECF No. 58 at 2]. The Court addresses these objections in turn.

12 The portion of the Mississippi statute regulating window tinting applies only to motor vehicles "required to be registered" in Mississippi.¹ Miss. Code. Ann. § 63-7-59(1) and (2) ; see also Fluker v. State, 44 So.3d 1029, 1031 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) ("Mississippi's prohibition regarding tinted or darkened windows, applies only to vehicles registered in Mississippi."). The Government contends that although Agent Holland was aware prior to the stop that Defendants’ vehicle was registered in Florida, the vehicle nevertheless may have been "required to be registered" in Mississippi if, for instance, Defendants had moved to Mississippi more than thirty days prior to the stop, or if Defendants were residents of Mississippi who had bought the vehicle out of state more than seven days prior to the stop. [ECF No. 58 at 4 & n.2]. Stated more simply, the Government argues that the stop was reasonable because the out-of-state vehicle was perhaps "required to be registered" in Mississippi, and therefore "Agent Holland had probable cause to stop the vehicle." Id. at 6. The problem with the Government's argument is that it is based merely upon after-the-fact justifications, without supporting evidence, on an issue for which the Government bears the burden of proof.² At the suppression hearing, Agent Holland testified on direct examination that he was familiar with the Mississippi law addressing window tint. However, there was no testimony whatsoever as to whether Agent Holland was aware that the Mississippi law applies only to vehicles required to be registered in that state. Further, there was no testimony that although the law applies only to vehicles required to be registered in Mississippi, Agent Holland nevertheless suspected that this particular vehicle should have been registered in Mississippi and was therefore potentially in violation of Mississippi's window tinting law. Because there was no testimony indicating Agent Holland was even aware that the Mississippi window tint statute applies only to vehicles required to be registered in that state, the Court cannot make the inductive leap invited by the Government—i.e. that Agent Holland was aware that the statute did not apply to out-of-state vehicles but he nevertheless had a reasonable suspicion that Defendants had become residents of Mississippi for a long enough period of time to require that they register their vehicle with that State and modify their window tint. Courts may not "arrive at probable cause simply by piling hunch upon hunch." United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 2004). For these reasons, the Court finds the government failed to carry its burden and show that the stop was justified at its inception because Agent Holland had a reasonable suspicion that this particular vehicle had committed a violation of Mississippi law by failing to register the vehicle with Mississippi authorities. See United States v. Raney, 633 F.3d 385, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2011).

In its second objection, the Government argues the scope of the Mississippi window tinting law is ambiguous, and therefore the Court should find the stop passes constitutional muster. The Court finds the Mississippi statute is clear—it applies only to "motor vehicles required to be registered in [Mississippi]."

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, consistent with the Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 57], Defendants’ Motions to Suppress [ECF Nos. 39, 43] are GRANTED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PATRICK J. HANNA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are the Motions to Suppress filed by Defendants, Sisi Labrador-Peraza and Gabriel Rodriguez-Pedraza. (Rec. Doc. 39 and 43¹ ). The Government opposed the Motion (Rec. Doc. 49). Defendants replied (Rec. Doc. 50; 51). The Motions were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. Considering the evidence, the law, and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons fully explained below, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motions be GRANTED.

Factual Background

Following an initial complaint in February 2020, Defendants were indicted on charges of theft or receipt of stolen mail in March 2020. (Rec. Doc. 1; 16). After delays necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Labrador-Peraza's counsel filed the Motion to Suppress at issue, which Rodriguez-Pedraza adopted. Defendants seek to suppress evidence seized from the February 3, 2020 traffic stop by Agent Holland with the South Mississippi Metro Enforcement Team ("MET") which led to their arrest. The Court held a hearing on December 15, 2020. (Rec. Docs. 52, 53, 56). A Spanish interpreter was present for both Defendants; although, Rodriguez-Pedraza speaks English.

Agent Holland testified that he has been a U.S. Border Patrol agent for thirteen years. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 7:8-9). He is also assigned as a criminal interdiction agent to the MET. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 7:17-8:10; 9:25-10:1). Agent Holland described his position as an officer working traffic enforcement who is trained to recognize criminal activity such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, and other major felonies. He further explained that as a border patrol agent, his primary focus is on transnational organizations and terrorist groups. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 23:4-9). He speaks both English and Spanish.

Since he began working with the MET eight years earlier, Agent Holland estimated that he has made more than 2,000 traffic stops in the area where this stop occurred. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 10:3-5). His agency did not provide either a dash camera for his vehicle or a body camera, and he did not have any such camera on the date of this stop. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 11:6-11). On the date in question, February 3, 2020, Agent Holland was parked in his unmarked Border Patrol unit in the median of Interstate 10 in Jackson County, Mississippi observing eastbound traffic. Other officers in marked units were also parked in the median. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 11:15-12:11).

Agent Holland testified that he first noticed Defendants’ vehicle approaching in the middle lane and begin to "coast," which he described as traveling at a normal rate of speed and then beginning to slow down as it reached the agent's location without slamming on the brakes. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 12:23-13:2). He described this coasting behavior as a "preindicator" of criminal activity, because it suggests a reaction to law enforcement presence. After pulling on to the interstate to catch up with the vehicle, he noticed that traffic was beginning to bottleneck behind it. He determined the vehicle's speed to be slightly less than 60 miles per hour.² (Rec. Doc. 56 at 13:9-24). Dispatch advised that the car's temporary paper tag was registered to Labrador-Peraza in Florida. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 29:19-30:16).

As Agent Holland was driving behind and to the side of Defendants’ vehicle, he observed that the back windshield and back windows were "darkly tinted," so that he could not see through them. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 14:14-23. See also Narrative at Rec. Doc. 39-2). He did not have a window tint detection device; however, he testified that he has seen window tint with less than the 28% light transmittance mandated by Mississippi law. One is unable to see through such tint, and Agent Holland was unable to see through the Defendants’ rear tinted windows. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 14:13-23).

Upon stopping the car, Agent Holland first contacted the driver, Rodriguez-Pedraza. They communicated in English as Agent Holland asked for his driver's license. Rodriguez-Pedraza told Agent Holland he did not have a driver's license, but he produced an ID on his phone. Agent Holland directed Rodriguez-Pedraza to wait at the passenger side of his Border Patrol unit. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 17:15-23).

Agent Holland then approached the passenger, Labrador-Peraza, who produced a Florida driver's license. In response to Agent Holland's question, Labrador-Peraza advised that they had come from Houston after visiting family for two days. (Rec. Doc. 56 at 18:14-17). Agent...