United States v. Langley

• Decision Date: 05 October 2017
• Docket Number: 3:15-CR-155
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. DENNIS LANGLEY, JR., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
DENNIS LANGLEY, JR., Defendant.

3:15-CR-155

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

October 5, 2017

(JUDGE MARIANI)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements, (Doc. 25). Defendant, Dennis Langley, Jr., is charged with a single count of possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). On October 23, 2016, Defendant filed this Motion seeking to suppress all physical evidence and statements that were obtained by police as a result of a July 6, 2015, traffic stop. The Motion has been fully briefed and an evidentiary hearing was held on July 25, 2017. For the reasons that follow, this Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements.

II. BACKGROUND

On the evening of July 6, 2015, Officer Michael Sampere of the Stroud Area Regional Police Department was dispatched to a welfare check in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 4, 9-10). Officer Sampere proceeded in a marked police cruiser onto Interstate 80 en route to the call. (Id. at 9-10). Encountering

Page 2

moderate traffic, Officer Sampere moved behind a black Dodge Charger which was traveling in the left lane of the two westbound lanes. (Id. at 11-12). Soon thereafter, traffic thinned and the right lane became clear of vehicles. (Id. at 13). Nevertheless, the Dodge Charger did not move into the right lane. (Id.). After traveling another half mile and wanting to pass the Dodge Charger, Officer Sampere attempted to get the driver's attention by sounding his vehicle's air horn two to three times. (Id. at 15, 60). When that did not get the driver's attention, Officer Sampere activated the police vehicle's sirens two to three times and motioned for the driver to move to the right. (Id. at 15-16). After receiving no response from the driver, Officer Sampere pulled the vehicle over at 7:48 p.m. (Id. at 17, 47; Gov't Ex. 3).

Once both vehicles were on the side of the road, Officer Sampere approached the Dodge Charger and saw that Defendant was the sole occupant. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 18). Officer Sampere asked Defendant for his license, vehicle registration, and insurance information. (Id. at 19). Defendant produced a valid license and an Enterprise rental agreement and told the officer that he had just dropped his girlfriend off in Clifton, New Jersey, and was on his way to visit family in Syracuse, New York. (Id. at 19-22; Gov't Ex. 1). When Officer Sampere asked what specific family member he was going to visit, Defendant was unable to answer. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 22). At this time, Officer Sampere also noted that Defendant had a smart phone on his lap and a flip phone in the car's center console. (Id. at 20).

Page 3

Officer Sampere went back to his vehicle and began to run Defendant's driver's license. (Id. at 23). At 7:49 p.m. Officer Sampere used his cell phone to call the car rental company to confirm the validity of the rental agreement. (Id. at 24, 50; Gov't Ex. 4). While still on the phone with Enterprise, Officer Sampere began running a criminal history check on Defendant and writing out a traffic citation. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 26). The criminal history check revealed that Defendant had prior felony drug convictions and a prior weapon related arrest. (Id. at 27). At 7:53 p.m., Officer Sampere requested back up and a canine unit. (Id. at 47-48; Gov't Ex. 3). Soon thereafter, Officer Sampere's call with Enterprise got disconnected and the officer had to call again. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 24-25, 50; Gov't Ex. 4). At approximately 8:16 p.m., Officer Sampere confirmed with Enterprise that the rental agreement was valid. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 25; Gov't Ex. 4). Around this same time, he was informed that the State Police's canine units were unavailable. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 29, 48; Gov't Ex. 3). Officer Sampere then contacted a nearby police department and was told that one of their dogs was available. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 29-30, 48, 50-51; Gov't Ex. 3, 4).

After completing the citation, Officer Sampere reapproached Defendant in the vehicle. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 31). The officer returned Defendant's documents and began to explain the citation. (Id. at 32). Officer Sampere then, for a second time, asked Defendant what family member he was visiting in Syracuse. (Id. at 33). Once again, Defendant did not have an answer. (Id. at 33-34). The officer then issued Defendant the

Page 4

citation for violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3301(a), driving on the left side of the roadway without passing. (Id. at 32, 34; Gov't Ex. 2). After breaking off contact for a moment, Officer Sampere reengaged Defendant, asked him a few more questions, and then asked for permission to search the vehicle. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 34-35, 68). Defendant did not consent to the search, at which point Officer Sampere asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle. (Id. at 36). Officer Sampere moved Defendant off the roadway, patted him down, and had him sit on a guard rail. (Id. at 36-37). While this happened, at approximately 8:32 p.m., Officer Nero of the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department arrived on scene with his dog. (Id. at 38, 48-49; Gov't Ex. 3).

Soon thereafter, Officer Nero brought his dog around the car and the dog alerted, indicating the presence of narcotics. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 39-40). Officer Sampere then decided to seize the vehicle and apply for a search warrant. (Id. at 40). At 8:53 p.m., the officer called Defendant a taxi cab. (Id. at 40, 49; Gov't Ex. 3). A half an hour later it was determined that the taxi was taking too long, at which point another officer drove Defendant to a nearby hotel. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 40-41, 49; Gov't Ex. 3). The car was then brought to the police station and impounded. (7/25/17 Hr'g Tr., Doc. 35 at 41-42). The next day, Officer Sampere applied for and received a search warrant for the vehicle. (Id. at 42). A search of the car uncovered over 10,000 individual bags which combined contained over 300 grams of a substance believed to be heroin. (Id. at 42-45).

Page 5

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Fourth Amendment provides that individuals shall not be subject to "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[A] defendant who challenges a search or seizure typically bears the burden of proving that it was illegal." United States v. Headen, 264 F. App'x 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2008). "However, once the defendant has established a basis for his motion, i.e., the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, the burden shifts to the government to show that the search or seizure was reasonable." United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant raises a variety of arguments as to why the initial traffic stop and the subsequent conduct of the police in this case violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Initial Traffic Stop

Defendant first argues that Officer Sampere violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when the officer stopped Defendant's car for an alleged violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3301(a). (Doc. 25 at 12-14). Specifically, Defendant contends that Officer Sampere lacked the requisite level of suspicion required to render the stop constitutionally permissible. It is beyond dispute "that stopping a car and detaining its occupants is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Johnson, 63 F.3d at 245. "Generally, for a seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be effectuated with a warrant based

Page 6

on probable cause." United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002). "A well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement permits an officer to 'conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.'" United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000)). Accordingly, "[a] routine traffic stop is constitutional when it is supported by reasonable suspicion." United States v. Gooch, 915 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702 (W.D. Pa. 2012); see also United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the "reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops"). "Where reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop is lacking, the evidentiary fruits of the traffic stop must be suppressed." Lewis, 672 F.3d at 237.

Initially, Defendant argues that, under United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002), the lawfulness of a traffic stop is evaluated under the law of the state in which the stop occurred. (Doc. 25 at 13). Defendant contends that, under Pennsylvania law, a police officer is required to possess probable cause before stopping a vehicle for a violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3301(a) and thus any stop in Pennsylvania predicated on less than probable cause is constitutionally invalid. (Doc. 25 at 13). Defendant is correct that courts in Pennsylvania have found that "some offenses, by their very nature, require a police officer to possess probable cause before he or she may conduct a traffic stop." Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). Thus, Pennsylvania

Page 7

has created a two tier system for traffic stops. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that "if the officer has a legitimate expectation of investigatory results, the existence of reasonable suspicion will allow the stop—if the officer has no such expectations of learning additional relevant information concerning the suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally permitted on the basis of mere suspicion." Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. 2008). For traffic offenses falling into the latter category, the Court...