United States v. Langley

• Docket Number: 21-2114
• Decision Date: 07 November 2022
• Citation: 52 F.4th 564
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Rasheem LANGLEY, a/k/a Q, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

52 F.4th 564

UNITED STATES of America

v.Rasheem LANGLEY, a/k/a Q, Appellant

No. 21-2114

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1a on September 12, 2022

Filed: November 7, 2022

Olubukola O. Adetula, Esq., 20 Rosewood Lane, Denville, NJ 07834, Attorney for Appellant

Rasheem Langley, Ray Brook FCI, P.O. Box 900, Ray Brook, NY 12977, Pro se

Mark E. Coyne, Esq., Jane M. Dattilo, Esq., Steven G. Sanders, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, 970 Broad Street, Room 700, Newark, NJ 07102, Attorneys for Appellee

Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

When counsel for a criminal defendant seeks to withdraw from representing her client, she must comply with the Supreme Court's edict in Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and file what is known as an Anders brief. But counsel filing an Anders brief confronts a paradox. On the one hand, to discharge her obligations under Anders , precedent and our Local Rules require counsel to identify all issues that might "arguably support" the defendant's appeal—only to explain why those issues are frivolous. Id. On the other hand, we have advised that counsel need not raise every frivolous issue. That paradox is even more confounding where a defendant subsequently files a pro se brief raising frivolous issues that counsel did not address. What, if anything, should counsel do in that circumstance? Does her failure either to anticipate the defendant's arguments or to file a supplemental Anders brief addressing them mean that counsel's brief is per se inadequate? We have not been consistent in answering these questions, so we write today to clarify counsel's obligations.

The vehicle that brings those issues before us is the appeal filed by Richard Langley. Langley's court-appointed counsel sought to withdraw from representing Langley, filing an Anders motion and accompanying brief that, on its face, met the standard for a "conscientious investigation ... [of] possible grounds [for] appeal." Id. at 741-42, 87 S.Ct. 1396. After being served a copy of that brief, however, Langley filed his own pro se brief raising three arguments that were not addressed by counsel but were patently frivolous. Because we hold that counsel is not required to anticipate or address the defendant's arguments in that circumstance, and we agree with Langley's counsel that there are no non-frivolous issues for Langley to raise on appeal, we will grant counsel's Anders motion and dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND¹

In or around 2009, a group of individuals operating under the names "CKarter Boys" or the "Jonez Boys" began a drug trafficking operation ("DTO") in Newark, New Jersey. Defendant Richard Langley was a minor player in this DTO and served as a street-level dealer between 2017 and 2019. And after an investigation consisting of audio and visual surveillance and controlled purchases, Langley was arrested along with 25 other individuals in connection with the DTO on June 18, 2019.

The Government offered Langley a plea agreement in January 2020. The terms of that agreement provided that Langley would plead guilty to a single count of conspiring with others to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 28 grams or more of crack-cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846—an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of 5-years' imprisonment. It also provided that he would not argue for a sentence below five years' imprisonment, and that he would enter into a limited appellate waiver applicable to any challenges to the "sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence is 5 years or below." App at 74. In exchange for his plea, the Government agreed to not file additional charges against Langley for his involvement in the DTO and waived its own right to appeal if the sentence imposed was "5 years or above." Id.

Although Langley and the Government acknowledged the sentencing decision was entirely within the discretion of the District Court and "recognize[d] that the stipulations," including the stipulated 5-year sentence, were "not binding upon the Court," both parties "nevertheless agree[d] to the stipulations" and that a term of five-years' imprisonment, i.e. , 60-months', would be "reasonable." App. at 74.

Langley accepted this plea deal and pleaded guilty in November 2020. During his plea hearing, the District Court engaged in a thorough colloquy under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. The Court confirmed that Langley wished to proceed by video conference, that he was not intoxicated, and that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). It also confirmed that Langley understood he had the right to plead not guilty and have a trial by jury, and that if he chose to go to trial, he would have the right to an attorney, the right to be present at trial, the right to subpoena witnesses, the right not to testify, and that by pleading guilty he would waive these rights. Id. 11(b)(1)(B)-(F).

Before Langley allocuted to an adequate factual basis for his plea, the Court advised him of the penalties he faced for his offense, and explained that, though non-binding, the Court would have to calculate a sentence range using the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. 11(b)(1)(G)-(O), 11(b)(3). And importantly, for our purposes, the Court ensured that Langley had discussed his plea agreement with his counsel and that he understood its terms—including the terms and effect of the appellate waiver. Id. 11(b)(1)(N). After affirming that he understood each point addressed by the District Court, Langley entered his plea.

A few months later, in May 2021, the District Court held Langley's sentencing hearing. There, the District Court heard arguments from both the Government and defense counsel that a 60-month sentence was appropriate given Langley's minor role in the DTO and the age of his prior convictions. Although not required, it also addressed pro se arguments raised by Langley, who had submitted a letter to the Court requesting a sentence reduction based on the COVID-19 pandemic, the effect of the crack/powder cocaine disparity on the Court's Guidelines calculation, and the age of the criminal convictions used to calculate his Criminal History Category. The Court advised Langley that his prior convictions had to be counted because the last day of incarceration for each of these offenses fell within the 15-year window for counting of offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines. It also explained to him that it had considered his arguments, but because it intended to grant a substantial downward variance and impose the mandatory minimum, in any event, those arguments could not reduce his sentence any further.

Based on a Criminal History Category of VI and an offense level of 25, the Court determined that the applicable guideline range was 110 to 137 months. Nonetheless, after considering arguments of counsel and the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court granted the downward variance agreed upon by Langley and the Government and sentenced Langley to 60-months' imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised release, and a $100.00 special assessment.

Langley filed a timely notice of appeal and requested appointment of appellate counsel, which we granted, appointing Langley's trial counsel to serve on appeal. In due course, the Clerk of Court issued a briefing schedule. When the time came, however, in lieu of filing an appellate brief, Langley's counsel moved to withdraw, asserting in his Anders brief, as required under Local Appellate Rule (L.A.R.) 109.2(a), that he identified "no issue of even arguable merit." Upon receipt of that motion, the Clerk issued a notice to Langley. L.A.R. 109.2(a). Shortly thereafter, Langley submitted his own pro se brief, objecting to withdrawal of counsel and arguing for a further sentencing reduction on the same grounds he had urged in the District Court.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction over Langley's appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Having received an Anders motion, this Court must evaluate the adequacy of counsel's briefing and "must then itself conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous." Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (internal citation omitted). If there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, we will grant counsel's motion to withdraw and will dismiss the appeal.² In conducting this analysis, we "exercise plenary review to determine whether there are any such [non-frivolous] issues" and review factual findings for clear error.

Simon v. Gov't of Virgin Islands , 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

When counsel files an Anders brief seeking to withdraw from representation, we ask two principal questions: (1) whether counsel's brief in support of her motion fulfills the requirements of L.A.R. 109.2(a); and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any non-frivolous issues. See United States v. Youla , 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). Counsel fails to fulfill her obligation under the first prong of the Anders inquiry where she either does not adequately attempt "to uncover the best arguments for ... her client," or she "argue[s] the purportedly frivolous issues [she identifies] aggressively without explaining the faults in the arguments." Id. (quoting United States v. Marvin , 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000) ). Conversely, counsel satisfies her Anders obligation if she: (1) demonstrates to this Court that she has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) explains why those issues are frivolous. Id. Once we determine whether counsel has met her Anders obligation, we proceed to step two of the Anders inquiry.

Although at step two we conduct our own review of the record regardless, it matters whether we found counsel's...