United States v. LaRoche
| Decision Date | 21 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-CR-30003-RAL |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JADE LAROCHE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
JADE LAROCHE, Defendant.
No. 3:22-CR-30003-RAL
United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Central Division
June 21, 2022
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR DISPOSITION OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
MARK A. MORENO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In this assaulting a federal officer case, Jade LaRoche moves to suppress statements he made when an officer tried to arrest him at his mother's house. But because LaRoche was not interrogated while in custody and made voluntary statements to the officer, his suppression motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
Around 2:30 a.m. on October 31, 2021, Josephine Skunk called local dispatch to report that her son, LaRoche, was acting up and she wanted someone to come resolve the situation. Dispatch apprised Justin Schmiedt, a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officer, of the call and he headed toward Skunk's home in the Lower Brule community. Along the way, Schmiedt confirmed, through dispatch, that LaRoche had an active Lower Brule Sioux Tribe arrest warrant but did not know what the warrant was for.
Upon arriving at the residence, Schmiedt knocked on the front door and Skunk invited him in.
As Schmiedt stood in the living room, Skunk informed him that she and LaRoche had a falling-out. She advised LaRoche that Schmiedt was there and had LaRoche join them in the room. There, Schmiedt and LaRoche conversed for about 14 minutes.
Schmiedt notified LaRoche of the arrest warrant at the outset of the conversation. LaRoche acknowledged knowing of the warrant and asked if Schmiedt had spoken with BIA Officer Moran about it. Schmiedt had not and told LaRoche as much. LaRoche began talking about Moran, the warrant, and himself before Schmiedt asked, “So, what's the warrant for? Do you know what it's for?” LaRoche professed that he “was supposed to go to treatment,” then initiated a lengthy explanation of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant and his life situation. Schmiedt allowed LaRoche to vent, contributing the occasional cursory interjection and clarifying question to the confab.
But as the dialogue continued, LaRoche became increasingly anxious. His eyes started to dart around the home, and he began to shift about on his feet. Noting the change in demeanor and after giving LaRoche plenty of time to speak his piece, Schmiedt declared that, “So far as tonight goes okay, I'm going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” After this, when a brief attempt to cajole his way out of the impending arrest was ineffective, LaRoche bolted.
LaRoche fled through the kitchen and into the connecting garage, where he stayed, that had a large blanket covering the doorway, top to bottom. Skunk warned Schmiedt there was a back door to the garage through which LaRoche might escape. As Schmiedt prepared to enter the garage with Taser and flashlight in hand, LaRoche rushed out from behind the blanket and knocked Schmiedt down. In response, Schmiedt deployed his Taser twice, but to no avail. LaRoche absconded out the front door of the house and vanished into the darkness.
A federal grand jury later indicted LaRoche on one count of assaulting, resisting, and impeding a federal officer. LaRoche moved to suppress what he said after Schmiedt asked about the arrest warrant.[1] The government resisted suppression.[2] The Court held a hearing on LaRoche's motion, at which Schmiedt testified,[3] and then supplemented the evidentiary record with a dash cam recording of Schmiedt and LaRoche's colloquy in the home.[4]
DISCUSSION
A. Miranda
LaRoche first claims that his statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.[5]He experienced custodial interrogation, he says, with no Miranda advisement. The issue is whether LaRoche was in custody and interrogated before he took off. If so, his statements must be suppressed because he was never Mirandized. If not, Miranda provides him no avenue for exclusion of the statements.
Reinforcing the Fifth Amendment, the Miranda decision requires law enforcement to warn suspects of their rights before engaging in custodial interrogation.[6]Interrogation is any question, word, or action that an officer should know is “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”[7] Custody,[8] for purposes of Miranda, occurs when: (1) a suspect is formally arrested, or (2) the suspect's “freedom of movement” is restricted to a “degree associated with a formal arrest.”[9] In determining
the extent to which a suspect's freedom of movement was restricted, a court examines the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and whether a reasonable person would “have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”[10]
Certain “relevant factors,” the Supreme Court has instructed, should be considered in the custody determination, including, “the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of [the suspect] at the end of the questioning.”[11] The Eighth Circuit has also set forth common “indicia” which tend to either mitigate or aggravate an atmosphere of custodial interrogation.[12] These indicia, while useful, are not dispositive or exhaustive.[13] They are merely one way to determine whether the suspect's movement was curtailed, as if he were under formal arrest, and subjected to the same inherently coercive pressures as the station house questioning at issue in Miranda.[14]
Skunk invited Schmiedt, who was by himself, into her home.[15] She then called
LaRoche to come out to the living room.[16] While Schmiedt mentioned the arrest warrant early in the conversation, “you know you got that warrant on you,” he did not arrest LaRoche or deprive LaRoche of his liberty in a manner tantamount to a conventional arrest.[17]
LaRoche and Schmiedt spoke with each other, in conversational tones and in Skunk's presence, for a while about LaRoche's life, past issues, and the circumstances preceding the warrant's issuance.[18] LaRoche controlled the conversation and did most of the talking.[19] Schmiedt did not announce that he was taking LaRoche in (arresting
him) until the very end of the discourse.[20] Then, when his last ditch effort to persuade Schmiedt to give him a break failed, LaRoche skedaddled.[21]
The conversation: (1) was relatively brief, amicable, and one LaRoche steered;[22] (2) took place in a familiar and relaxed setting and in the company of LaRoche's mother;[23] (3) did not involve any display of weapons, physical force, or heavy-handed tactics on the part of Schmiedt;[24] (4) went on without restraint to LaRoche's freedom of movement;[25] and (5) ended when LaRoche scampered off to the garage (his bedroom)
and then out the front door.[26] That LaRoche was never told he was free to leave is not dispositive.[27] Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person, in LaRoche's position, would not have understood he was in custody until Schmiedt said he had to execute the warrant and take LaRoche into custody.[28]
Regardless, none of Schmiedt's inquiries amounted to impermissible interrogation. His questions, “So, what's the warrant for? Do you know what it's for?,”[29]were not interrogatory. Given their context,[30] they were designed to help him assess the
situation he faced and clarify LaRoche's earlier statements[31] and not to expand the scope of them and enhance LaRoche's guilt.[32] LaRoche's other statements were either spontaneous or arose from Schmiedt's follow-up of volunteered information.[33]Schmiedt's queries did not create culpability for LaRoche or worsen his predicament.[34]
Lacking both custody and interrogation, LaRoche cannot prevail on his Miranda claim. That portion of his suppression should accordingly be denied.
B. Voluntariness
LaRoche next claims that his statements were involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. He points to these circumstances that, when combined, he says overbore his will and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination:
1. The time (during the wee hours of the morning), manner (asked incriminating and unnecessary questions), and location (his mother's living room) of the interrogation; and
2. Schmiedt's attire (BIA uniform), room position (blocking the front door), weapon on his person (Taser), and suspicions (LaRoche may be under the influence).[35]
The Court is not persuaded.
When statements to law enforcement are “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by their maker,” they are voluntary.[36] Statements are not considered involuntary unless the police extorted them from the accused through coercive activity.[37] Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that
statements are not voluntary under the Due Process Clause.[38] Voluntariness is judged by the totality of the circumstances.[39]
Neither the recording nor Schmiedt's testimony offer any hint of coercive or improper conduct from Schmiedt.[40] And as an adult with extensive experience in the criminal justice system,[41] LaRoche did not show any hesitancy about speaking to Schmiedt during the short-lived interaction.[42] Nothing Schmiedt said or did undermined LaRoche's free-will and decision-making abilities. LaRoche's flight-to the garage and from the house-is proof positive of this. LaRoche made his statements voluntarily. As a result, they are admissible as substantive evidence against him at trial.
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