United States v. Lasseque

• Decision Date: 18 November 2015
• Docket Number: Nos. 14–2026,14–2079.,s. 14–2026
• Citation: 806 F.3d 618
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. David LASSEQUE, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

806 F.3d 618

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.David LASSEQUE, Defendant, Appellant.

Nos. 14–2026

14–2079.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Nov. 18, 2015.

William T. Murphy for appellant.

Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Peter F. Neronha, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Opinion

STAHL, Circuit Judge.

Following a two-day jury trial, Defendant–Appellant David Lasseque was convicted of aiding and abetting a bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, and conspiring to commit a bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. At sentencing, the district court applied a weapon enhancement and an obstruction of justice enhancement, both of which increased the recommended sentencing range. The defendant now appeals. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. Facts & Background

“As with any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following a trial by jury, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.” United States v. Bayes,210 F.3d 64, 65–66 (1st Cir.2000).

David Lasseque (“Lasseque”) and Pierre Rheau (“Rheau”) lived one floor apart in the same building in Providence, Rhode Island. On the afternoon of July 12, 2013, Rheau asked Lasseque to drive him to Barrington, Rhode Island. Lasseque agreed and drove Rheau in a brown Hyundai rented the day before by Rheau's second cousin.

In Barrington, Rheau, wearing a baseball cap, a black cloth around his face, dark sunglasses, latex gloves, and a pillow under his clothes to make him seem heavier, entered a local branch office of Bank of America. Brandishing a black gun, he demanded money from the tellers, who quickly obliged. Rheau exited the bank about one minute later and got back in the Hyundai driven by Lasseque. Local police officers quickly were dispatched to the crime scene following a report of the robbery by the bank tellers.

About a mile away from the bank, a police officer saw a driver that he believed fit the description of the robber approaching from the direction of the bank. Noticing that he was speeding and changing lanes without signaling, the officer pulled Lasseque over. As the police officer got out of the cruiser and approached the Hyundai, Lasseque sped off.

Lasseque led officers on a lengthy high-speed chase that only terminated when his vehicle collided with a police cruiser. After the crash, Lasseque immediately exited the car and began to flee on foot. As Lasseque attempted to scale a backyard fence, two officers pulled him down. Lasseque initially struggled with the officers and refused to place his hands behind his back, but finally relented and was cuffed.

Rheau remained in the Hyundai after it crashed. Upon a search of the vehicle, officers found the money stolen from the bank, the gun, and Rheau's robbery attire. After indictment, Rheau eventually pled guilty to two counts: armed bank robbery and conspiracy to commit a bank robbery. At the plea hearing, Rheau admitted that he and Lasseque had agreed to rob the bank, and that he executed the robbery with Lasseque serving as the getaway driver.

Although Lasseque waived his Mirandarights the morning after the robbery and agreed to speak with an investigating officer, when questioned, Lasseque “smiled, joked, giggled, and was non-responsive.” Lasseque proceeded to trial on two counts: aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery and conspiracy to commit a bank robbery.

At trial, Lasseque testified that, on the afternoon of July 12, 2013, he agreed to drive Rheau to his girlfriend's house in Barrington so that he could retrieve a few things. Lasseque claimed that once Rheau exited the vehicle, he fell asleep. According to Lasseque, he awoke when Rheau got back in the car and demanded that Lasseque drive away quickly because Rheau did not want his girlfriend “to see what kind of car he jumped in.” Lasseque testified that after they were pulled over by the police, Rheau revealed he had a gun. Fearing that the police would shoot him because of the gun, Lasseque sped off as the police officer was approaching the car. Lasseque denied having seen Rheau's disguise prior to the robbery or having any prior knowledge of the robbery or the gun.

At the close of the government's case, Lasseque moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lasseque argued that the government had failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that there was an agreement between Rheau and himself to rob the bank, that he physically participated in the robbery in any way, or that he had the requisite intent necessary to support either charge. The district court rejected Lasseque's motion. The jury found Lasseque not guilty of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery, but convicted him on the lesser-included count of aiding and abetting a bank robbery and conspiring to commit a bank robbery.

At sentencing, Lasseque lodged a number of objections to the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), only two of which are at issue on appeal. First, Lasseque objected to the application of a three-point weapon enhancement pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual(“U.S.S.G.”). Second, Lasseque objected to the application of a two-point obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court denied both objections and sentenced Lasseque to a term of incarceration of 140 months.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Lasseque contends that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29motion for judgment of acquittal and further argues that, at sentencing, the court erred in imposing the weapon and obstruction of justice enhancements. We address each contention in turn.

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a defendant may move for the court to enter a judgment of acquittal after the government closes its evidence on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The denial of that motion we review de novo. United States v. Trinidad–Acosta,773 F.3d 298, 310 (1st Cir.2014). On review, we examine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” asking “whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos–Montes,786 F.3d 92, 112 (1st Cir.2015). The scope of our review accords due deference to those properly charged with sifting and weighing the facts, informed by the credibility cues of the witnesses and the full context of the trial. Our job is to monitor the boundaries of reasonable fact-finding, not to engage in it ourselves. United States v. Davila–Nieves,670 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2012)(stating that, in reviewing the denial of a motion for acquittal, “we do not weigh competing evidence; rather, we merely verify that some evidence adequately supports the jury's verdict”). As such, Lasseque's Rule 29challenge “face[s] an uphill battle on appeal.” United States v. Lipscomb,539 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir.2008)(quoting United States v. O'Shea,426 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir.2005)).

Lasseque argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he knowingly aided and abetted Rheau in committing the bank robbery. To prevail on its theory of accomplice liability, the government had to prove that: (1) Rheau committed the substantive acts of the bank robbery; and (2) Lasseque “became associated with the endeavor and took part in it, intending to ensure its success.” United States v. Spinney,65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir.1995). As Rheau's guilt is undisputed, our inquiry necessarily focuses on the second element of this recitation, and whether the government offered sufficient evidence that Lasseque took an affirmative act in furtherance of the bank robbery with the intent to facilitate its commission. See Rosemond v. United States,––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1245, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014).

Upon reviewing the record, we agree with the determination of the district court that the government provided sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find Lasseque guilty of the charged offense. Because the robbery took place during daylight hours in a commercial district with heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic, it would be quite reasonable to infer that Rheau donned his unconventional apparel, including latex gloves and a pillow under his clothes, in the car before being dropped off. This suggests that Lasseque was well aware of the plot soon to unfold.

The alternative, of course, is that Rheau acquired this mélange of items elsewhere after being dropped off by Lasseque and then either assembled his disguise at the foot of the bank or meandered his way through town sporting his full ensemble. The jury need not surrender to such speculation. The government must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonabledoubt, not beyond alldoubt.

In addition, the jury was well within reason to find that the nature and extent of Lasseque's elusion of authorities following the robbery belied the justification he offered at trial. Here, Lasseque engaged in a lengthy and dangerous high-speed chase, culminating in a collision with a police cruiser, an attempt to flee by foot, and a struggle with the arresting officers. The jury could quite easily find that this form of flight was “a particularly eloquent reflection of a guilty mind,” rather than the panicked impulse of an innocent heart. United States v. Martinez,922 F.2d 914, 923 (1st Cir.1991).

Finally, Lasseque's alternative explanation at trial is undercut by his failure to offer it after waiving his Mirandarights in his post-arrest interview. All of this evidence is probative of Lasseque's intent and was placed before the jury by the government.

In addition to reinforcing Lasseque's foreknowledge of the plan, there can be little doubt that Lasseque's evasive exploits constituted an affirmative act in furtherance of the robbery. It is well settled that a getaway driver aids and abets a robbery. See Rosemond,134 S.Ct. at 1249. A bank robbery would hardly be...