United States v. Laurent

• Decision Date: 26 April 2022
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 15-3807-cr,15-3848-cr,16-1794-cr,August Term, 2017
• Citation: 33 F.4th 63
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jamal LAURENT, also known as Tails, Trevelle Merritt, also known as Tiger, Yasser Ashburn, also known as Indio, also known as Swerve, also known as Supa Swerve 6, also known as Yassen Ashburn Defendants-Appellants, Ricky Hollenquest, also known as Dancer, Devon Rodney, also known as D-Bloc, Haile Cummings, also known as Ruger, also known as Rugan, Geraldo Elainor, also known as Gunny, also known as Geraldo Casimir, Daniel Harrison, also known as Bones, Ralik Odom, also known as Ra-Ra, also known as Rahleek Odom. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

33 F.4th 63

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Jamal LAURENT, also known as Tails, Trevelle Merritt, also known as Tiger, Yasser Ashburn, also known as Indio, also known as Swerve, also known as Supa Swerve 6, also known as Yassen Ashburn Defendants-Appellants,Ricky Hollenquest, also known as Dancer, Devon Rodney, also known as D-Bloc, Haile Cummings, also known as Ruger, also known as Rugan, Geraldo Elainor, also known as Gunny, also known as Geraldo Casimir, Daniel Harrison, also known as Bones, Ralik Odom, also known as Ra-Ra, also known as Rahleek Odom. Defendants.^*

Docket Nos. 15-3807-cr

15-3848-cr

16-1794-cr

August Term, 2017

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: May 2, 2018

Decided: April 26, 2022

Bruce R. Bryan, Bryan Law Firm, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Jamal Laurent.

Robert Rosenthal, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Trevelle Merritt.

Randa D. Maher, Law Office of Randa D. Maher, New York, NY, for Jamal Ashburn.

Margaret Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, (Emily Burger, M. Kristin Mace, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief) for Richard P. Donoghue, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.

Before: Leval and Lynch, Circuit Judges.^†

Leval, Circuit Judge:

Yasser Ashburn, Jamal Laurent, and Trevelle Merritt (together, "Defendants") appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nicholas G. Garaufis, J. ) convicting them of crimes arising from their participation in a violent Brooklyn street gang known as the Six Tre Outlaw Gangsta Disciples Folk Nation ("Six Tre" or the "Gang").³ Defendants were convicted, in various combinations, on twelve counts, including violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) ; conspiracy to violate RICO; murder in aid of racketeering; firearms offenses; and related crimes. On appeal, Defendants contend, among other arguments, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions; and that certain of the offenses of conviction do not qualify as predicate "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Ashburn also challenges the reasonableness of his life sentence.

BACKGROUND

The Six Tre gang committed robberies, murders, and other acts of violence. Members would typically join the Gang as "foot soldiers" and advance their status by contributing financially or committing acts of violence. At times, the Six Tre gang would go to war with rival gangs. Members were expected to demonstrate their loyalty to the Six Tre and uphold its honor by killing and committing other acts of violence against members of rival gangs.

At the times relevant to this appeal, Defendant Ashburn was the Gang's primary leader, sometimes referred to as the "Big Homie." Defendants Laurent and Merritt were foot soldiers.

Defendants were charged in a fourteen-count superseding indictment (the "Indictment") with crimes committed from 2008 through 2011. Following a five-week jury trial involving testimony of more than 35 witnesses (including three cooperating defendant-witnesses), the jury found the Defendants guilty on twelve of the fourteen counts. All three were convicted on Count One (the "substantive RICO" count) of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) ; on Count Two (the "RICO conspiracy" count) of racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) ; and on Count Three of unlawful use of firearms "during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The complete list of counts of conviction is shown in the table below:

Defendant	Offense	Count
Ashburn, Laurent, & Merritt	Racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)	1
Ashburn, Laurent, & Merritt	Racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)	2
Ashburn, Laurent, & Merritt	Unlawful use of firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)	3
Ashburn	Murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)	4
Laurent	Murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)	5
Laurent	Assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)	6
Laurent	Unlawful use of firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)	7 & 10
Laurent	Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)	8 & 9
Merritt	Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)	11 & 12

Each defendant was sentenced to prison terms as follows:

For Ashburn, life in prison on Counts One and Two, concurrently; life in prison on Count Four, consecutive to Counts One and Two; and 10 years in prison on Count 3, consecutive to the other terms.

For Laurent, life in prison on Counts One and Two, concurrently; life in prison on Count Three, consecutive to all other counts; life in prison on Count Seven, consecutive to all other counts; 20 years on Counts Six and Eight, concurrent with each other and with Counts One and Two; life in prison on Count Ten, consecutive to all other counts; and life in prison on Count Five, consecutive to all other counts.

For Merritt, 30 years on Counts One and Two, concurrently; 20 years on Counts Eleven and Twelve concurrently with each other and with Counts One and Two, and 10 years on Count Three, consecutive to all other counts.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

We turn first to the Defendants’ claims of insufficiency of evidence. Our review is de novo , in that we do not defer to the District Court's determination as to evidence sufficiency. United States v. Guadagna , 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999). However, in conducting our own review of the trial record, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been [reasonably] drawn in the government's favor, and deferring to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence," United States v. Coplan , 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) ; see also United States v. Landesman , 17 F.4th 298, 320 (2d Cir. 2021) ("The jury's inferences ... must be reasonable."). "[W]e will uphold the judgments of conviction if ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Coplan , 703 F.3d at 62 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ).

All three Defendants contend the trial evidence was insufficient to convict them on the Count One charge of racketeering in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and the Count Two charge of RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Ashburn and Laurent also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(l) (Counts Four and Five respectively).

To prove a substantive RICO violation, as charged in Count One, the government must show, inter alia , that a defendant participated in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise "through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To show such a pattern, the government must prove at least two predicate racketeering acts that "amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity," and are "related." H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co. , 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). The predicate racketeering acts must be related both "to each other (‘horizontal’ relatedness), and ... to the enterprise (‘vertical’ relatedness)," United States v. Vernace , 811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Minicone , 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992) ). The relatedness of predicate acts may be shown by evidence that the acts have "the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." United States v. Payne , 591 F.3d 46, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting H. J. Inc. , 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 ) (internal alterations omitted). " ‘[T]he same or similar proof that establishes vertical relatedness’ may also establish horizontal relatedness, because ‘the requirements of horizontal relatedness can be established by linking each predicate act to the enterprise.’ " Vernace , 811 F.3d at 616 (quoting United States v. Daidone , 471 F.3d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (alterations adopted).

The RICO conspiracy statute charged in Count Two, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), provides, simply, that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section." To be guilty of such a conspiracy, one must agree with others to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise and agree that the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise will include the predicate racketeering acts alleged. United States v. Basciano , 599 F.3d 184, 199 (2d Cir. 2010). The RICO conspiracy provision is broader than the general conspiracy provision applicable to federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 371, as it does not require the commission of an overt act. See Salinas v. United States , 522 U.S. 52, 63, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997).

To prove murder in aid of racketeering, as charged in Counts Four and Five, the government must show that a defendant committed murder "for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position" in the racketeering enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(l). That intent requirement can be proven by a showing "that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership." United States v. Pimentel , 346 F.3d 285, 296 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Laurent and Ashburn were also charged with murder in aid of racketeering based on the conduct underlying two of the alleged Racketeering Acts. All three Defendants contend that there was insufficient evidence to prove several of the underlying Racketeering...