United States v. Law, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 08-77
| Decision Date | 11 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 08-77 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RODNEY LAW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
Defendant Rodney Law is serving a 130-month sentence in federal custody for his conviction of possession of cocaine base ("crack") with intent to distribute. Presently before the Court is defendant's pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. The motion presents one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Specifically, defendant alleges that his attorney failed to request that the Court run defendant's federal sentence concurrently with his then-undischarged state sentence or grant a downward departure to account for time defendant had already served on the state sentence. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the motion.
The background of this case is set forth in detail in prior opinions of this Court and the Third Circuit. See United States v. Law, 384 F. App'x 121 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Law, No. 08-77, 2008 WL 1776422 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2008); United States v. Law, 526 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Pa. 2007); United States v. Law, No. 05-78, 2005 WL 3464449 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2005). The background will be repeated in this Memorandum only as necessary to explain the Court's ruling on the instant motion.
A federal grand jury returned an Indictment on February 7, 2008, charging defendant with possession of cocaine base ("crack") with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) ("Count One"); possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) ("Count Two"); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) ("Count Three"); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ("Count Four").1 Defendant proceeded to trial, and on April 23, 2008, the jury returned a guilty verdict on Counts One and Two. The jury acquitted him of Count Three, and the Court acquitted him of Count Four.
Defendant was sentenced on August 28, 2008. The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") stated that defendant had a total offense level of thirty-six and a Criminal History Category of VI, with a resulting guideline sentencing range of 324 to 405 months.2 This calculation was premised on a base offense level of twenty-eight for the crimes of conviction, a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, a six-level enhancement fordefendant's assault on a police officer during his arrest,3 and a determination that defendant was a career offender.
At the sentencing hearing, the Court rejected several of the sentencing recommendations made in the PSR, shortening defendant's sentence substantially. First, the Court determined that there was insufficient evidence to support the proposed two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon. (See 8/28/08 Hr'g Tr. 13.) Second, the Court rejected the proposed six-level enhancement for assaulting a police officer. (Id. at 19.) The Court reasoned that, although there was evidence that defendant had pushed or otherwise touched one of the officers involved in his arrest, "the drafters of the guidelines had in mind a more significant assault" when they formulated the enhancement. (Id.) In lieu of applying that enhancement, the Court stated that it would "take [defendant's] conduct into consideration in determining where within the guideline range" to sentence him. (Id.) Third, the Court decreased the base offense level from twenty-eight to twenty-six to account for the retroactive crack cocaine amendment. (Id. at 20-21.) Finally, the Court rejected the government's argument that defendant was a career offender. (Id. at 24-25.)
As a result of all these rulings, the Court determined that defendant's total offense level was twenty-six. In Criminal History Category V, that resulted in a guideline range of 110 to 137 months—approximately one-third the range recommended in the PSR and advocated by the government. The Court sentenced defendant to 130 months' imprisonment, four years'supervised release, and a $1000 fine. The Court informed defendant that, had he not assaulted an officer, he would have received a sentence of 110 months, at the bottom of the guideline range. (Id. at 44.) Continuing, the Court stated, (Id. at 44-45.)
At the end of the sentencing proceeding, defense counsel thanked the Court "on behalf of Mr. Law who . . . found [the Court] immensely fair." (Id. at 52.) Defense counsel stated that he had told defendant that "he got a tremendous break from where they wanted to come to 300 months to where he wound up, 130 months." (Id. at 52-53.) The Third Circuit affirmed the reasonableness of the sentence on appeal, rejecting defendant's argument that the sentence did not adequately account for the disparity in punishments for offenses involving cocaine and offenses involving crack. Law, 384 F. App'x at 124.
At the time of his federal sentencing, defendant had already begun to serve a sentence on unrelated state charges. He was convicted on April 23, 2004, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County of carrying firearms without a license and being a felon in possession of a firearm.4 On March 22, 2006, he was sentenced to one-and-a-half to three years' imprisonment and five years' probation on those charges, and he began serving that sentence immediately. He was transferred, on a writ, from the Graterford State Correctional Institution to the FederalDetention Center in Philadelphia on April 21, 2008. When this Court sentenced defendant on the federal charges, a maximum of approximately seven months' imprisonment remained on his state sentence.
At defendant's federal sentencing proceeding, there was no mention of the undischarged state sentence. The PSR noted the state conviction and sentence but did not discuss how they might interact with the federal sentence. Defendant and the government now agree that defendant completed his state sentence on March 29, 2009, having served the maximum three-year term of imprisonment. Because "[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively" unless ordered otherwise, 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), defendant did not begin to serve his federal sentence until he completed the state sentence.
Defendant contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. "Strickland v. Washington supplies the standard for addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2003). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
This standard requires a two-part inquiry. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient," that is, "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. The measure for counsel's performance under this first prong is "whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances," including"prevailing professional norms." Id. "Second, the defendant must show that [counsel's] deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. The defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "In the sentencing context, prejudice exists where the deficient performance affected a defendant's sentence." United States v. Hankerson, 496 F.3d 303, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001)).
Defendant argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. According to defendant, had counsel raised the issue, the Court might have (1) permitted defendant to serve the remainder of his state sentence concurrently with his federal sentence or (2) granted him a downward departure to account for the time he had already served on the state sentence. (Def.'s Reply 3-4.) Defendant asserts that the Court might have been particularly inclined to grant such relief because the multiple indictments in this case allegedly caused him to "miss[] his opportunity for parole" on the state sentence. (Id.)
Defendant's claim is rejected. Turning first to the issue of prejudice, the Court finds that there was none. The Court would not have ordered concurrent state and federal sentences or a downward departure even if counsel had requested them.
"Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently." 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). "This statement reflects the fact that several convictions imposed after different trials are more likely to reflect unrelated behaviors, [and in that situation], consecutive sentences are more likely to beappropriate." Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1476 (2012). Nonetheless, in a case like this one, the concurrent/consecutive decision is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge. A movant under § 2255 cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement unless he can demonstrate a reasonable probability that the sentencing judge would have...
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