United States v. Lawin
Citation | 779 F.3d 780 |
Decision Date | 05 March 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–2577.,14–2577. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Adam LAWIN, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David E. Mullin, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Dan Chatham, AUSA, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant–Appellant.
Before BYE, BRIGHT, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
[Published]
Adam Lawin pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. The district court 1 sentenced him to 147 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release. Lawin argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a downward variance and in denying his request to continue the sentencing hearing. We affirm.
In early 2012, Lawin began to purchase and distribute 3,4–methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known as MDMA or ecstasy. The government charged him with one count of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance and one count of possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance. In February 2014, Lawin pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court calculated Lawin's sentencing guidelines range to be 135 to 168 months and sentenced him to 147 months' imprisonment. Before the sentencing hearing on June 19, 2014, both parties asked the court to vary downward by two levels in anticipation of Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines.2 At the sentencing hearing, the district court recognized it had the authority to vary downward but declined to do so, explaining the then-proposed amendment was not guaranteed to take effect.
On appeal, Lawin argues the district court erred in denying the motion to vary downward by two levels from the correctly calculated guidelines range in anticipation of Amendment 782. Our case law on this issue is clear: United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir.2008); United States v. Davis, 276 Fed.Appx. 527, 528 (8th Cir.2008) ( ); United States v. Harris, 74 F.3d 1244 (8th Cir.1996). The district court considered and rejected prospectively applying Amendment 782. It did not err in so doing. Without any supporting authority, the dissent attempts to distinguish our case law on the basis that this case involves a different amendment and states that “[t]he applicability of the cases [above] ... may be questionable.” However, our holdings were not limited to any specific amendment. Moreover, they follow the firmly-established principle that the court must apply the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing unless doing so would violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 509 F.3d 929, 932 n. 4 (8th Cir.2007).
Lawin also argues the district court erred in denying his request to continue the sentencing hearing until after November 1, 2014. “We will reverse a district court's decision to deny a motion for continuance only if the court abused its discretion and the moving party was prejudiced by the denial.” United States v. Woods, 642 F.3d 640, 644 (8th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lawin argues the denial of the continuance prejudiced him because it deprived him of the benefit of Amendment 782, but he fails to articulate how the court abused its discretion in denying the continuance. We find no abuse of discretion. See id. at 644–45 ( ); United States v. McBride, 426 Fed.Appx. 471, 474 (8th Cir.2011); United States v. Scallion, 83 F.3d 425 (8th Cir.1996).
To address the dissent's concern, we note that Lawin has not been deprived of the opportunity to pursue the benefit of Amendment 782. See18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (). The dissent believes the opportunity to pursue relief under § 3582(c)(2) renders the issues on appeal moot because Lawin is “entitled to the relief he now seeks regardless of the outcome of this appeal.” However, Lawin has neither received the relief he seeks in this appeal nor is he guaranteed to receive it under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Hasan, 245 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc) () . Moreover, whether Lawin is entitled to a reduction in his sentence based on § 3582(c)(2) is a separate question from whether the district court erred in denying his motions.
Finally, the dissent asserts remand is appropriate so as not to “delay any further the remedy that Lawin deserves.” However, it acknowledges “the district court may immediately hold a hearing to rule on Lawin's eligibility for a sentence reduction and determine that reduction.” We do not believe our holding causes any delay or deprives Lawin of a benefit he may be entitled to, nor do we perceive any material benefit in remanding. Cf. United States v. Yanez–Estrada, No. 14–2989, 2015 WL 508862, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 9, 2015) (); United States v. Hayden, 775 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir.2014) (); United States v. Ergonis, 587 Fed.Appx. 431, 432 (9th Cir.2014) (); United States v. Moreno, No. 13–41019, 2015 WL 394450, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2015).
Accordingly, we affirm.
I write separately to express my view that I would neither affirm nor reverse in this case. For all practical purposes, this appeal is moot. In my view, we should remand for further proceedings now that the reduction in the base offense levels for most drug quantity offenses under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (Amendment 782) has become effective and retroactive. SeeU.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d) and (e)(1); United States v. Thomas, No. 14–3801, 2014 WL 7359580, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 29, 2014).
It's unnecessary to reach the merits of this appeal for two reasons. First, there exists good authority for mootness. In United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385 (8th Cir.2008), we considered whether the district judge erred in sentencing the defendant by refusing to apply the proposed amendment to the 100:1 ratio between crack cocaine and powder cocaine quantities in the Guidelines. Id. at 389. The amendment had become effective and retroactive at the time we considered the defendant's appeal. Id. We noted:
As a practical matter this issue is essentially moot. The sentencing commission has made the guidelines amendment retroactive. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 713 (Supp.2008) cited in United States v. Whiting, 522 F.3d 845, 851–52 (8th Cir.2008). The district court has the discretion to resentence Allebach using the amended guidelines.
The same is true here. The parties prepared and filed their briefs in this case prior to Amendment 782 becoming effective on November 1, 2014. Because Amendment 782 now retroactively applies to Lawin, he is entitled to the relief he now seeks (the benefit of the Amendment) regardless of the outcome of this appeal. See18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, this case is moot.
Second, there is no need to reach the merits because even in the absence of mootness, our case law favors a remand instead of an outright affirmance. In United States v. Whiting, 522 F.3d 845 (8th Cir.2008), we stated that “[w]hen an amendment to the guidelines becomes retroactive during the appellate proceedings on a case, it may be remanded to the district court for determination of whether the amendment warrants a sentence reduction” even though the district court or the defendant can independently move for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).3Id. at 853. We have applied this principle on multiple occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Shields, 519 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir.2008); United States v. Coohey, 11 F.3d 97, 101 (8th Cir.1993). And although a remand in these circumstances is not contingent on the mutual consent of the parties, it is significant that both parties here requested that the district court give Lawin the benefit of Amendment 782 at sentencing. Indeed, remanding would afford counsel for the parties an early opportunity to seek application of the now effective amended Guidelines for Lawin's benefit.
I acknowledge that some of the case law cited in the majority opinion may support an affirmance. These cases, however, relate, for the most part, to an amendment reducing the sentence...
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