United States v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 15 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-3061,20-3061
• Citation: 1 F.4th 40
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Melvin LAWRENCE, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

1 F.4th 40

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

v.Melvin LAWRENCE, Appellant

No. 20-3061

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued May 10, 2021

Decided June 15, 2021

William L. Welch, III, Baltimore, MD, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, and Timothy R. Cahill, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Rogers, Millett, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges.

Millett, Circuit Judge:

In 2009, the district court sentenced Melvin Lawrence to nearly 21 years in prison for selling 21.1 grams of crack cocaine. In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222, which permits defendants sentenced for certain crack offenses before August 3, 2010, to seek sentence reductions because of the profound (and disproportionately racial) disparity in the law's prior treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses. Lawrence then filed a motion for sentence reduction, but the district court reduced his sentence only by the ten months needed to comply with the new statutory maximum.

The sole and narrow question presented in this appeal is whether the law mandated that the district court provide Lawrence the opportunity to allocute—to speak in person to the district court judge—before ruling on his motion for a sentence reduction. Because no categorical right to allocute applies to motions to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

For nearly 25 years, federal criminal law punished offenses involving crack cocaine far more harshly than offenses involving powder cocaine. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207–2 to 3207–4; Dorsey v. United States , 567 U.S. 260, 263–264, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012). For instance, the law required a five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for people convicted of possessing with the intent to distribute either (i) 500 grams of powder cocaine or (ii) 5 grams of crack cocaine—a 100-to-1 disparity. Dorsey , 567 U.S. at 263–264, 132 S.Ct. 2321. Among other unjust effects, this punishment scheme particularly affected Black defendants, who constituted the large majority of defendants convicted of crack offenses and sentenced to disproportionately long prison terms. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N , 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS table 34 (2009), https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive/sourcebook-2009 (showing that in 2009, Black defendants constituted 79 percent of defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses but only 28 percent of defendants convicted of powder offenses); Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85, 98, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) ; United States v. White , 984 F.3d 76, 89–90 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

After two decades of criticism, see Dorsey , 567 U.S. at 268, 132 S.Ct. 2321, Congress reduced, but did not eliminate, the crack-to-powder disparity in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. See White , 984 F.3d at 81–82 ("[T]he Fair Sentencing Act * * * reduced the disparity between cocaine base and powder cocaine from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1."). As relevant here, the Fair Sentencing Act amended the penalties for drug distribution under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), by raising the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger various statutorily mandated sentences. See Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a), 124 Stat. at 2372; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii). For example, the trigger for a mandatory ten-years-to-life sentencing range was raised from 50 grams of crack to 280 grams. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2372. And the trigger for a mandatory 5-to-40-year sentencing range was raised from 5 grams of crack to 28 grams. Id. § 2(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2372.¹

But the Fair Sentencing Act's reduced punishments applied only prospectively to defendants sentenced after the Act's effective date of August 3, 2010. Dorsey , 567 U.S. at 264, 132 S.Ct. 2321 ; White , 984 F.3d at 82. Defendants sentenced prior to that date remained subject to their original sentences.²

Eight years went by before Congress turned to the defendants left serving sentences imposed under the disparately more punitive sentencing regime. In Section 404 of the First Step Act, Congress empowered district courts to reduce existing sentences for people convicted of certain crack cocaine offenses. See First Step Act § 404, 132 Stat. at 5222; 21 U.S.C. § 841 note (2019) ("Application of Fair Sentencing Act"). Section 404 proceeds in three parts.

First, Section 404 applies to a "covered offense[,]" which means "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010." First Step Act § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222 (internal citation omitted).

Second, Section 404 provides that the original sentencing court "may," on motion of the defendant, the government, or the court itself, "impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222 (internal citation omitted). In that way, Section 404 authorizes courts to apply the Fair Sentencing Act's crack-cocaine reforms retroactively. See White , 984 F.3d at 82.

Third, Section 404 sets out certain "[l]imitations" on the relief available. First Step Act § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222. Courts may not entertain motions under Section 404 if the "sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with" the Fair Sentencing Act. Id. Courts also may not entertain renewed motions under Section 404 if a previous Section 404 motion was "denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits." Id. And finally, "[n]othing in [Section 404] shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to [Section 404]." Id.

In short, Section 404 creates a process through which defendants sentenced for a qualifying offense under the prior, disparate sentencing regime may seek a sentence reduction, which the district court may grant in its discretion.

The district court's discretion in adjudicating a Section 404 motion is "broad" but not "unfettered[.]" White , 984 F.3d at 88. The district court's judgment "must take account of Congress's intent to rectify disproportionate and racially disparate sentencing penalties." Id. at 81. To that end, the district court must consider "all relevant factors[,]" id. at 93, including not only the sentencing factors outlined at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), id. at 92–93, but potentially also "new statutory minimum or maximum penalties; current Guidelines; post-sentencing conduct; and other relevant information about a defendant's history and conduct[,]" id. at 90 (quoting United States v. Hudson , 967 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2020) ). The district court must also consider relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant. Id. at 92–93. As with other sentencing decisions, see Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), sentence-reduction decisions under Section 404 "must be procedurally reasonable and supported by a sufficiently compelling justification[,]" White , 984 F.3d at 91 (quoting United States v. Boulding , 960 F.3d 774, 784 (6th Cir. 2020) ).

II

This is Melvin Lawrence's third appearance before this court.

A

In 2003, Lawrence was convicted of unlawful distribution of 5 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), and three charges related to possession of drugs and firearms. On appeal, we affirmed Lawrence's conviction on the distribution charge, but we reversed his convictions on the three possession charges and remanded for resentencing. United States v. Lawrence , 471 F.3d 135, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

On remand, the district court held a new sentencing hearing, in which Lawrence allocuted. Resentencing Transcript at 11–12, United States v. Lawrence , No. 03-cr-00092-CKK (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2009), ECF No. 103. Lawrence told the court that, while incarcerated, he had "been trying to do the right things as far as * * * becoming a man so I can provide for my son, he's 11 and very big." Id. Lawrence's mother was "getting old" and does "the best that she can[,]" but his son had "health issues as far as * * * weight gain and a lot of other things." Id. at 12. Lawrence explained that he "just want[ed] a chance to be a father" to his son, and that he "was just hoping that it's possible that * * * I can get out in his life before * * * the streets * * * or anything that maybe I have done affect him[.]" Id. He said he wanted to "be a productive citizen[,]" and noted that he "read the Bible" and "attended church, school, [and] college." Id. He admitted that he had "gotten into some altercations," but "not because I wanted to, but it's prison, and you know, there's all types of people in prison." Id. While "making no excuses" for his actions, he said he "was just hoping the Court would have leniency" in his "particular case." Id.

Based on the single crack cocaine distribution conviction and the district court finding that Lawrence was a career offender, Lawrence's Sentencing Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months. In addition, because Lawrence's offense involved 21.1 grams of crack, Lawrence was subject to a mandatory minimum prison term of five years (60 months) and a statutory maximum of 40 years (480 months). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009). The district court granted Lawrence a downward variance of twelve months based on the court's disagreement with the crack–powder disparity in the Guidelines. The court rejected Lawrence's request for a larger downward variance and sentenced him to 250 months of...