United States v. Lawson

Citation677 F.3d 629
Decision Date20 April 2012
Docket Number10–4846,10–4882.,10–4845,10–4841,Nos. 10–4831,10–4870,s. 10–4831
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Scott Edward LAWSON, Defendant–Appellant.The United Gamefowl Breeders Association, Amicus Supporting Appellant,The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Sheri M. Hutto, Defendant–Appellant.The United Gamefowl Breeders Association, Amicus Supporting Appellant,The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Wayne Hugh Hutto, Defendant–Appellant.The United Gamefowl Breeders Association, Amicus Supporting Appellant,The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Leslie Wayne Peeler, Defendant–Appellant.The United Gamefowl Breeders Association, Amicus Supporting Appellant,The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Nancy Elizabeth Dyal, Defendant–Appellant.The United Gamefowl Breeders Association, Amicus Supporting Appellant,The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. James Morrow Collins, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.The United Gamefowl Breeders Association, Amicus Supporting Appellant,The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED: Clarence Rauch Wise, Greenwood, South Carolina; Jonathan McKey Milling, Milling Law Firm, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina; Douglas Neal Truslow, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Nathan S. Williams, Office of the United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John Dennis Delgado, Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson & Delgado, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant Sheri M. Hutto; Swepson Harrison Saunders, VI, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant Leslie Wayne Peeler; Henry Wesley Kirkland, Jr., Kirkland & Rush, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant Nancy Elizabeth Dyal. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Mark L. Pollot, Boise, Idaho, for The United Gamefowl Breeders Association, Amicus Supporting Appellants. Jonathan R. Lovvorn, Kimberly D. Ockene, Aaron D. Green, The Humane Society of the United States, Washington, D.C.; Emily L. Aldrich, Hunton & Williams LLP, Los Angeles, California; Gregory N. Stillman, Hunton & Williams LLP, Norfolk, Virginia; Joseph P. Esposito, William E. Potts, Jr., Andrew E. Walsh, Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, D.C., for The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.

Before GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and LIAM O'GRADY, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge KEENAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge GREGORY and Judge O'GRADY joined.

OPINION

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Scott Lawson and certain other defendants (collectively, Lawson) were convicted by a jury of violating, and conspiring to violate, the animal fighting prohibition of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a) (the animal fighting statute), resulting from their participation in “gamefowl derbies,” otherwise known as “cockfighting.” The animal fighting statute prohibits, among other things, “sponsor[ing] or exhibit[ing] an animal in an animal fighting venture.” Id. The term “animal fighting venture” is defined in the statute, in relevant part, as “any event, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, that involves a fight conducted or to be conducted between at least 2 animals for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment.” 7 U.S.C. § 2156(g)(1). Several of the defendants in this case also were convicted of participating in, and conspiring to participate in, an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (the illegal gambling statute), with relation to activities that occurred during the “derbies.”

Lawson raises numerous challenges to his convictions, arguing that: (1) the convictions for violating the animal fighting statute should be vacated because Congress lacks power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the fighting of game-fowl; (2) the animal fighting statute is unconstitutional because the statute provides for different elements of proof in jurisdictions where animal fighting is legal; (3) the district court abused its discretion in consolidating Scott Lawson's trial with the trials of his co-defendants; and (4) a juror's misconduct in performing unauthorized research of the definition of an element of the offense on Wikipedia.org (Wikipedia), an “open access” internet encyclopedia, deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Additionally, the defendants convicted of violating the illegal gambling statute raise several challenges to those convictions.1

Upon our review of the parties' arguments, we hold that the animal fighting statute is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause; that the provision of different elements of the crime in jurisdictions permitting animal fighting does not violate Lawson's equal protection rights; and that the district court did not err in conducting Scott Lawson's trial jointly with the trials of his codefendants. However, we hold that the juror's misconduct violated Lawson's right to a fair trial, and we therefore vacate the convictions for violating the animal fighting statute. For this reason, we also vacate the conspiracy convictions with respect to those defendants for which the conspiracy alleged related solely to the animal fighting activities. Additionally, we reject the challenges made by several of the defendants to the illegal gambling convictions, and we affirm the convictions relating to those offenses as well as the conspiracy convictions for which illegal gambling was one of the objects of the conspiracy alleged.

I.

In November 2009, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Lawson and Leslie Wayne Peeler (the Lawson indictment),2 alleging one count of participating in a conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of participating in, and/or aiding and abetting, an unlawful animal fighting venture, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. With respect to the conspiracy charge, the Lawson indictment alleged that Lawson offered gaffs for sale and sharpened gaffs for individuals who entered birds into a cockfighting event held in Swansea, South Carolina in July 2008, and that Peeler served as a referee for a cockfighting event held in Swansea in April 2009. With respect to the violations of the animal fighting statute that did not involve an alleged conspiracy, the indictment alleged generally that Lawson and Peeler sponsored and exhibited an animal, or aided and abetted individuals who sponsored an animal, in an animal fighting venture that occurred in July 2008, and April 2009, respectively.

The grand jury returned a separate indictment in November 2009 against Nancy Elizabeth Dyal, Sheri M. Hutto, and Wayne Hugh Hutto (the Dyal indictment), alleging one count of participating in a conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act and to engage in an illegal gambling business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, two counts of participating in, and/or aiding and abetting, an unlawful animal fighting venture, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and two counts of participating in, and/or aiding and abetting, an illegal gambling business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. A similar indictment was returned against James Morrow Collins, Jr. in December 2009,3 alleging the same five counts as alleged in the Dyal indictment, based on Collins' alleged role in the Swansea derbies held in July 2008 and April 2009.

With respect to the conspiracy charge, these indictments alleged that Dyal, Sheri Hutto, Wayne Hutto, and Collins each helped organize the derbies held in Swansea in July 2008 and April 2009. These indictments were based on Sheri Hutto's alleged acts of announcing the scheduled fighters; Dyal's alleged acts of collecting admission fees, checking identifications for membership in the South Carolina Gamefowl Breeders Association, and selling such memberships during the derbies; Wayne Hutto's alleged acts of serving as a referee for the fights; and Collins' alleged acts of handling money and ensuring that the rules were followed. With respect to violations of the animal fighting statute that did not involve a conspiracy, these indictments alleged generally that Dyal, Sheri Hutto, and Wayne Hutto sponsored and exhibited an animal, or aided and abetted individuals who sponsored an animal, in an animal fighting venture that occurred in July 2008 and April 2009, respectively. With respect to the illegal gambling statute charges, these indictments alleged that the nature of the derby, in which owners of fighting birds paid an entry fee to enter the birds in the derby and were eligible to win a “purse” if their birds won the most fights, constituted an illegal gambling operation in violation of South Carolina Code sections 16–19–10 and 16–19–130.

The indictments stemmed from an undercover investigation conducted by the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources of a cockfighting organization based in Swansea. Undercover officers attended and made video recordings of two cockfighting derbies, held in July 2008 and April 2009. During these derbies, several individuals, including individuals alleged to be part of the conspiracy at issue, entered birds into cockfighting matches. In these matches, the birds were “equipped” with gaffs or other sharp, metal objects attached to their legs. The birds fought their opponent to the death or at...

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