United States v. Lee
| Decision Date | 30 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | NO. 7:12-CR-00005-FL-2,7:12-CR-00005-FL-2 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DERONTAE TREMAINE LEE |
This cause comes before the Court upon Defendant's motion to suppress (DE-39) all evidence seized during a traffic stop that occurred on September 22, 2011. The government has responded (DE-44), and a hearing on the motion was held July 25, 2012. (DE-45, DE-47). In addition, the undersigned allowed the parties to submit supplemental memoranda following the evidentiary hearing. (DE-51, DE-52). Accordingly, the motion is ripe for adjudication. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for entry of a memorandum and recommendation. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's motion to suppress be denied.
Defendant is charged by way of indictment of being a felon in possession of a firearm and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. (DE-1). These charges were brought after officers with the Onslow County Sheriff's Office discovered firearms during a search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Defendantnow moves to suppress all evidence found during the search on the grounds that the traffic stop and search were unlawful.
At the evidentiary hearing, the Government presented the following evidence:
Testimony by Robert Eugene Ides
First Sergeant Robert Ides, a fourteen-year veteran of the Onslow County Sheriff's Office, testified that on the evening of September 22, 2011, he was on duty conducting surveillance of a residence in the Richlands area near Jacksonville, North Carolina. Mot. Supp. Hr'g Tr. 3:2-23, July 25, 2012. Sergeant Ides was driving an unmarked Crown Victoria patrol vehicle. Hr'g Tr. 4:18-19. Two other officers, Sergeant Sanders and Detective Gonzales, accompanied Sergeant Ides. Hr'g Tr. 4:23. At approximately 8:00 p.m., the three officers had concluded their surveillance and were returning to Jacksonville via NC Highway 258/24 when they observed a red Chevrolet convertible ("the Chevy") driving erratically in the south-bound lane. Hr'g Tr. 4:25, 5:1-3. Highway 258/24 is a five-lane highway, with a center turn lane and two lanes on either side. Hr'g Tr. 17:5-10. Sergeant Ides explained that the Chevy "caught [his] attention" because it "crossed the right fog line; it was riding the right fog line." Hr'g Tr. 5:6-7. The officers began following and observing the Chevy, which then "crossed back over into the left lane of the four lane highway" and "crossed into the left divided line, which . . . crosses off into the center turn lane." Hr'g Tr. 5:9-12. The Chevy continued to change lanes, riding the fog lines and crossing the center dividing line. According to Sergeant Ides, the driver-side tires on the Chevy crossed the center dividing line "at least two or three times." Hr'g Tr. 18:2. Detective Gonzales ran the Chevy's tags, which were valid,Hr'g Tr. 27:2-4, and informed Sergeant Ides the vehicle was "out of Fayetteville." Hr'g Tr. 24:15. From his vantage point approximately a car's length behind, Sergeant Ides could see two African-American men in the Chevy. Hr'g Tr. 5:20-23. He also "observed a lot of movement within the vehicle." Hr'g Tr. 5:18-19. Specifically, Sergeant Ides saw the passenger lean forward, and both the passenger and the driver reaching back towards the rear seat of the vehicle. Hr'g Tr. 9:22-25, 10:4. The driver of the Chevy also began to tap the brakes. Hr'g Tr. 6:20-21. After following the Chevy for approximately one and a half miles and concerned that the driver might be intoxicated, Hr'g Tr. 25:23-25, Sergeant Ides initiated a traffic stop. Hr'g Tr. 6:23.
After the Chevy stopped, all three officers exited the patrol car, and Sergeant Ides approached the driver side window. Sergeant Ides asked the driver, later identified as Kenneth Shaw, for his driver's license and registration. Hr'g Tr. 7: 4-6. Shaw did not appear to be intoxicated, and Sergeant Ides did not smell any alcohol. Hr'g Tr. 27:9-10. However, when Sergeant Ides processed the information from the driver's license, he learned that Shaw was on probation for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, among other things. Hr'g Tr. 7:19-22. Because of Shaw's probation status, Sergeant Ides understood he could conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. Hr'g Tr. 8:2. Sergeant Ides returned to the vehicle and asked Shaw "what he was on probation for." Hr'g Tr. 8:6-7. Shaw replied that he was on probation for stealing a vehicle. Hr'g Tr. 8:6-8. At that point, Sergeant Ides "knew [Shaw] was lying." Hr'g Tr.8:8. Sergeant Ides asked if there were any weapons in the vehicle. Hr'g Tr. 8:10. Shaw said no. Sergeant Ides asked Shaw whether "he knew that he was on, himbeing on probation, that he was subject to search if we feel there's something within the vehicle." Hr'g Tr. 8:16-18. Shaw nodded his head.
Suspecting the presence of weapons, Sergeant Ides decided to search the Chevy. Shaw had already exited the vehicle and Sergeant Sanders, who was standing next to the passenger-side of the Chevy, asked Defendant to get out of the vehicle as well. Hr'g Tr. 9:12-15. Defendant did not respond immediately but eventually complied. Hr'g Tr. 9:16-19. After Defendant exited the Chevy, Sergeant Ides "went directly to where [he] saw . . . the movement" by Shaw and Defendant he had observed earlier, i.e., the rear seat of the vehicle and beneath the front passenger seat. Hr'g Tr. 9:22-25. Sergeant Ides found one firearm wrapped inside a "hoodie" on the back seat, and a second firearm, a nine-millimeter Ruger, beneath the passenger-side seat. Hr'g Tr. 9:25, 10:1-5. Sergeant Ides then placed Shaw and Defendant under arrest and took them to the sheriff's office.
During cross-examination, Sergeant Ides confirmed that at the time of the stop, it was "just starting to get dark" but remained "fairly clear." Hr'g Tr. 12:6-7. It was not raining. Hr'g Tr. 12:13-15. The rear window of the Chevy was clear and not hazed. Hr'g Tr. 22:6-13. Sergeant Ides agreed that when he prepared his report of the incident, he "probably should have" included his observation that the Chevy crossed the center line several times. Hr'g Tr. 18:11. Sergeant Ides denied that Shaw's probation status was the "sole reason" he decided to search the Chevy. Hr'g Tr. 29:25. Rather, Sergeant Ides explained, it was a combination of factors, including the movement he observed in the vehicle, the fact that Shaw was on probation for assault with a deadly weapon, and Shaw's dishonesty about his probation status. Hr'g Tr. 30:11-20. In Sergeant Ides'estimate, the entire stop--from the time it was initiated until the time of arrest--lasted fifteen minutes. Hr'g Tr. 28:22-25.
Defendant presented no witnesses at the hearing, but introduced several exhibits into evidence, including a map and photograph of the highway. DE-48.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "'[T]he underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable.'" Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)). It is well settled that the "'[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police . . . constitutes a "seizure,'" no matter how brief the detention or how limited its purpose." United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008). (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996)). "An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
"Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop." Branch, 537 F.3d at 335. Any ulterior motive a police officer may have for making the traffic stop is irrelevant. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; see also Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988) (). An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop. United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 2010). This may be done "so as a precautionary measure, without reasonable suspicion that the passenger poses a safety risk." Id. During such a stop, a police officer may "request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation" without offending constitutional imperatives. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).
To prolong a routine traffic stop, however, a police officer "must possess a justification for doing so other than the initial traffic violation that prompted the stop in the first place." Branch, 537 F.3d at 336; see also United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir. 1992) (). "Thus, a prolonged automobile stop requires either the driver's consent or a 'reasonable suspicion' that illegal activity is afoot." Branch, 537 F.3d at 336. Likewise, "to conduct a lawful protective search of a stopped vehicle . . . an officer must possess a reasonable belief of both (1) the suspect's dangerousness and (2) the possibility that the suspect might gain immediate control of any weapons inside the vehicle." United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d...
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