United States v. Lee
| Decision Date | 02 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19 C 641 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DONALD LEE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Defendant Donald Lee is charged with various crimes in aid of racketeering. He moves to dismiss Counts II and III of the superseding indictment, as well as portions of the government's Notice of Special Findings, as unconstitutional as applied to him.[1] R. 476, 489, 482. The motions are granted in part and denied in part.
The defendants in this case were charged with conspiring to engage in a variety of racketeering acts through an enterprise known as the Wicked Town faction of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). They are charged with a number of substantive offenses. Relevant to the instant motions, Lee is charged with murdering Lemont Ware in July 2000 and Ernest Moore in December 2002, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1). Lee was 17 at the time of Ware's murder and 20 at the time of Moore's murder.
A trial date has been set for September 19, 2022. Lee has filed various motions to dismiss pursuant to Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Those motions are addressed below.
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that sentencing juveniles (individuals under 18 years of age) to mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment. 567 U.S. at 460. This is so because the attendant factors of youth make juveniles “less deserving of the most severe punishments,” as they are inherently less culpable for their crimes and more capable of reform. Id. at 471. Miller did not categorically bar the option of life sentences for juvenile offenders, but a court must now consider the individual defendant, as well as his youth and corresponding mitigating characteristics, before imposing a discretionary life sentence. Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 20910 (2016) (citing Miller, at 483)).
The operative statute in this case, 18 U.S.C. § 1959 provides that a defendant convicted of murder in aid of racketeering must be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Because he was 17 years old at the time of Ware's murder Lee contends the penalty provisions of § 1959 are unconstitutional as applied to him under Miller, and therefore Count II must be dismissed. Lee also argues that Count III should also be dismissed because, although he was 20 years old, the same characteristics outlined in Miller as attributable to youth should extend beyond 18 years old. Finally, Lee argues any portions of the government's Notice of Special Findings, which provides for potential enhanced penalties should Lee be convicted, must also be dismissed as unconstitutional insofar as they relate to the Ware murder.
Count III alleges Lee murdered Ernest Moore in December 2002. Lee was 20 years old at the time. Although he was a legal adult, Lee argues that many of the characteristics of youth identified in Miller, such as a juvenile's “immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity” extend beyond age 17 and up to age 22. Miller, at 472. Lee references studies which provide that the brain development process, which is not yet complete at age 17, remains unfinished beyond age 18. R. 488 at 8 . The research, Lee argues, shows that 18 to 21-year-old individuals, as compared to older adults, have underdeveloped decision-making abilities which lead them to act on impulse when emotions are aroused.
Lee does not point to any cases in which a Court extended Miller to a defendant accused of committing a murder when they were 18 or older, and the Court is unaware of any. See Cruz v. United States, 826 Fed.Appx. 49, 52 n.2 (2d Cir. 2020) (). Instead, Lee relies on a recent dissenting opinion. See R. 488 at 16-17 (citing Ruiz v. United States, 990 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2021)). In Ruiz, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a defendant's predicate offenses underlying his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions were “crimes of violence” warranting a 45-year sentence to run consecutive to his seven concurrent life sentences (both sentences stemmed from the same case, but only the 45-year term was challenged). Ruiz, 990 F.3d at 1027. The Seventh Circuit determined that, even if Ruiz's § 924(c) convictions were vacated, he would still be serving life sentences for valid convictions for his other crimes, and found that any error was thus harmless. Judge Wood dissented, explaining she would have reached the merits on Ruiz's claims because “a conviction for a noncrime is always prejudicial error as a matter of law.” Id. at 1035. Judge Wood went on to note that future legal reforms may alter Ruiz's life sentences, and that “these possibilities are far from remote.” Id. at 1039. She then pointed out that Ruiz was 18 at the time of his offenses, detailed Miller's demand for different penal treatment for juveniles and the current age of 18 as the relevant cutoff point. Id. Judge Wood continues:
But science does not stand still, and there is no reason to think that it will do so going forward. The scientific community's views on the development of the brain evolve all the time. One of the medical authorities on which the Supreme Court has relied most heavily on questions of neurological development is the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) ... Just this year, the AAIDD released the 12th edition of its treatise ... In it, the Association defines the end of the human intellectual development period as “the age of 22”-not 18.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, Judge Wood wrote that if the Supreme Court revised the Miller rule and raised the Eighth Amendment age-line to 22, Ruiz's life sentences would become eligible for immediate resentencing. Judge Wood argues that the majority was wrong to find no error stemmed from his § 924(c) 45-year sentence, because his underlying life sentences could, one day, be vacated. Id. at 1040.
Lee's reliance on the Ruiz dissent is not persuasive. First, of course, the Court is not bound by a dissent. But regardless, Judge Wood's position is that if the Supreme Court revises the Miller rule to extend beyond age 18, then Ruiz would have a valid challenge to his life sentences. Judge Wood does not make the argument that the majority should have applied Miller to Ruiz's case, only that the possibility to do so may arise in the future. At present, the Supreme Court has drawn the line at 18, and Miller does not provide Lee with relief from Count III. See In re Rosado, 7 F.4th 152, 160 (3d Cir. 2021) ( ). The motion to dismiss Count III is denied.
Count II alleges Lee murdered Lemont Ware in July 2000, when Lee was 17 years old. The parties agree that Miller applies, and a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional as a punishment for Count II should Lee be convicted. Lee argues the statute is therefore unconstitutional in its entirety as applied to him, and he cannot be convicted under it. The government argues the statute can be severed.
When part of a statute is deemed unconstitutional, courts must determine whether a partial severance of the statute can eliminate the unconstitutional portion before invalidating the entire statute. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246-47 (2005). “[T]he traditional rule is that the unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S.Ct. 2183, 2209 (2020). The inquiry is whether “the legislature would have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all”. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006).
Section 1959 provides:
Lee cannot be sentenced to death per Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and cannot receive a mandatory life sentence per Miller. He argues if those portions are removed, all that remains is a fine, and a fine as the sole punishment for murder in aid of racketeering is nonsensical and contrary to what the legislature intended, and therefore the statute is not severable.
Lee relies primarily on United States v. Under Seal, 819 F.3d 715, 717 (4th Cir. 2016), where the Fourth Circuit ruled that prosecuting a juvenile for murder in aid...
To continue reading
Request your trial