United States v. Leija-Sanchez
| Decision Date | 04 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 17 C 7466,17 C 8584,18 C 269 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JULIO LEIJA-SANCHEZ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MANUEL LEIJA-SANCHEZ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. GERARDO SALAZAR-RODRIGUEZ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Petitioners Julio Leija-Sanchez, Manuel Leija-Sanchez, and Gerardo Salazar-Rodriguez were convicted in 2013 of murder in aid of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit murder abroad, and other crimes. Three years later, their convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. See United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 820 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2016). Petitioners now seek relief from their convictions and sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, each arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. For the reasons discussed below, the petitions are denied.
BACKGROUND[1]
In a superseding indictment filed October 23, 2007, the Government charged Petitioners with leading a Chicago-based criminal enterprise that created and sold fraudulent government documents, such as green cards, Social Security cards driver's licenses, and state identification cards. The Government also alleged that Petitioners smuggled aliens and arranged for the murder of a business competitor, Guillermo Jimenez Flores (referred to as “Montes”), in Mexico.[2] (See Superseding Indictment [146]; Pet. at 3-4; Gov't's Resp. at 2.) The indictment charged Petitioners with document-fraud conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); racketeering conspiracy, id. § 1962 (Count 2); murder in aid of racketeering, id. § 1959 (Counts 3 and 4); as to Julio and Gerardo, murder for hire, id. § 1958 (Count 5); conspiracy to commit murder abroad id. § 956 (Counts 6 and 7); attempted money laundering, id. § 1956 (Count 8); as to Julio and Manuel, alien smuggling, id. § 1324 (Count 10); and as to Julio and Manuel, illegal transfer of currency, 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (Count 11).[3] (See Superseding Indictment.)
Before trial, Petitioner Julio, through counsel, moved to dismiss Count 3. He argued that he could not be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 () for the murder of Montes, which took place on Mexican soil. This court granted that motion, but the Seventh Circuit reversed on interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals rejected the “extraterritoriality” argument and held that § 1959 “applies to a murder in another nation designed to facilitate the operation of a criminal enterprise in the United States.” United States v. Leija-Sanchez (Leija-Sanchez I), 602 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2010).
Petitioners were tried jointly in 2013.[4] At the end of the six-week trial, the jury found each Petitioner guilty on all counts against him [856, 857, 858], although this court later granted Petitioners' motions for acquittal with respect to the alien smuggling charge in Count 10 of the indictment [910, 911].[5] The jury also made special findings based on the murder in Mexico, with the effect of raising the maximum penalty for Count 2, racketeering conspiracy, to life imprisonment [849]. This court sentenced Petitioners to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3; 20 years imprisonment on Counts 6, 7, and 8; and 60 months on Count 1 [928, 930, 932, 942, 944, 946].
Petitioners appealed their convictions to the Seventh Circuit.[6] They argued that (1) a conviction for murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 cannot be predicated on a murder in Mexico;[7] (2) the maximum sentence for a racketeering conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 cannot be increased to life imprisonment based on a murder in Mexico; (3) a defendant cannot be convicted for conspiracy to commit murder abroad under 18 U.S.C. § 956 if he was not in the United States at the time of the conspiracy; and (4) the Government, during its closing argument, improperly contradicted its own expert witness regarding the number of times the murder victim had been shot. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the second argument and reduced the sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (Count 2) to 20 years, but otherwise affirmed the judgments of conviction. United States v. Leija-Sanchez (Leija-Sanchez II), 820 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2016). Because the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction for murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, which carried a mandatory life sentence, the Leija-Sanchez II decision made no difference for Petitioners' terms of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit denied Petitioners' requests for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of certiorari. See Leija-Sanchez v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1327, 197 L.Ed.2d 544 (2017) (mem.).
Petitioners, acting pro se, timely filed these petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences. Petitioners' opening briefs are essentially identical, as are the Government's responses.
Long after Petitioner Julio's petition had been fully briefed, he filed an additional memorandum. (See Def.'s Am. Mot., No. 17 C 7466 [*16].) Styled as an “amended” version of his motion, this brief set out a new legal theory regarding extraterritoriality issues unrelated to the Sixth Amendment arguments raised in Julio's original petition. This new brief, which was filed over two and a half years after the Supreme Court denied Petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari, plainly exceeded the one-year limitations period set by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). It would thus be timely only if it related back to Julio's original petition. To relate back, an amendment must assert a claim “that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out” in the original motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). An amendment to a § 2255 petition does not relate back (and thereby escape the one-year statute of limitations) merely because it relates to the same trial, conviction, or sentence as a timely-filed claim. Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662 (2005)). To relate back, the new claims must be based on the same “common core of operative facts” as the original claims. Id. As mentioned above, that is not the case here. Because Julio's amended brief raises a legal theory wholly distinct from his ineffective-assistance argument, the court rejects it for untimeliness.[8]
After Petitioner Gerardo filed his opening brief (but before the Government had filed its response), he filed a motion for the court to entertain an additional ineffective-assistance argument related to the identification of his voice at trial. The court granted Gerardo's motion “without prejudice to the government's objections, if any.” (Minute Order, No. 18 C 269 [*11].) In the Government's response brief, it did not address the voice-identification argument whatsoever. (Gov't's Resp., No. 18 C 269 [*19].) Gerardo then supplemented the argument in his reply brief. (Movant's Reply, No. 18 C 269 [*32].) The court addresses the voice-identification argument below.
An individual in federal custody may seek postconviction relief on the ground that he was sentenced “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Relief under § 2255 is appropriate only for “an error of law that is jurisdictional constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1991)). Because § 2255 “asks the district court essentially to reopen the criminal process to a person who already has had an opportunity for full process, ” it is considered an “extraordinary remedy.” Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007). The statute entitles a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing if he “‘alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle him to relief, '” but a hearing is not necessary if “‘the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'” Bruce v. United States, 256 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (first quoting Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1994); then quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255).[9]
The Sixth Amendment “guarantees the accused in a criminal case the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Vinyard v. United States, 804 F.3d 1218, 1224 (7th Cir. 2015). This right is “‘firmly established' not only for trial but also for a first appeal as of right.” Id. (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)). Claims of ineffectiveness are governed by the familiar two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under that test, a petitioner must show “that his counsel's performance was unreasonable and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Peterson v. Douma, 751 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2014).
To satisfy Strickland's deficient-performance requirement, a petitioner must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Yu Tian Li v. United States, 648 F.3d 524, 527-28 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Jones, 635 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2011) (). “[A] claim...
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