United States v. Leland

• Decision Date: 21 April 2015
• Docket Number: 1:03-cr-00033-JAW-01
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIAM LELAND
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIAM LELAND

1:03-cr-00033-JAW-01

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

April 21, 2015

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF AUDITA QUERELA PURSUANT TO THE ALL WRITS ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, DENYING MOTION TO EXPUNGE CONVICTION, AND GRANTING PRO SE MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

On August 20, 2014, William Leland moved for reconsideration of his pro se motion for writ of audita querela, which asked the Court to recalculate his sentencing guideline range to eliminate a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, to grant a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and to allow a further two-level reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Mr. Leland separately asks the Court to expunge his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. Finally, he later filed a separate pro se motion to reduce sentence. The Court denies the motion for reconsideration of its order denying the motion for writ of audita querela, denies the motion to expunge his firearms conviction, denies the motion based on ineffective counsel, but grants the motion for reduction of sentence under Guidelines Amendment 782 and reduces his sentence from 252 months to 201 months.

I. BACKGROUND OF MOTION FOR WRIT OF AUDITA QUERELA PURSUANT TO ALL WRITS ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 1651

A. Motion and Order

Sentenced on October 28, 2005 to 252 months of incarceration for seven federal felonies, representing his leadership role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy involving cocaine, methamphetamine, oxycodone, marijuana, and MDMA (Ecstasy) and possession of a firearm by a felon, William Leland has waged a determined and relentless campaign to obtain a court order reducing his sentence. The primary source of Mr. Leland's discontent is that the sentence was more severe than the one he thought he was going to receive under the terms of the plea agreement with the Government.

1. The Plea Agreement

The plea agreement provided in part:

3. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B) the parties agree to take the following positions at sentencing:

A. The parties agree to recommend that the Court find that the Base Offense Level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 is 32 and that the amount of the narcotics and other illegal substances involved in all reasonably foreseeable acts or omissions of the defendant and other co-conspirators totals between 1,500 and 3,000 kilograms of marijuana on the drug equivalency table.

B. The parties agree to recommend that the evidence does not support a finding that any dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed in relation to any of the drug offenses.

C. The parties agree to recommend that the Court find that the offense level should be increased by four (4) points under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.

D. The Government agrees to recommend that the Court find that the Defendant has accepted responsibility for the offenses ofconviction in the above-captioned Indictment, and that the Court should reduce by 3 levels Defendant's Adjusted Offense Level under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

The Government reserves the right not to recommend a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 if, at any time between his/her execution of this Agreement and sentencing Defendant (a) fails to admit a complete factual basis for the plea; (b) fails to truthfully admit his/her conduct in the offenses of conviction; and (c) falsely denies or frivolously contests relevant conduct for which Defendant is accountable under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Defendant understands that he/she may not withdraw his/her guilty plea if, for any of the reasons listed above, the Government does not recommend that he/she receive a reduction in Offense Level for acceptance of responsibility.

4. The Government and the Defendant agree to recommend that the Court impose a period of imprisonment within the applicable guideline range, in addition to restitution and supervised release to be determined by the Court at the time of sentencing. The parties agree not to seek any further additions or reductions to the guidelines, other than those set forth in section Three. The parties agree not to seek nor recommend any upward or downward departures. The parties expressly agree and understand that these recommendations will not be binding on the Court and should the Court reject the recommendations of the parties, Defendant will not thereby be permitted to withdraw his/her guilty plea. The parties agree and understand that the Court has the discretion to impose any lawful sentence.

Agreement to Plead Guilty at 4-5 (ECF No. 207) (Plea Agreement). Finally, in paragraph 6, Mr. Leland agreed not to "appeal or collaterally attack any matter pertaining to this prosecution and sentence as long as the sentence of imprisonment is less than 210 months." Id. at 5.

2. The Rule 11 Hearing

On January 27, 2004, the Court engaged Mr. Leland in an extensive Rule 11 colloquy. Tr. of Proceedings at 1-29 (ECF No. 306). The Court specifically advised Mr. Leland that the statutory maximum for two of the counts was life imprisonment.Id. at 7:15-23. The Court warned Mr. Leland that depending on the drug quantity, there were statutory minimum sentences of either ten or five years. Id. at 8:21-9:8. The Court reviewed detailed contents of the plea agreement with Mr. Leland. First, the Court established that Mr. Leland was pleading guilty to the charged crimes because he was actually guilty and that he was truthfully admitting to the facts underlying the offenses:

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Leland, have you pled guilty to Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, and 14 of the second superseding indictment of this case because you are actually guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Tr. of Proceedings at 5:16-19 (ECF No. 306) (Rule 11 Hr'g).

..............

THE COURT: Now, as a part of your pleading guilty, I must find there's a factual basis for your guilty plea, and to assure myself there is such a factual basis, I will be asking you questions about the conduct that gave rise to these charges, and you must answer my questions truthfully. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

Id. at 16:8-14. Later, the Court returned to the prosecution version of the offenses and asked Mr. Leland direct questions about the underlying facts:

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Leland, have you had an opportunity to review [the] government's version of the offense dated January 27, 2004?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I'm going to ask a very important question, Mr. Leland, and I want your honest answer. Is there any respect with which you disagree with what is set forth in government's version of the offense dated January 27, 2004?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Is the information contained in the government's version of the offense dated January 27, 2004, true to your own personal knowledge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.

Id. 18:5-18. Before turning to the Plea Agreement, the Court directly asked Mr. Leland whether anyone had threatened him or attempted to force him in any way to plead guilty:

THE COURT: Now, the next part of this process, Mr. Leland, is for me to assure myself that you're pleading guilty today voluntarily, of your own free will. So I am going to ask you a number of questions directed to that issue. Has anyone threatened you or has anyone attempted to force you to get you in any way to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

Id. 18:24-19:5.

The Court also questioned Mr. Leland closely about his understanding of the Plea Agreement's sentencing provisions:

THE COURT: This contains a number of references to recommendations that the parties agree to make to the court concerning base offense levels and whether the evidence supports a finding of a dangerous weapon possessed in relation to the drug offense, increases in points, acceptance of responsibility, and other matters. Did you review that paragraph before coming into court today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: What I want you to understand, Mr. Leland, is this. That as far as sentencing is concerned, this plea agreement permits you and your lawyer, Mr. Largay, and the prosecutor to make recommendations to the court regarding sentencing, but the authority to determine the appropriate sentence in this case rests with me as the judge in this court. Do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If I do not accept the recommendations, even those recommendations that are set forth in paragraph 3, you will have no right to withdraw your guilty plea. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

Id. at 22:24-23:19.

The Court addressed with Mr. Leland the potential impact of the Sentencing Guidelines:

THE COURT: I can't determine the guideline sentence until I've read a presentence report the probation office will prepare and until I've given your lawyer and the prosecutor an opportunity to challenge the facts in the probation office report. After I determine what guideline does apply to the case, I still have the authority in some circumstances to impose a sentence that is more severe or it could be less severe than the sentence called for by the applicable guideline. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What I want you to understand, Mr. Leland, [is] that even if I impose a sentence that is more severe than the one called for by the applicable guideline, you will still not be permitted to withdraw your guilty plea. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

Id. 23:25-24:15.

Finally, the Court directly asked Mr. Leland whether there were any side deals not set forth in the Plea Agreement:

THE COURT: Now, aside from this written plea agreement, has anyone made any promises to you in an effort to get you to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises to you as to what kind of sentence I will ultimately impose?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Has

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