United States v. Lenore

• Decision Date: 01 October 1913
• Citation: 207 F. 865
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. LENORE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota

207 F. 865

UNITED STATES v. LENORE.

United States District Court, D. North Dakota.

October 1, 1913

Edward Engerud, U.S. Dist. Atty., and M. A. Hildreth, Asst. U.S Dist. Atty., both of Fargo, N.D.

Clement L. Waldron, of Beach, N.D., for defendant.

AMIDON District Judge.

This is a suit in equity, brought by the United States under section 15 of the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596, 601, c. 3592 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 537)), to cancel a certificate of citizenship granted to the defendant by the district court of the Tenth judicial district of North Dakota, sitting in the county of Billings. The statute authorizes such a suit whenever the certificate is obtained by fraud or 'illegally procured.' The bill charges that the petition presented to the state court by the defendant for her naturalization was signed by her mark, and not 'in her own handwriting,' as required by the statute. This charge was admitted by the answer, and was amply shown by the evidence adduced at the trial of the present suit. It also appeared from the pleadings that at the hearing of defendant's petition for her naturalization the government was represented by counsel, who participated in the examination of witnesses, and specifically objected to the granting of the certificate because the petition was not properly signed. This objection was heard by the court considered, and overruled.

I am asked to cancel the certificate of citizenship, not upon the ground that it was obtained by fraud, but upon the ground that it was 'illegally procured'; the illegality consisting wholly, as is charged, in the ruling of the state court above mentioned. The extraordinary character of such a decree at once challenges notice. By it one court is called upon to set aside the judgment of another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction because of a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute. It should also be noted that this jurisdiction, if it exists, is not confined to the federal district courts. The bill for cancellation of a certificate of citizenship may be presented in any court 'having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing the suit.' It results that, if this court may cancel a certificate of citizenship issued by the state court because of a difference of opinion in regard to a matter of law, the state court may be called upon in the next suit to exercise the same power with respect to a certificate of citizenship issued out of this court. Not only that, but courts of different judicial districts and of different states may each set aside the solemn judgments of other courts of the same state or of other states, entered after full hearing, because of a difference of opinion as to the law. As the statute requires these suits to be brought by the United States attorney, it will probably happen, as a general thing, that he will file the bill in the court to which he is officially attached. It will thus become the duty of federal courts to set aside the judgment of state courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and send their orders to the clerks of those courts, commanding them to cancel records which they made pursuant to the judgment of the court to which they are attached. Two serious consequences must result from the exercise of this jurisdiction: First, it will produce a babel of conflicting judgments among courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and tend directly to destroy respect for the courts, and also to destroy that good will which should always exist among courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Second, it will tend to break down that comity which has been the bond of peace between federal and state courts exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction in the same territory. Results so unfortunate can be justified only by imperative and unequivocal language.

A brief history of the causes which led to the passage of the act of 1906 will, in my judgment, show that Congress never intended to confer the jurisdiction which is here invoked.

In 1902 fraudulent and illegal practices in the naturalization of aliens were discovered in the city of St. Louis, Mo. Some of these misdoings are recounted in the opinion in Dolan v United States, 133 F. 440, 69 C.C.A. 274. The prosecutions which resulted in the Eastern district of Missouri led to investigations in other cities, and the discovery of many fraudulent and illegal practices in the issuance of certificates of naturalization. In some cases perjury and subornation of perjury were resorted to for the purpose of deceiving the court and obtaining certificates for aliens who had not resided in the country for the requisite time. In other cases foreigners were marched into the court in large companies, and the oath of allegiance administered to the whole company, although many of them were unable either to speak or understand the language that was used. Two persons made the ordinary witness' oaths for the whole company. Upon this sham and spurious proceeding certificates were issued. In other cases clerks of court issued such certificates without any proceeding in court whatever, and fabricated a judicial record to support the certificates. It was even discovered that some clerks were engaged in a regular brokerage business in certificates of naturalization. This practice went so far that some of these certificates were sold to aliens residing abroad, who had never been in the United States, in order that they might be used for fraudulent purposes, both with respect to foreign countries and this country. The result of these investigations was gathered together in an elaborate report, which was presented to Congress and resulted in the passage of the act of 1906. Congressional Record, vol. 40, part of page 7036; House Documents, vol. 44 (Miscellaneous), 59th Congress, 1st Session. It will be seen that the mischievous practices which the statute was intended to correct fell into two general classes: First, the obtaining of certificates of naturalization through the deception of the court by means of perjury and subornation of perjury. Such practices were fraudulent, and certificates obtained thereby are accurately described as having been 'obtained by fraud.' This had been familiar law, not only in the case of naturalization certificates, but of patents for public land. Second, false and spurious certificates were obtained without any judicial proceeding whatever, or by a proceeding in court which was itself sham and spurious. Certificates thus obtained are accurately described as having been 'illegally procured.' Neither the debates in Congress nor the report of the investigation which was laid before Congress contain any suggestion that any other evils were intended to be dealt with, or that the phrase 'illegally procured' was intended to set one court to annulling the judgments of another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction because of a difference of opinion in regard to a matter of law. To say that a certificate which is issued pursuant to a full hearing in court is 'illegally procured,' if any error occurs in the proceeding, would be a wide departure from the language which courts have been accustomed to use in referring to judicial error. 'Illegally procured' imports, not an error of court, but willful misconduct on the part of the holder of the certificate or those who have acted in his behalf. The history of the statute shows that its language can be given full effect according to the mischief that was present to the thought of Congress, without upsetting the whole judicial system that has hitherto obtained among courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. I am, therefore, unable to follow the decisions in United States v. Meyer (D.C.) 170 F. 983, United States v. Plaistow (D.C.) 189 F. 1007, and United States v. Schurr (D.C.) 163 F. 648. I concur in the view expressed in United States v. Luria (D.C.) 184 F. 643, 646, that "illegally procured' does not mean that the certificate was issued through error of law. ' Errors of courts, committed in the honest exercise of their jurisdiction under the naturalization laws, must be corrected the same as in other cases by appeal or writ of error. Such a method of review has been recognized in the Circuit Courts of Appeal of most of the circuits. United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 103 C.C.A. 660 (2d Circuit); Bessho v. United States, 178 F. 245, 101 C.C.A. 605 (4th Circuit) ; ...