United States v. Leon, No. 82-1771

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWHITE
Citation468 U.S. 897,82 L.Ed.2d 677,104 S.Ct. 3405
Decision Date05 July 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-1771
PartiesUNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Alberto Antonio LEON et al

468 U.S. 897
104 S.Ct. 3405
82 L.Ed.2d 677
UNITED STATES, Petitioner

v.

Alberto Antonio LEON et al.

No. 82-1771.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 17, 1984.
Decided July 5, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 1984.
Syllabus

Acting on the basis of information from a confidential informant, officers of the Burbank, Cal., Police Department initiated a drug-trafficking investigation involving surveillance of respondents' activities. Based on an affidavit summarizing the police officers' observations, Officer Rombach prepared an application for a warrant to search three residences and respondents' automobiles for an extensive list of items. The application was reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys, and a facially valid search warrant was issued by a state-court judge. Ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs and other evidence. Respondents were indicted for federal drug offenses, and filed motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted the motions in part, concluding that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Although recognizing that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, the court rejected the Government's suggestion that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, also refusing the Government's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the rule. The Government's petition for certiorari presented only the question whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized.

Held:

1. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. Pp. 905-925.

(a) An examination of the Fourth Amendment's origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure works no new Fourth Amendment wrong. The question whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case as a judicially created remedy to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect, must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence. Indiscriminate application of the

Page 898

exclusionary rule—impeding the criminal justice system's truth-finding function and allowing some guilty defendants to go free—may well generate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. Pp. 906-908.

(b) Application of the exclusionary rule should continue where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate, but the balancing approach that has evolved in determining whether the rule should be applied in a variety of contexts—including criminal trials—suggests that the rule should be modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. Pp. 908-913.

(c) The deference accorded to a magistrate's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based, and the courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. Moreover, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. However, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at the same time declaring that the warrant was somehow defective will not reduce judicial officers' professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all colorable warrant requests. Pp. 913-917.

(d) Even assuming that the exclusionary rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law, and penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. Pp. 918-921.

(e) A police officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth, or if the

Page 899

issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role. Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Pp. 922-925.

2. In view of the modification of the exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeals' judgment cannot stand in this case. Only respondent Leon contended that no reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that there existed probable cause to search his house. However, the record establishes that the police officers' reliance on the state-court judge's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable. Pp. 925-926.

701 F.2d 187 (CA 9 1983), reversed.

Sol. Gen. Rex E. Lee, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Barry Tarlow, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent Leon.

Roger L. Cossack, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents Stewart, et al.

Page 900

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. To resolve this question, we must consider once again the tension between the sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand, deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, establishing procedures under which criminal defendants are "ac-

Page 901

quitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175, 89 S.Ct. 961, 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).

I

In August 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy" were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal. The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of methaqualone by "Patsy" at the residence approximately five months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy." He further declared that "Armando" and "Patsy" generally kept only small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank.

On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initiated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price Drive residence and later on two other residences as well. Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stewart, who had no criminal record. During the course of the investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack, and drove away. A check of Del Castillo's probation records led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone number Del Castillo had listed as his employer's. Leon had been arrested in 1980 on drug charges, and a companion had informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily involved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had

Page 902

learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation, the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716 South Sunset Canyon in Burbank.

Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages; observed a variety of other material activity at the two residences as well as at a condominium at 7902 Via...

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9606 practice notes
  • U.S. v. Ruiz, No. 96-CR-227 S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • April 3, 1997
    ...The remedy of suppression is one provided by judicial decision for protection of Fourth Amendment interests. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Congress has provided no such remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant has cited no case for the Page 1532......
  • United States v. Williams, No. 12–3864.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • September 24, 2013
    ...547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (exclusion is a “last resort, not our first impulse”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In Herring, the Supre......
  • United States v. Wurie, No. 11–1792.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • May 17, 2013
    ...on appeal, that suppression is inappropriate here under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The government bears the “heavy burden” of proving that the good-faith exception applies, United States ......
  • Leonard v. Robinson, No. 05-1728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • February 2, 2007
    ...(en banc) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911-12, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ("We have not required suppression of the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-f......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
9576 cases
  • U.S. v. Ruiz, No. 96-CR-227 S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • April 3, 1997
    ...The remedy of suppression is one provided by judicial decision for protection of Fourth Amendment interests. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Congress has provided no such remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant has cited no case for the Page 1532......
  • United States v. Williams, No. 12–3864.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • September 24, 2013
    ...547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (exclusion is a “last resort, not our first impulse”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In Herring, the Supre......
  • United States v. Wurie, No. 11–1792.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • May 17, 2013
    ...on appeal, that suppression is inappropriate here under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The government bears the “heavy burden” of proving that the good-faith exception applies, United States ......
  • Leonard v. Robinson, No. 05-1728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • February 2, 2007
    ...(en banc) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911-12, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ("We have not required suppression of the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-f......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
16 books & journal articles
  • Rethinking Police Expertise.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 2, November 2021
    • November 1, 2021
    ...407,434-35 (2013). (18.) This is the case, for example, in disputes concerning the good-faith exception, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984), and reasonable mistakes of law, see Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014). See generally Brian J. Foley, Policing from t......
  • Rights, Structure, and Remediation: The Collapse of Constitutional Remedies.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 7, May 2022
    • May 1, 2022
    ...annually due to the exclusionary rule). (280.) HUQ, supra note 2, at 142. (281.) See id. at 117-18 (criticizing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (delineating the bounds of the good-faith (282.) 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see HUQ, supra no......
  • ICEBERG AHEAD: WHY COURTS SHOULD PRESUME BIAS IN CASES OF EXTRANEOUS JUROR CONTACTS.
    • United States
    • Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol. 72 Nbr. 2, December 2021
    • December 22, 2021
    ...infra Part 1(D)(1); infra Part II. (5.) See infra Part II. (6.) See infra Part III. (7.) See infra Part II. (8.) United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alternation in original) (quoting Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: T......
  • The Broken Fourth Amendment Oath.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 74 Nbr. 3, March 2022
    • March 1, 2022
    ...Scott A. Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2021). (35.) United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,922-23 (1984). (36.) Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). (37.) Pierson v. Ray,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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