United States v. Leuschner, 18744.

Decision Date28 August 1964
Docket NumberNo. 18744.,18744.
Citation336 F.2d 246
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Richard D. LEUSCHNER, Sr., Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

John B. Jones, Jr., Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Joseph Kovner, William A. Kriedlander, Ralph A. Muoio, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., Loyal E. Keir, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Tax Section, Charles Magnuson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Charles F. Hamlin, Donald A. Jackson, Wiley Y. Thompson, Kimble, Hamlin & MacMichael, Fresno, Cal., for appellee.

Before BARNES, MERRILL and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.

DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals from a judgment denying recovery in an action brought to collect the "penalty" prescribed by section 2707(a)1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, relating to taxes withheld by two corporations from the wages of their employees. Jurisdiction is predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 and 1345 and 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401 and 7403. The taxes involved are employees' income taxes (I.R.C.1939, § 1622(a)) and social security taxes (I.R.C.1939, §§ 1400, 1401(a)). Section 2707(a) is made applicable to these taxes by I.R.C.1939, § 1627, as to income taxes, and § 1430, as to social security taxes. I.R.C.1939, § 3661 requires that amounts withheld "shall be held to be a special trust fund in trust for the United States."

The taxes in question were withheld from employees' wages by two corporations, Yosemite Creek Company (Yosemite) for the last two quarters of 1952, in the net sum of $45,636.38 and Kadota Creek Company (Kadota), for the last two quarters of 1953 and the first quarter of 1954, in the net sum of $41,165.35. Defendant-appellee Leuschner bore the same relationship to each company, being a director and general manager. The court found that he was under a duty2 to pay over the withheld taxes to the United States, and that during the periods in question funds available to the respective corporations were used to pay other creditors, in preference to the payment of the taxes. This finding is not contested.

The court also found that Leuschner did not willfully fail to make the payments. The government contends that this finding is clearly erroneous. We hold that, as to moneys withheld by Yosemite, the finding is not clearly erroneous, but that, as to moneys withheld by Kadota, it is clearly erroneous.

Yosemite was engaged in canning and processing fruits and vegetables. One Anders, whom Leuschner called the Controller, kept the books, made out and filed the tax returns, and paid the bills, including the taxes. Leuschner spent most of his time in the field. He handled sales, bought the raw fruits and vegetables, supervised the harvesting and shipping, and generally ran the business. He travelled extensively in this work and was seldom at the company office. For this reason, although he was a co-signer of company checks and of its tax returns, he left signed checks and returns with Anders, who would then complete, sign, and send them out. He relied entirely on Anders to see that creditors, including the United States, were paid. Anders' testimony is flatly contradictory of this, but the court evidently did not believe him.3 In the case of Yosemite, it was pressed for cash during the periods in question, and Leuschner spent a good deal of his time in seeing to it that Anders had funds with which to meet the company's obligations. However, he did not learn that the taxes in question had not been paid until early in 1953, when the company was forced, by an attachment, to make an agreement with certain of its creditors, in the nature of an assignment for their benefit. Among the creditors were the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which levied the attachment, and the Internal Revenue Service.

Yosemite being forced to close down its business, Leuschner arranged to have Kadota carry on the same business. He operated exactly as he had for Yosemite, and so did Anders. He did not instruct Anders to see that withheld taxes were paid, or that other creditors were not preferred. He made no inquiries as to whether the taxes were being paid currently. He says that he did not learn that the taxes were not paid until April of 1954, when the Internal Revenue Service levied on Kadota's bank account.

In Bloom v. United States, 1959, 272 F.2d 215, this court considered the meaning of "willfully" as used in section 2707(a). We said that, in that case, Bloom's decision not to have the corporation pay the taxes to the government "was a voluntary, conscious and intentional act to prefer other creditors" over the United States, and was therefore willful. We held that "there need not be present an intent to defraud or deprive the United States of the taxes collected or withheld * * * nor need bad motives be present."4

The government says that, as a matter of law, Leuschner's conduct is within the Bloom definition of "willfully." As to the Yosemite taxes, we think not. The question is one of fact. (Wilson v. United States, 9 Cir., 1958, 250 F.2d 312, 325.) The evidence does not require a finding that the failure of Yosemite to pay over the withheld taxes was caused by a "voluntary, conscious and intentional act" of Leuschner. It would support a finding that Leuschner did not...

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35 cases
  • Pacific National Insurance v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 1 Junio 1970
    ...does not control this case; and we follow the legal standard adopted in the later Bloom decision. Pacific also cites United States v. Leuschner, 336 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1964). That case is not in point, its holding being simply that negligence is not 20 The issue was not listed in the pretri......
  • Datlof v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 24 Marzo 1966
    ...v. Patterson, 326 F.2d 302, 304-305 (5th Cir. 1963); Flan v. United States, 326 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Leuschner, 336 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1964). 12. In the present case, Mr. Joseph Datlof admits that by "the latter part of July" (Tr. 405), the "first part of Aug......
  • Phillips v. U.S. I.R.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 10 Enero 1996
    ...because the facts allowed for the possibility that the chief executive was "negligent, which is not willfulness." United States v. Leuschner, 336 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir.1964). But when he did it again in a second company, with the same controller, when he knew that the controller had once f......
  • Thomsen v. U.S., 89-1130
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 7 Junio 1989
    ...421 U.S. 979, 95 S.Ct. 1981, 44 L.Ed.2d 471 (1975). An example of the application of this principle appears in United States v. Leuschner, 336 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.1964). Leuschner knew that Anders, on whom he relied, had failed to see that such taxes were paid and had preferred other creditor......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Taxation
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books The Limited Liability Company - Volume 1-2 Volume 1
    • 1 Abril 2022
    ...(7) Delegation of authority to pay the IRS by the responsible party to others is a defense. United States v. Leuschner , 64-2 USTC 9,742, 336 F2d 246 (9th Cir. 1964) (the party is still subject to good-faith limitations); Wiggins v. United States , 60-2 USTC 9,716. (8) The Tenth Circuit, in......

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