United States v. LeVison
Citation | 418 F.2d 624 |
Decision Date | 26 November 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 23974.,23974. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William George LeVISON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Johnston Jeffries (argued), Kenai, Alaska, for defendant-appellant.
Douglas Baily (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Marvin S. Frankel, U. S. Atty., Norman Sepenuk, Special Asst. U. S. Atty., Anchorage, Alaska, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BARNES, ELY and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a conviction by a jury on two counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) ( ) and of 18 U.S.C. § 876 ( ).
Appellant was sentenced to a three year concurrent sentence on each count, with each sentence suspended and probation granted.
The telephonic threat was made on September 26, 1967 in Los Angeles to appellant's former wife in Alaska, in which phone call appellant threatened to throw acid in the face of his former wife's mother, Mrs. June Pate, unless his daughter, Triston, wrote him. Thereafter, he called Mrs. Pate in Texas, advised her he had called his former wife (Mrs. Pate's daughter) and told her (his former wife) that if he did not hear from his daughter * * *"
The mailed threat was contained in a letter from appellant to his former wife, mailed in Los Angeles on October 6, 1967, addressed to his former wife, which stated, in part, as set forth in the margin.1
Two errors are alleged: First: that the court erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's telephone call to the mother, Mrs. Pate, because: "the two alleged crimes do not require specific intent and admission of such evidence was inflammatory, irrelevant, and prejudicial to appellant." Second: that misconduct of the jury required the trial judge to declare a mistrial.
We find no merit in either error urged.
As appellant recognizes in his brief, there exists little factual dispute — "the chief point in controversy * * * was whether appellant actually made an oral threat to injure the complaining witness, or whether he simply made derogatory oral statements concerning his former wife and her mother."
Appellant urges that "intent" is no element of the offenses charged against him, citing United States v. Pennell, 144 F.Supp. 317 (N.D.Cal. 1956). Appellant misreads the holding of that case. It holds that under § 875(c) of Title 18, "Congress intended that the transmitting in interstate commerce of a communication threatening to injure the person of another should be, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute a violation under the Statute," without being coupled with an intent to extort money or other things of value, as the other subdivisions of § 875 require.
"If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances, he intentionally breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent." Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 257, 27 S.Ct. 600, 602, 51 L.Ed. 1047 (1906).
But proof of other criminal acts of an accused are admissible for several reasons other than to prove intent. As we so recently said in United States v. Jiminez-Robles, 415 F.2d 308, decided August 6, 1969:
In Seeber v. United States, 329 F.2d 572, 577 (1964), we characterized four instructions given (under the statute in effect prior to the time Congress made § 875(c) a separate crime) as not referring "to the vital issue of intent, and to that extent are incomplete." From this it can be inferred we considered a general intent to threaten is an essential element of the crime.
Relying on our Seeber case, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331 (1966) at 333, has specifically held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) "requires a showing that a threat was intended."
Thus, the trial court was amply justified in admitting into evidence proof of the appellant's subsequent threats to Mrs. Pate in the telephone call made to her after he had first called and threatened his former wife, to establish the appellant's intent at the time the threat was made to his onetime wife.
For still another reason we hold the admission of such testimony "of other threats" was not error. It was introduced into evidence on cross-examination of the complaining former wife by appellant's counsel (R.T. p. 28, l. 20). No motion to strike the witness' statement as nonresponsive (or on any other ground) was then made. On R.T. p. 30 appellant's counsel admitted he asked for hearsay testimony with respect to threats made by appellant to his former wife's mother, and specifically stated he had no objection to such testimony. Having thus created what is now asserted as error, appellant is in no position to complain.2 Skiskowski v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 158 F.2d 177, 182 (1946); United States v. Bramson, 139 F.2d 598, 600 (2d Cir. 1943); Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 1946).
As to appellant's second alleged error, we quote with approval a portion of the appellee's brief on this subject:
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