United States v. Lewis

Decision Date06 November 1953
Docket NumberNo. 1387.,1387.
Citation100 A.2d 40
PartiesUNITED STATES v. LEWIS
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Lewis A. Carroll, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., William J. Peck and Kenneth D. Wood, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., and Alexander L. Stevas, Asst. U. S. Atty., Arlington, Va., were on the brief, for appellant.

Walter E. Gallagher, Washington, D. C., with whom Myron G. Ehrlich and Joseph Sitnick, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

Frank Lewis was charged by information with having engaged in the business of accepting wagers without paying the occupational tax imposed by Chapter 27A of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 3285 et seq. (Supp. V, 1952). He moved to dismiss the information and the trial court granted his motion, holding in a written opinion that Chapter 27A is unconstitutional because it compels a defendant to give self-incriminating information and imposes a penalty in the guise of a tax. From that decision the United States has brought this appeal.

Determination of the constitutionality of an act of Congress is, as the Supreme Court has said, one of the most serious responsibilities of the judiciary. "It is always an exceedingly grave and delicate duty to decide upon the constitutionality of an act of the congress of the United States. The presumption, as has frequently been said, is in favor of the validity of the act, and it is only when the question is free from any reasonable doubt that the court should hold an act of the lawmaking power of the nation to be in violation of that fundamental instrument upon which all the powers of the government rest. This is particularly true of a revenue act of congress. The provisions of such an act should not be lightly or inadvisedly set aside, although, if they be plainly antagonistic to the Constitution it is the duty of the court to so declare." Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 514, 19 S.Ct. 522, 525, 43 L.Ed. 786.

Much greater has been the unwillingness of courts of first instance to strike down acts of Congress. Out of an awareness of the serious nature of such a procedure and out of a concern for uniform enforcement of federal laws has grown more than a rule of law: a sound and well-defined public policy has been established among the United States District Courts of resolving every intendment in favor of acts of Congress and refraining from nullification of such acts unless some plain mandate of the constitution is clearly shown to have been violated.1 Thus it has been said: "* * * before pronouncing an act of Congress unconstitutional and unenforceable, a District Court should be even more carefully deliberate and firmly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of its unconstitutionality than would be necessary on the part of a Circuit Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court of the United States. A District Court is a one-man court. There are numerous District Courts; and the result of conflicting views of individual District judges as to the unconstitutionality of acts of Congress leads to a frequently confusing status in the enforceability of national laws. Wherefore District Courts should be most reluctant to pronounce acts of Congress void. The soundest public policy is conserved when District Courts do not interfere with the operation of acts of Congress. Pending the final decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, nullification of laws in some districts and their enforcement in other districts leads to much confusion and inequality."2

To this we would add that a still greater duty of self-restraint rests on courts of limited jurisdiction like the Municipal Court. Such a court should not challenge the right of Congress to make a law unless unconstitutionality is glaring and it is manifest that Congress has exceeded its grant of power.

In applying this test we note first that the wagering tax act here involved has been held valid by a three-judge federal court in this jurisdiction. Combs v. Snyder, D.C. D.C., 101 F.Supp. 531, affirmed without opinion, 342 U.S. 939, 72 S.Ct. 562, 96 L.Ed. 698. Six other district courts have likewise upheld the constitutionality of the same act.3 And in the only case in which a district court held the act invalid there resulted a reversal by the Supreme Court. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, rehearing denied 345 U.S. 931, 73 S.Ct. 778. There the highest Court held that the act did not prescribe a penalty or require self-incriminating revelations in violation of the fifth amendment.

Discussing the Kahriger decision at length in his opinion, the trial judge found the, present case distinguishable. He held compliance with the act would involve self-incrimination, because registration is required only after wagers have been accepted. Therefore, he said, since District of Columbia laws make the acceptance of wagers a crime,4 and since such laws are federal laws, one who registers under the act, giving his name and address, and his employees' names and addresses, would necessarily be giving evidence tending to incriminate himself of a violation of federal law. This position is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in the Kahriger case, where it was said: "Since appellee...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Ruddler v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 9 Junio 1954
    ...policy the trial court would have been required to rule in favor of the constitutionality of the Gwinn Amendment. See United States v. Lewis, D.C.Mun.App., 100 A.2d 40, 41, where we repeated the well established rule that courts of first instance should resolve every intendment in favor of ......
  • Hicks v. District of Columbia
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 5 Febrero 1964
    ...dope peddling or gambling. Affirmed. 1. Henderson v. E Street Theatre Corporation, D.C.Mun.App., 63 A.2d 649 (1948). 2. United States v. Lewis, D.C.Mun.App., 100 A.2d 40, aff'd 94 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 214 F.2d 853, aff'd 348 U.S. 419, 75 S.Ct. 415, 99 L.Ed. 475 3. Rogers v. District of Columbi......
  • Lewis v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 14 Marzo 1955
    ...that section. The Municipal Court sustained a motion to dismiss the information. The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District reversed, 100 A.2d 40, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Municipal Court of Appeals. 94 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 214 F.2d 853. We granted certiorari. 348 U.S......
  • Lewis v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 10 Junio 1954
    ...§ 3290 (1952), on the business of accepting wagers, is constitutional in its application to the District of Columbia. United States v. Lewis, D.C.Mun.App.1953, 100 A.2d 40. That decision is clearly correct, in view of United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754, rehea......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT