United States v. Liberisther
Decision Date | 30 July 2012 |
Docket Number | Non–Argument Calendar.,No. 12–10243,12–10243,n–Argument Calendar. |
Citation | 688 F.3d 1198,23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1343 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Smiti LIBERSE, a.k.a. Smiti Liberisther, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kathleen Mary Salyer, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Anne Ruth Schultz, U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, Julia J. Vaglienti, U.S. Atty., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Smiti Liberse, Miami, FL, pro se.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before CARNES, HULL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
This is the third decision we have issued in the past month concerning the application of Amendments 750 and 759 to the sentencing guidelines and the scope of a district court's authority to reduce a defendant's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In the first two decisions, we held that those amendments did not authorize a court to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) if the defendant's guidelines range remained the statutory mandatory minimum after the amendments or if the guidelines range was otherwise not affected by the amendments. SeeUnited States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1206–08, 2012 WL 2814303, at *3–4 (11th Cir.2012) (statutory mandatory minimum); United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1320–21, 2012 WL 2866265, at *2–3 (11th Cir.2012) ( ). Our decisions in Glover and Lawson establish that “a court cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that case.” Glover, 686 F.3d at 1206, 2012 WL 2814303, at *3.
This appeal raises a different issue because the pro se appellant's original guidelines range of 121 to 151 months was above, and thus not affected by, the applicable statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. As a result, Amendments 750 and 759 would reduce his guidelines range. For those reasons, § 3582(c)(2) gives the district court authority to reduce the sentence in its discretion. Because the court believed it lacked that authority, we vacate its order denying the motion for resentencing and remand for the court to determine whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence.
In 2006, Smiti Liberse was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. Liberse's presentence investigation report held him accountable for at least 50, but less than 150, grams of crack cocaine. The offense carried a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years (or 120 months) imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006). Applying the 2005 sentencing guidelines, the PSR set his base offense level at 32. SeeUnited States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(4) (Nov. 2005). He received a 3–level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, making his total offense level 29. With a criminal history category of IV, his guidelines range was 121 to 151 months imprisonment. Although Liberse was subject to a 120–month statutory mandatory minimum, that mandatory minimum did not affect the calculation of his guidelines range because it was less than the 121–month bottom of the range. SeeU.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (); id.§ 5G1.1(c) ().
The district court sentenced Liberse to 121 months imprisonment, the bottom of his guidelines range. The government later filed a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) motion to reduce Liberse's sentence based on his substantial assistance to the government. The district court granted that motion and reduced his sentence to 97 months, below his guidelines range and below the statutory mandatory minimum. See18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 ().
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372, which “increased the drug amounts triggering mandatory minimums for crack trafficking offenses from 5 grams to 28 grams in respect to the 5–year minimum and from 50 grams to 280 grams in respect to the 10–year minimum,” Dorsey v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2329, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012); see21 U.S.C. § 841. “[T]he Fair Sentencing Act instructed the Commission to ‘make such conforming amendments to the Federal sentencing guidelines as the Commission determines necessary to achieve consistency with other guideline provisions and applicable law.’ ” Dorsey, 132 S.Ct. at 2329 (quoting Fair Sentencing Act § 8(2), 124 Stat. at 2374). The Sentencing Commission then promulgated Amendment 750 to the guidelines, which revised the crack cocaine quantity tables listed in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), to comply with the Fair Sentencing Act's instructions. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 750 (Nov. 2011). The Commission made Amendment 750 retroactively applicable by Amendment 759. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 759 (Nov. 2011).
In light of those developments, Liberse filed a pro se motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence, contending that Amendment 750 to the sentencing guidelines had lowered his guidelines range to 70 to 87 months imprisonment. The district court denied the motion. The court reasoned that because Liberse was originally sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act went into effect, he was subject to the same 120–month statutory mandatory minimum that he had been when he was originally sentenced. And because “[t]he Sentencing Commission has no authority to alter a statutory mandatory penalty,” the district court concluded that it lacked authority to reduce Liberse's sentence. He contends that the district court does have authority to reduce his sentence, arguing that Amendment 750 lowered his guidelines range to 70 to 87 months in prison.1
“As a general rule, district courts may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed ....” United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir.2008). There is an “exception ... for a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). When that has happened, “the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Williams, 549 F.3d at 1339 (quotation marks and alteration omitted); accord18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
A court, however, “cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that case.” Glover, 686 F.3d at 1206, 2012 WL 2814303, at *3. We have explained that Id. For that reason, “a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction to consider a § 3582(c)(2) motion, even when an amendment would lower the defendant's otherwise-applicable Guidelines sentencing range,” if the defendant's guidelines range was, and remains, the statutory mandatory minimum under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (Nov. 2011). Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Mills, 613 F.3d 1070, 1077–78 (11th Cir.2010); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) ().
When a retroactively applicable guidelines amendment lowers the guidelines range in a case, a district court usually may not reduce a defendant's sentence to a term below the amended guidelines range. SeeU.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (Nov. 2011). But there is an exception. Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) of the sentencing guidelines, as revised by Amendment 759, states:
Exception for Substantial Assistance.—If the term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities, a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range determined under subdivision (1) of this subsection may be appropriate.
Id.§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). Expressly included within this exception are government substantial assistance motions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or Rule 35(b), like the one the government filed in Liberse's case. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 3.
The government contends that Liberse was sentenced based on the 120–month statutory mandatory minimum, even though he received a Rule 35(b) substantial assistance reduction. So, according to the government, the district court lacks authority to reduce Liberse's sentence because Amendment 750 did not lower his applicable guidelines range. See id.§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); see also United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.2008) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial- United States v. John Doe
- United States v. Anderson
- United States v. Anderson
-
United States v. Anderson
...generally, district courts do not have jurisdiction to modify a sentence once it has been imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Liberse, 688 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.2012). However, he argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) creates a few exceptions to this rule, which grant district courts the aut......